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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses the theoretical framework developed by John 
Kingdon to analyse, from the perspective of the Commonwealth 
government, the problems, policy solutions and political context that led 
to the opening of three mental health policy windows in Australia: the 
adoption of Australia's National Mental Health Policy and first National 
Mental Health Plan in 1992, the adoption of the Second National Mental 
Health Plan in 1998 and the adoption of the Council of Australian 
Governments' National Mental Health Action Plan in 2006.
Data was assembled from four sources: firstly political party 
documents, ministerial speeches, Parliamentary debates and 
government documents; secondly a systematic review of literature 
published in academic journals; thirdly interviews with key informants; 
and fourthly my own observations as an expert key participant in mental 
health reform. From a thematic analysis of data from the first three 
sources five themes emerged that describe the issues shaping the 
mental health policy debates over the twenty year period covered by the 
thesis. These themes are human rights and community attitudes, 
community need, service structures, service quality and effectiveness, 
and resources.
For each of the periods that led up to the opening of the policy 
windows in 1992, 1998 and 2006, the problems confronting the 
Commonwealth government and the policy solutions proposed were 
identified in each of the five thematic areas. The political response that 
occurred at each time is also discussed. For each policy window a set of 
defined problems and policy solutions, specific to that window, were 
identified. While taking action suited the political agenda of the 
government, each occasion was also associated with a highly publicised 
mental health issue that had dominated the media and demanded a 
policy response.
While mental health waxed and waned as a policy priority over
the twenty years covered by the thesis, it became progressively more 
im portant during this period w ith increasing engagement by 
governm ent, civil society and policy entrepreneurs. This increasing 
focus has been influenced by high profile events g iven w ide media 
coverage. The in itia l focus on im prov ing  services for people with 
severe mental illness broadened to include increased access to 
treatm ent fo r those with more common mental disorders and the need 
fo r population wide interventions including a focus on prevention and 
health prom otion. The policy space in mental health became much 
more contested with multiple agendas within mental health competing 
for government attention.
Because the Kingdon model was used to organise the information 
collected it could not be used to also validate the model. However it was 
not difficult to find, for each policy window, clear problems, policy 
solutions and a political context within which the opening of the window 
occurred. The events shaping the political stream were largely 
independent of those shaping the problem and policy streams, which 
themselves were not independent of each other. In most cases, the 
individuals who had identified the problems were also promoting and 
advocating policy solutions to those problems. While the Kingdon model 
establishes a preconfigured cyclical dynamic and does not predict when 
a policy window might open, it did provide a useful framework for 
identifying and explaining factors important in mental health policy 
development and adoption.
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CHAPTER 1 - introduction
This thesis is about national mental health policy in Australia during the 
twenty years from 1988 to 2008. Specifically it is about the adoption of 
new policy directions by the Commonwealth government during this 
period. During those twenty years I worked in the mental health field as 
a clinician, as a director of mental health for a State government and for 
the Commonwealth government in Australia, for an international 
development bank and as an academic. Throughout this twenty year 
period I was involved in mental health policy development and 
implementation. At first I focused on the content of policy and how I 
thought service direction should be reformed to achieve better outcomes 
for patients. The perspectives I gained in these multiple roles have 
afforded me many opportunities to observe that the content of policy 
adopted by governments, and the tim ing of its adoption, often appears 
disconnected from the problems being experienced by patients and the 
community and from possible technical solutions. I therefore became 
increasingly interested in understanding why governments adopted 
certain policies and not others and this interest formed the basis for 
undertaking the research contained in this thesis.
Each wave of mental health policy development in Australia over 
the twenty years being studied was both applauded and criticised by 
different stakeholders, with escalating public scrutiny and political 
attention being paid to the area of mental health. The public debate 
preceding each major policy initiative was one of mental health care 
being in crisis due to failures of policy direction and/or implementation. 
This thesis analyses the three main waves of mental health policy 
development during the period, provides an explanation of how and why 
the Commonwealth government adopted the policy directions it did at 
the time and draws implications for policy development from an 
understanding of the actions of government in this sector.
Mental health policy aims to improve the mental health of the
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population and reduce the impact of mental illness on individuals in the 
community. Mental illness is a leading cause of health related disability 
(Begg et al. 2008) and a global health challenge (Collins et al. 2011). 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has estimated that around 
20% of Australians experience a mental illness in a given year and many 
Australians with a mental illness do not receive treatm ent (ABS 2008). 
Mental illness has a significant effect on the family of those with mental 
illness and a substantial impact on the wider community and the 
economy through costs attributed to the health and social welfare 
system and loss of productivity in the workplace (Hilton et al. 2010).
There have been international as well as national calls to enhance 
services for people with mental illness (Chisholm et al. 2007, Rosenberg, 
Hickie and Mendoza 2009) and agencies such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) have recommended improved policy and planning 
in the delivery of mental health services (WHO 2005b). Most of the 
mental health policy and planning literature, both in Australia and 
internationally, has focused on the content of policy and policy 
implementation. Much less attention has been paid to understanding the 
factors that determine how and why policy is formulated and adopted by 
governments, the focus of the thesis applied to the Australian federal 
context.
For the purposes of the thesis, mental health services are defined 
as those services which aim to prevent or treat mental illness as defined 
in internationally accepted medical classification systems (for example, 
the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual or 
the WHO International Classification o f Diseases). The terms mental 
illness and mental disorders are used synonymously and, for the 
purposes of this thesis, exclude alcohol and drug use disorders and 
intellectual disability, both of which followed different policy trajectories. 
Services for the latter are mostly provided separately from mental 
health services in Australia. In addition the boundary between mental 
health services and aged care services is often blurred. This thesis does 
not specifically address aged care policy or services. The provision of
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care to people with dementia is predominantly within aged care 
services. It also does not address in detail, policy areas that are specific 
to a section of the population who may have special needs (for example 
Indigenous Australians).
Mental health services have been changing in Australia since the 
establishment of the first psychiatric hospital at Castle Hill in Sydney in 
1811. Patients with mental illness were, for the most part, treated in 
hospitals separate from general hospitals that treated other medical 
conditions. In the public sector, both the general and the psychiatric 
hospitals were the responsibility of State governments and, to the 
extent that it was actually articulated, mental health policy was the 
responsibility of individual State and Territory governments.
Prior to 1946 the Commonwealth government had no involvement 
in the provision of mental health services. From 1946 onwards 
Commonwealth legislation allowed benefits to be paid to the State 
governments for patients in public hospitals. This could have included 
psychiatric patients if they had been admitted to those hospitals. In 
1948 Commonwealth legislation was extended to provide for 
Commonwealth benefits to be paid for patients in stand-alone 
psychiatric hospitals. In 1955 the Commonwealth government stopped 
paying per diem patient benefits and instead provided funding to the 
State governments for capital works programs to establish additional 
bed capacity in State psychiatric hospitals. This funding continued until 
the introduction of the Medibank Scheme, Australia's first universal 
health insurance scheme, in 1975. The Medibank Scheme provided for 
funding from the Commonwealth government to the State and Territory 
governments to assist in the provision of services in general hospitals 
but separate psychiatric hospitals were excluded from this arrangement. 
Commonwealth funding was also provided for community health 
services which in many States, especially Victoria, included mental 
health service provision. These forerunners of community based mental 
health service delivery started to build a critical mass of clinical 
expertise and demonstrated the viability of community-based care.
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In the 1980s the Commonwealth government began to reconsider 
its involvement in mental health services delivered by the State and 
Territory governments. In 1984 the Royal Australian and New Zealand 
College of Psychiatrists (RANZCP) and the Australian National Mental 
Health Association (ANAMH) petitioned the Commonwealth government 
to develop a national mental health policy. In March 1991 Australian 
Health Ministers released the report Mental Health: Statement o f Rights 
and Responsibilities (Australian Health Ministers 1991) and in April 1992 
Australia's first National Mental Health Policy: Joint Statement by the 
Health Ministers o f the Commonwealth, States and Territories o f 
Australia (1992b) and the first five-year National Mental Health Plan 
Endorsed by Health Ministers Subject to Commonwealth Financial 
Contribution (1992a) were adopted by the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory governments. These three documents, together with Schedule 
F of the 1993-98 Medicare Agreements, comprised the National Mental 
Health Strategy (Department of Health and Ageing n.d.). In 1996 
mental health was made a national health priority area along with 
cardiovascular health, cancer and injury prevention. Since then mental 
health has been a prominent health and social policy issue for 
governments.
From the adoption of the National Mental Health Policy in 1992 
onward there were periodic changes in policy direction and these 
dictated cycles of service reform. Each cycle lasted for five years, with 
the policy directions detailed in a national mental health plan signed by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory health ministers. Each national 
mental health plan corresponded, and ran concurrently, with 
Commonwealth/State Health Care Agreements; 1993-98 (the first plan), 
1998-2003 (the second plan) and 2003-08 (the third plan). The focus of 
the first plan was on reform of services for people with severe mental 
illness, primarily specialist hospital and community treatm ent services. 
In the second plan, Commonwealth attention shifted to mental health 
promotion, illness prevention and early intervention in primary health 
care. An ambitious attem pt to encompass the policy priorities of the first
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two plans in the third plan illustrated the inherent danger of attempting 
to be ali things to all stakeholders, as available resources were diluted 
and the implementation of plan struggled to gain traction. In part as a 
result of this, there was widespread disillusionment among stakeholders, 
and in response the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 2006 
endorsed a whole of government National Action Plan on Mental Health 
2006-2011 (COAG 2006b) which superseded the third National Mental 
Health Plan 2003-08 (Australian Health Ministers 2003), making it less 
relevant from a Commonwealth perspective (Rosenberg 2011). However 
the COAG National Action Plan on Mental Health was basically a list of 
areas in which each jurisdiction would independently commit funding, 
compared to the three preceding national mental health plans which 
were set agendas for collaborative action in areas where combined effort 
was required as well as priorities that could be pursued by each 
jurisdiction independently.
This thesis explores the twenty years of mental health policy and 
service reform in Australia, from 1998 when the Commonwealth 
government actively began to consider having a policy position on 
mental health to 2008, the year when the third national plan ended. This 
twenty year period is considered in three parts: 1988 to 1996, the years 
of the Hawke-Keating governments (1983-96) up to 1996, the year 
when the Howard Coalition government was elected; 1996 to 2003, the 
year when the Second National Mental Health Plan ended; and 2003 to 
2008, two years after the adoption of the COAG National Action Plan on 
Mental Health and the year when the third National Mental Health Plan 
ended. Each of these time periods saw escalating stakeholder activity 
accompanied by public and media attention leading to the opening of a 
policy window with governments adopting a national mental health plan, 
reflected in the corresponding Commonwealth/State and Territory 
Health Care Agreements.
My analysis concentrates on the perspective of one jurisdiction; 
the Commonwealth government. This is not to suggest that other 
stakeholders, such as State and Territory governments, professional
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organisations, private providers and consumer and carer groups were 
not important in advancing the policy agendas. However my aim is to 
explore why the Commonwealth government became involved in 
national mental health policy development and service reform and how 
and why the Commonwealth government's policy direction changed over 
time. The twenty year tim e-fram e allows consideration of policy 
development and adoption under governments of different political 
philosophies. In this thesis, I describe many of the areas of reform 
undertaken during this period but it is not my intention to provide a 
comprehensive account of all areas of reform.
In that twenty year period there were three major changes in 
mental health policy referred to in the thesis as 'policy windows', 
borrowing the term from John Kingdon as discussed below. The first was 
when the Commonwealth Labor government became involved in and 
adopted a national mental health policy for the first time. The second 
was the change in policy direction by a newly elected Liberal-National 
Coalition government with the adoption of the second plan. The third 
was when mental health policy reached a political threshold for it to be 
considered by COAG in 2006. The latter was widely perceived to be a 
more decisive political development than the adoption of the third plan 
in 2003 which was, as noted earlier, essentially a continuation of the 
directions in the first and second plans and not seen to be 
groundbreaking. To analyse this trajectory, three specific research 
questions are posed. These are:
1. What led the Commonwealth Labor government to adopt 
Australia's first National Mental Health Policy and first plan in 
1992?
2. What led the Commonwealth Coalition government to adopt the 
second plan in 1998?
3. What led the Commonwealth Coalition government to adopt the 
COAG National Action Plan on Mental Health in 2006?
These questions focus attention on the initiating and authorising 
role of Commonwealth government. To answer these questions, I
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analysed information from four sources.
First, I reviewed primary data sources including political party 
documents, ministerial speeches, information from Parliamentary 
debates (House of Representatives and Senate Hansard) and 
government documents (e.g. policy documents, evaluation reports of 
the national mental health plans and documents held by the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing).
Second, I conducted a systematic review of secondary sources, 
mainly literature published in academic journals, using a standard 
methodology for systematic literature review.
Third, I conducted interviews with key informants representing 
three groups: politicians and their advisors, government officials, and 
mental health stakeholders from the community (technical experts and 
advocates).
The fourth source of information is my own observations as an 
expert key participant in mental health reform.
To understand the factors which influenced the Commonwealth 
government's consideration of mental health policy at these three time 
points I apply the theoretical framework developed by John Kingdon 
(1984, [1995] 2003). Kingdon described three major streams, problem 
recognition, policy formulation and politics, operating independently in 
any area of interest to the public and government. Using this 
framework, he describes how various problems are identified and come 
to the attention of government. He further describes how a community 
of policy specialists generate proposals which, when coupled with the 
identification of problems, identify a range of solutions. Thirdly Kingdon 
employs the model to describe a political stream in which events and 
concepts such as national mood, electoral changes and political 
opportunism connect with an emergent policy solution which is attached 
to an identified problem, opening a window for action by a government.
In applying the Kingdon framework to the thesis topic, I identify 
the extent to which the model adequately explains the data and also 
identify the areas where the model is inadequate; i.e. where the data is
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inconsistent with and does not fit the model.
The limitations of the thesis relate primarily to the lim itations of 
the data sources. Specifically, there are two areas where the data 
sources are most problematic. Political decisions about adopting certain 
policy positions are often made in confidential meetings (for example, 
Cabinet meetings). As of 2013, access to Cabinet records is available up 
to and including 1985, three years before the start of period under 
study. Secondly, while I have chosen key informants so as to provide 
representation across the major stakeholders of the policy area, I 
cannot guarantee that the key informants interviewed held positions and 
views that are representative of that stakeholder sector.
Another limitation relates to my own potential bias. I am not an 
independent observer of the national mental health policy and reform 
process, but rather have been involved at senior government official and 
advisory levels, as discussed in Chapter 3. The influence of my 
perceptions on areas such as the thematic analysis is therefore a source 
of potential bias, although efforts were made to overcome this by having 
the coding of the themes independently confirmed by a research 
assistant.
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
In Chapter 2 I define how the term public policy is used and 
provide a brief overview of a number of different models of policy­
making with a focus on the policy cycle model, specifically where 
problem identification and political decision sit within the cycle as these 
are the most relevant to the thesis. To address in more detail how and 
why a particular policy is developed and adopted I discuss the Kingdon 
model of problem, policy and politics streams and policy windows.
In Chapter 3 I provide a brief review of the mental health policy 
literature and a summary of the mental health policy situation in key 
OECD countries and in developing countries.
In Chapter 4 I describe in detail the methodology used in the 
thesis. Four data sources were used to collate information necessary to 
address the research question. The first was a review of primary source
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documents including Parliamentary proceedings as recorded in Hansard; 
the second a review of secondary source documents, for example 
published academic literature; and third, interviews with key informants 
and fourth, information I have obtained as an expert key participant. 
The data retrieved from the first three sources was subjected to 
thematic analysis from which five themes emerged that describe the 
issues that shaped the mental health policy debates over the twenty 
year period covered by the thesis. These themes are human rights and 
community attitudes, community need, service structures, service 
quality and effectiveness and resources.
In Chapter 5 I describe the mental health service context within 
which the twenty year period of analysis takes place. This includes the 
historical context summarising the development of mental health 
services internationally and a more detailed overview of mental health 
services in Australia before 1988.
In the next three chapters I describe, for each of the three 
periods of major policy change (1988-96; 1996-2003; and 2003-08), 
the problems identified as confronting the Commonwealth government, 
the policy solutions proposed in each of the five thematic areas and the 
political response that occurred at that time.
In Chapter 6 I focus on the years 1988 to 1996. I describe, for 
each of the five thematic areas, the problems that were identified in the 
data sources as confronting the Labor government, the policy solutions 
being proposed and the political response by the government with 
specific attention to the factors which influenced the decision to adopt a 
national mental health policy and plan in 1992. In this chapter I 
conclude with a discussion of mental health reform undertaken from 
1993 to 1996.
In Chapter 7 I focus on the years 1996 to 2003. I describe, for 
each of the five thematic areas, the problems that were identified in the 
data sources as confronting the new Coalition government, the policy 
solutions being proposed and the political response by the government 
with specific attention to the factors which influenced the decision to
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adopt the Second National Mental Health Plan in 1998. In this chapter I 
conclude with a discussion of mental health reform undertaken from 
1996 to 2003.
In Chapter 8 I focus on the years 2003 to 2008. I describe, for 
each of the five thematic areas, the problems that were identified in the 
data sources as confronting the Coalition government, the policy 
solutions being proposed and the political response by the government 
with specific attention to the factors which influenced the decision to 
adopt the COAG National Action Plan on Mental Health in 2006. In this 
chapter I conclude with a discussion of mental health reform undertaken 
from 2006 to 2008.
In Chapter 9 I summarise the problems in the mental health 
sector confronting governments in Australia over the twenty year period 
and what policy solutions were proposed to respond to those problems. I 
then discuss the reasons why the Commonwealth government chose a 
particular policy direction on the three occasions of major mental health 
reform during this twenty year period. I describe the similarities and 
differences in the dynamics of each policy window. I examine the extent 
to which the Kingdon model was able to provide a framework for 
understanding policy development and adoption, and identify any 
weakness in the robustness of the model in explaining mental health 
policy changes during these 20 years. Finally I conclude with comments 
about future directions for mental health policy and services.
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CHAPTER 2 - Policy LITERATURE REVIEW
This thesis is a study of policy change and policy reform. This chapter 
will therefore focus on literature that helps to construct an 
understanding of the challenges of explaining these processes. The term 
'policy', when used in the sense of 'public policy', describes government 
actions, government programs, specific decisions taken, and/or the 
political process by which policy is shaped. As its use in non-academic 
discourses has become more frequent, its precise meaning in some 
public discussions has become less clear. A working definition (Dimock, 
Dimock and Fox 1983) for the purposes of this thesis is:
Public policy is deciding at any time and place what objectives and 
substantive measures should be chosen in order to deal with a 
particular problem, issue or innovation.
This review of the public policy and health policy literature 
identifies the contextual issues within which policy development takes 
place, as well as the factors that shape its content and impede or 
facilitate implementation (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007, Baker 
1996, Cochrane and Malone 1999, Gardner 1995, Palmer and Short 
2000, Walt 1994). Many different models of policy-making have been 
proposed and I briefly survey these below.
Ostrom (1986) argued that individuals and organisations are like 
actors in 'action arenas'. She proposed that the focus of institutional 
analysis should be on variables such as participants, positions, 
outcomes, action-outcome linkages, control exercised by the 
participants, and (perceived) costs and benefits to the actors. Ingram et 
al. (1984) described four tasks of institutional analysis: identifying 
actors and their stakes, the resources actors can use to advance their 
interests, the orientations of different decision arenas; and the means 
necessary to overcome institutional impediments. Many policy scholars 
have contributed similar perspectives, essentially taking a systems 
approach (ed. Colebatch 2006), in which policy-making is a process 
characterised by interactions between diverse agendas from which a
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policy direction ultimately emerges.
The punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) 
states that policy change generally occurs only incrementally due to 
constraints imposed by the 'stickiness' of institutional cultures, 
opposition from vested interests, and the bounded rationality of 
individual decision-makers (lim ited by the information they have, the 
cognitive lim itations of the ir minds, and the finite amount of time they 
have to make a decision). According to this model, policy is 
characterised by long periods of stability, punctuated by large but 
infrequent changes brought about by the election of a new government 
or a marked shift in societal opinion.
Other theories of policy change, referred to collectively as policy 
diffusion (or policy transfer) have focused on how innovations that exist 
in one institution are adopted by another institution (Berry and Berry 
2007). These theories have evolved from an initial focus on variations 
over time to a more recent study of mechanisms in channels of diffusion 
such as emulation, learning or coercion (Gilardi 2010, Jordana, Levi-Faur 
and Fernandez-i-Marin 2011).
Moore (1995) advocated a value-adding approach to 
understanding policy-making in which the policy world is organised by 
incorporating new ideas that enhance public value, analogous to the 
growth of shareholder value in public companies (but acknowledging 
that public policy value has characteristics that distinguish it from 
private sector concepts of value).
Another approach is that of risk uncertainty management (Boin et 
al. 2005, Perrow 1984) which views policy-making as the management 
of risk and crisis. This model acknowledges that policy development 
often takes place with insufficient information and within serious time 
constraints. In attempting to achieve the ir objectives, policy-makers try  
to establish order in an environment which is unpredictable, high-risk 
and crisis-driven.
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) described a 'garbage can 
approach' to policy-making that suggests:
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Organisations can be viewed for some purposes as 
collections of choices looking for problems, issues and 
feelings looking for decision situations in which they might 
be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be 
an answer, and decision-makers looking for work.
Burch and Wood (1989) proposed a model in which government 
works like a firm, taking private and public resources and producing 
goods and services, rules and regulations and transfer payments as 
policy outputs. Simeon (1976) proposed a model in which policy 
development is a 'funnel of causality'. At the wide end or mouth of the 
funnel, policy options seem more amenable to social and economic 
imperatives. As the funnel narrows, remaining options are those that 
promise to address issues perceived as immediate and urgent. At the 
narrowest end of the funnel, those issues of immediate relevance to the 
policy being considered are all that matter.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) propose an 'advocacy coalition 
framework', which describes policy-making as arising from the 
negotiation between government and interest groups. In this model, the 
interaction between a coalition of interested stakeholders, policy-makers 
and political institutions (working together as a policy community) 
develop an agreed solution to a particular problem. Initially, a shared 
understanding or conceptualisation of the problem is necessary and 
compromise is required to arrive at the solution.
All models are imperfect and each has its limitations. For the 
purposes of this thesis I have assumed that while policy change tends to 
be cyclical, identifiable events can be described in the process. Despite 
the contextual complexities, it is useful to describe policy development 
via a sequence of tasks which are deliberate and explicit. This 
understanding attempts to overcome the 'irrationality' of politics.
Althaus, Bridgman and Davis (2007) use the policy cycle as an 
explanatory tool. They note that as early as 1951 Harold Lasswell 
characterised policy-making as a sequence of steps, an approach later 
writers modified (for example Anderson 2005). They acknowledge the
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risk that an over-reliance on a cyclical view to explain policy outcomes 
may impose (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007, 36):
... too great a neatness on policy-making, renowned for 
complexity and discontinuity rather than the relentlessly 
logical unfolding implied ....
1. Problem Identification  in the Policy Cycle
Althaus, Bridgman and Davis (2007) have identified eight steps in the 
policy cycle (see Error! Reference source not found.), beginning with 
issue identification, then proceeding through policy analysis using policy 
instruments and consultation to coordinate decision-making, 
implementation and evaluation.
Figure 1: The A ustra lian  Policy Cycle
cooniimtkm
pokey instruments
TH© A u s tra lian  p o licy  cycle
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The public policy cycle has been well documented and health 
policy analysis is becoming an important area of academic research 
(Walt et al. 2008). Within the health policy literature a similar five-part 
policy cycle has been described (Roberts et al. 2003). This policy cycle 
collapses some of the steps described by Althaus et al. The next part of 
this chapter briefly discusses the five steps of the policy cycle as 
described by Reich (1996): problem identification; option development; 
political decision; implementation; and evaluation. The stages of 
problem identification and political decision as described by Roberts and 
colleagues (2003) are the focus of this thesis and are considered in 
more detail, below. Examples applicable to mental health policy are 
provided.
1.1 Problem Identification
As a starting point for an understanding of what shapes policy, it is 
important to clearly identify the real or perceived problems that the 
policy response is intended to address. All governments have some kind 
of policy agenda which 'represents the narrowing of an infinite array of 
possible policy problems to those few that command government 
interest' (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007, 43). The identification of 
any particular problem as needing policy attention occurs within the 
wider social, economic, historical and political environment. My interest 
in this thesis is to understand how the particular issue of mental health 
becomes significant enough to reach the threshold for policy attention.
To understand the factors that create the momentum for an issue 
to reach the threshold for attention requires an understanding of the 
nature of the policy problem and what drivers are behind the agenda. 
'Issue drivers', whether they are external to government or internal to 
political parties in government, constantly produce topics to be 
suggested for policy attention. Althaus et al. (2007) have identified 
examples of external drivers as economic forces, media attention, 
opinion polls, legal decisions (for example, High Court judgments), 
international relations (for example, refugee arrivals), technological
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advances (fo r example, the internet and GST) and demographic shifts 
(for example, population growth).
They described factors within government that also contribute to 
the identification of issues by policy specialists, such as monitoring 
responses to similar policy issues in other jurisdictions, monitoring local 
'w icked' problems and intractable issues of perennial government 
concern, and coordination of responses to policy issues across 
governments and between government institutions.
Althaus et al. (2007) have suggested that, for an issue to attract 
policy attention, four conditions need to be met:
1. There needs to be agreement on the existence of a problem by 
significant interest groups and individuals. They must agree that 
the current situation is unacceptable and that something different 
is needed;
2. A prospect of a solution is necessary. Some intractable problems 
always need to be responded to, but those with a plausible 
resolution are more likely to attract political support;
3. The problem needs to be appropriate and worthy of support. The 
opportunity cost of investment in the response to the problem 
needs to be weighed in the political process. Consideration needs 
to be given as to whether there would be a better (or more 
politically rewarding) response if resources were allocated to a 
different area; and
4. The problem needs to be acceptable within the ideological 
framework of the government in power. Some problems would 
not be ones which governments of a particular political persuasion 
would wish to deal with.
Perspective matters here, as what is thought of as a problem by 
one group may not perceived that way by another. A problem that those 
working in health services think is deserving of government attention 
may not necessarily appear prominent from a government perspective. 
For example, the fact that the m ajority of Australians with depression do
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not receive treatment (Andrews, Henderson and Hall 2000) might not be 
a priority for busy health providers who already have enough patients 
wanting to see them, but the general population is likely to take a 
different view. Governments therefore may see improving access to care 
as a priority needing policy attention.
Given the many issues competing for policy attention by 
government, the question becomes how particular issues are selected 
for policy attention. In their review of the health policy literature, 
Roberts and colleagues highlighted mechanisms that determine which 
issues receive selective attention (Roberts et al. 2003). First, cultural 
and social attitudes act as filters that selectively focus on or divert public 
and government attention from issues. If a particular problem does not 
evoke public sympathy or is seen as less worthy, attention is diverted to 
other, more 'meaningful' problems. In mental health this was the case 
with the issues of poor physical conditions, poor quality of care, and 
abuses inflicted on patients in psychiatric hospitals during much of the 
last century. For decades these circumstances were not seen as 
warranting intervention (Upton 1983). A change in societal attitudes 
saw a human rights perspective expanded to include individuals with 
mental illness. This legitimised a change in the political perception of the 
problem and contributed to government action in the form of a major 
policy shift towards de-institutionalisation, leading to the closure of 
many wards and hospitals and an impetus to improve conditions in 
those that remained.
As societal attitudes shifted again, de-institutionalisation came to 
be seen as a problem to do with the welfare of people with mental 
illness living in the community. The focus for societal attention had 
changed from concerns about patient abuse and neglect in institutions 
to community safety and the ’right’ to treatment for people with mental 
illness living in the community (Whiteford 2001). A similar change in 
societal norms and attitudes has underpinned fluctuations in the 
threshold for involuntary detention seen in mental health legislation 
(Salize and Dressing 2004). When societal focus is on individual liberty,
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the threshold for involuntary detention and treatm ent is higher. When 
the focus is on the 'righ t to treatm ent' and public safety, the threshold 
for involuntary detention and treatm ent is lower.
The second mechanism relates to the role of 'issue 
entrepreneurs'. Roberts et al. (2003) describe these individuals or 
groups as activists who take up particular issues, and promote them as 
problems needing attention, following the filtration process described 
above which has confirmed them as worthy and meaningful issues. 
These entrepreneurs may be politicians, public servants, professional 
bodies or interest groups within the community. Their motives vary. 
Some act on the basis of a personal conviction about the need to 
improve a particular area. These individuals or groups often have a 
stake in that area. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, a coalition whose 
member groups hold values-based convictions regarding public 
advocacy, including the ANAMH and the RANZCP, acted as issue 
entrepreneurs between 1984 and 1989 to build the momentum for the 
National Mental Health S trategy.
The interaction between the social filtering process and the efforts 
of issue entrepreneurs produces fluctuating patterns in the process of 
problem definition and in this the media play an important role (Miller 
2007). Cobb and Elder (1972) suggested tha t issues most likely to reach 
the threshold for policy attention are those which have mass public 
appeal and this is often expressed through the media. The reporting of 
issues by the media can highlight problems needing attention or create 
the perception of a problem where none really exists. The media focus 
can be captured by scandal and/or personalities. There can be a herd 
mentality when it comes to reporting in the media. Competitive media 
outlets feel compelled to cover a story simply because other outlets are 
doing so. However media interest in an issue can quickly fade following 
a loss of interest by the public and government. There are usually only 
brief windows of opportunity to target policy decision makers. A finite 
issue attention cycle (Downs 1972) exists, especially given the 
susceptibility of governments to the influence of the media.
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Issue entrepreneurs attempt to influence those whom they 
believe can have an impact on the decisions they want made. These are 
usually politicians and their advisers. However Parliamentarians and 
political appointees must have regard to the realities of partisan 
interests, competing factions, public perceptions and power politics in 
their dealings with those acting on conviction. Although they may be 
moved by the convictions of advocates, their interest in the problem is 
affected by their concerns over the attractiveness of proposed solutions, 
party positions, and electoral politics. The balance between these 
motives is often not clear to the advocacy groups, and the willingness of 
politicians to become involved in particular issues can be influenced by 
the electoral cycle, given the ultimate priority for the politician is to be 
re-elected.
It is generally expected that public servants will implement the 
policies of the government of the day. However, most governments do 
not come to power with a detailed action plan for how they will deal with 
every area within each portfolio. Many areas, such as mental health, 
may not be mentioned at all in the party political platform and even 
when they are, detail is usually lacking and there is much room for 
interpretation. Public servants in health departments and related 
government agencies (such as those with responsibility for social 
services, justice, housing, and education programs) undertake most of 
this interpretation. These officials hold the corporate history about 
government programs and prepare submissions with options (and often 
costings of those options) for ministers and governments to consider. 
They can facilitate or impede problem identification (and policy adoption 
and implementation). Given they generally hold the keys to making the 
machinery of government work it is important to understand the role 
they play in having policy considered by the government.
For a national policy to be adopted in a federated system of 
government such as Australia there are added complexities. Agreement 
on a national policy requires its endorsement by the Commonwealth 
government and all State and Territory governments. All (or at least
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most) jurisdictions need to accept that the problem is important enough 
for national policy attention, even before policy solutions start to be 
considered. Issues can become caught in competition between the 
Commonwealth government and the State/Territory governments, which 
may have nothing to do with the problem but which may reflect political 
rivalry, especially when different political parties hold government in 
different jurisdictions.
In health policy there is a long-standing Commonwealth/State 
power struggle for influence. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution 
allocates a very small role for the Commonwealth government in health, 
essentially assigning only quarantine powers to prevent disease entering 
the country. However, the Commonwealth government has gradually 
assumed a more prominent role following the centralisation of income 
tax collection which occurred during World War II. The Commonwealth 
government now raises more revenue than it spends in directly 
delivering services, with the State and Territory governments spending 
more on the services they provide than they can raise through State 
taxes. This so-called vertical fiscal imbalance requires the 
Commonwealth government to transfer money to the State and 
Territory governments for areas such as health. Conditions tied to the 
transfer of these funds allow the Commonwealth government to 
influence or even dictate the direction of health reforms. This state of 
affairs has also allowed the Commonwealth government to subsidise 
major parts of the health system, including primary care, private 
specialist medical services and pharmaceuticals.
1.2 Policy Analysis and the Developm ent of a Policy Option
Once government has agreed that a problem exists and needs to be 
addressed, policy solutions need to be identified and considered. 
Occasionally, the solution to be adopted is largely prescribed. This 
occurs when a political party has made a commitment to take certain 
actions during an election campaign and will not change from this. 
However, this is rare and, when a new government has been elected,
20
solutions to various problems need to be found. How a particular 
solution is chosen among a range of potential options is conceived as 
policy development.
Experts, both within and outside government, in any particular 
policy area will usually propose potential solutions. These solutions can 
be adapted from a consideration of what other jurisdictions or countries 
have chosen to do in response to similar problems. In health where 
rationing of client services is widespread, the need for solutions 
promoting efficiency is a recurrent policy challenge. Industry solutions 
have, for example, been imported by considering health services as a 
production of outputs (for example, a given number of patients treated) 
with a need to improve capacity, quality and equity. In mental health 
this has seen the introduction of routine outcome measures and the 
development of methodologies for cost-effectiveness of mental health 
interventions (Chisholm 2005, Thornicroft et al. 2006).
Whether a policy solution is being imported from another 
jurisdiction, from industry or developed generically, it is necessary for 
government to agree upon and select a proposed solution. Achieving a 
consensus requires the government to consider the possible options and 
choose from among them. Stakeholder consultation allows government 
to determine the position of relevant groups and individuals both inside 
and outside government who are likely to influence the policy choice and 
the success of its implementation (Sturm 1999). Stakeholder analysis 
includes interest group analysis and bureaucratic analysis and has been 
refined to the extent that software now exists to undertake the analysis 
(Reich 1996). Choosing which stakeholders to consult is important, 
because excluding any major group from the process is likely to 
generate resentment and opposition to the policy. It is nearly always 
better to have all stakeholders involved in the consultation process, 
even if it is time-consuming, to build the greatest possible support for 
the policy position.
Broad stakeholder consultation can also assist in determining the 
extent to which a policy solution is politically feasible. The options
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proposed by policy experts and stakeholder consultation with the 
broader community can demonstrate irreconcilable differences and 
impact on the political feasibility of a policy solution. In health, the 
debate about needle exchange programmes is an example (Collins and 
Coates 2000). The scientific data supported the use of such programmes 
but the political view for a long time was that this would be unpopular 
with the electorate. Examples like these demonstrate that the final 
decision to adopt a policy is often a political decision rather than a 
technical or bureaucratic one.
1.3 Reaching a Political Decision
The environment of political decision-making is complex. Factors such as 
the relative power of different people and groupings in the political 
landscape, the views of the constituencies they represent and 
negotiations that need to be made, all impact on the final decision. 
Successfully negotiating a coalition of support from among the various 
players usually involves bargaining and trade-offs. Throughout the 
process of negotiation, the content of a policy solution will usually be 
modified, because compromise is usually necessary to achieve 
consensus.
In trying to arrive at a decision about adopting a policy, politicians 
and their advisors consider the reaction from their constituencies, policy 
experts and the broader community to assess the degree of support the 
policy will have. Estimating the degree of support or otherwise is often 
difficult, especially in the complex environment of health and mental 
health. A policy solution can affect different parts of the system 
differently. I t  may be necessary to make multiple policy changes at the 
same time in order to achieve the desirable outcome. Failure to do this 
can undermine the success of good policy decisions. For example, the 
policy of closing more long-stay hospital beds during the 1980s and 
1990s was undermined by the lack of accommodation for patients 
discharged from the hospitals into the community. The health policy was 
not accompanied by a policy of expanding the availability of community
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housing, the responsibility of a separate government department (e.g. 
the Housing Department) (Whiteford 1994b).
Another component of this complexity is the concentrated costs, 
and power, of certain stakeholder groups such as the medical and 
nursing professions. The potential beneficiaries of a policy, for example 
people with mental disorders, are generally less well-organised and 
influential. The closure of a ward in a psychiatric hospital with the 
savings going to community-based services might generate vocal 
opposition from the staff who are to be affected in the hospital. The 
potential beneficiaries of the community services are less likely to 
coalesce into a strong advocacy group. This imbalance can create 
significant obstacles to having a policy adopted. The formation of a 
stakeholder network attempting to encompass those potentially 
benefiting from policy changes has been used in Australia (via the 
creation of national and State consumer advisory groups) to help 
address this imbalance (Whiteford, Buckingham and Manderscheid 
2002 ) .
To create the necessary support for a policy to be adopted, it can 
be useful to align it with symbols that have strong ideological appeal. 
For example, the policy of de-institutionalisation was accompanied by 
the promotion of treatm ent in the community, rather than hospital, as 
aligned with 'least restrictive care'. The more recent backlash against 
de-institutionalisation has been accompanied by the increased attention 
to accessing hospital care and a promotion of the 'righ t to treatm ent'.
Reframing the explanation around a policy can help ensure 
political adoption. For example the policy position of allowing patients to 
be involuntarily treated under mental health legislation in private 
hospitals as well as public hospitals was initially seen as unsupportable 
because the private sector would receive payment as a result of patients 
being admitted and detained in hospital against their will. With statutory 
safeguards in place, including independent review, the policy 
explanation was reframed to emphasise that a person with mental 
illness, who had chosen and paid for private health insurance, should be
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allowed to remain with the psychiatrist (and hospital) of the ir choice 
even if the ir illness deteriorated to the point where involuntary 
treatm ent was needed. With this reframing, the policy became politically 
acceptable and was adopted in several jurisdictions. Political decision­
making is influenced by the way the policy solution is portrayed 
(Whiteford 2001).
1.4 Policy Im plem entation
Policies can be successfully developed and adopted but implementation 
can still fail. Government options for implementation are limited with 
five main levers available (Lee, Buse and Fustukian 2002, Musgrove 
1996, Palmer and Short 2000, Roberts et al. 2003). These are: 
information; financing; payment; service organisation; and regulation. 
The information system collects and publishes data. The financing 
system determines what resources are available, where these resources 
come from and who has access to them. The payment system 
determines on what terms these resources are made available to 
individuals and organisations. The organisation of the service system 
shapes the distribution of services and how they respond to consumer 
demands. The regulatory system determines the constraints on services, 
for example how providers are trained and registered.
The Commonwealth government used financing and payment 
levers to help drive the implementation of the National Mental Health 
Policy. For example, the first plan detailed not only how the National 
Mental Health Policy would be implemented but came with $135 million 
of specific Commonwealth government funding over 5 years. The 
provision of this funding was through a special schedule (Schedule F) of 
the 1993-98 Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreements. This funding 
was contingent on State and Territory governments not only 
implementing the National Mental Health Policy but maintaining their 
own financial effort in mental health. This was to prevent the 
substitution of new Commonwealth government funding for State and 
Territory government funding (Whiteford 2001).
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The information lever was also used. The Commonwealth, State 
and Territory governments ail committed themselves under the 1993-98 
Medicare Agreements to provide data on their progress in implementing 
the Policy. The data were used to inform a set of 49 national policy 
indicators, first collected for the 1992-93 year and published annually or 
biennially since (Department of Human Services and Health 1994a). 
These national mental health reports have been used by professional 
and community groups and the media as a form of public accountability 
(Lawn et al. 2008).
Policy implementation will be more successful if it has the support 
of the stakeholders who advocated for the policy to be adopted. Forging 
new alliances consolidates support and enhances implementation. In 
mental health such an alignment occurred between governments and 
the Strategic Planning Group for Private Psychiatric Services, now the 
Private Mental Health Alliance (PMHA 2011), established by the 
Australian Medical Association (AMA) and the RANZCP. The private 
psychiatric sector had not been involved in the development of the 1992 
National Mental Health Policy and the establishment of this group was 
seen as a way of forging a new alliance to support policy 
implementation. Likewise the creation of the Mental Health Council of 
Australia (MHCA 2013) resulted, in part, from the need to have a broad- 
based non-government body working with governments to support the 
implementation of the National Mental Health Policy (Whiteford 2001).
Policy implementation requires sustained effort over time. By the 
time of the implementation stage, which usually lasts for many years, 
the political party in power when the policy was adopted may well have 
changed. However, if the coalition of stakeholders remains largely intact 
and there is public expectation of implementation continuity, progress 
should continue. There is however always a risk that new governments, 
which need to have policies which distinguish them from the party they 
replaced, will try  and modify or even abandon implementation. In 
mental health policy, which has tended to attract support across political 
parties, the tendency of successive governments has been to modify
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rather than entirely abandon the established policy direction. Flexibility 
in responding and adapting to emerging issues, which can create 
barriers and opportunities, is essential. At a local level, implementation 
of national policy will also tend to be piecemeal in response to specific 
problems and resources idiosyncratic to the local environment (Garfield 
2009). As is discussed in Chapter 5, the implementation of the first 
National Mental Health Plan provided an example of how an originally 
unforeseen event led to an unplanned enhancement of the resources 
available. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(HREOC) Inquiry into the Rights of Persons with Mental Illness released 
its report in 1993. The report identified the same service deficiencies 
that were addressed in the first plan, but in the face of extensive media 
coverage about these deficiencies, the new Commonwealth Health 
Minister, Senator Graham Richardson, announced additional 
Commonwealth government funding for the first National Mental Health 
Plan released the previous year. Politically it was considered necessary 
to be seen to respond to the HREOC Report. The additional funding 
effectively doubled the Commonwealth government allocation for the 
first plan (Whiteford 2001).
1.5  Evaluation
I f  many polices are not implemented as originally designed, even fewer 
are evaluated. By the time an evaluation is due to be conducted, many 
of the government officials originally involved in the policy development 
will have departed. During the implementation, organisations that 
support the policy may have wilted (or grown), and those who oppose it 
may be stronger. For an evaluation to have credibility, it must be as 
transparent and independent as possible. Ideally this means finding 
sufficient data that allows assessment of the extent to which the 
outcomes of the implementation aligned with the policy intent.
The results of the evaluation should be used to revise and 
improve the policy. In revising policy and implementation plans, it is 
important to be aware that there is often little advocacy for areas that
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have been successfully addressed and a focus on areas that have been 
the subject of criticism. Balance is important and there will always be 
criticism where priority has been given to one area over another. As a 
result, there will be a temptation for an evaluation to advocate a swing 
away from an area tha t has been relatively successful to one which has 
been less so, or to expand the policy agenda to include all areas that are 
being advocated for. While the policy can be broad, it is important to 
ensure that scarce resources necessary for policy implementation 
remain focused on priority areas. I f  the effort is diffuse and resources 
spread too widely, effectiveness will be diluted, with a loss of credibility 
for the policy and its implementation. As is discussed in Chapter 8 this is 
what happened in the national mental health reforms in Australia.
The policy cycle model, whilst providing a useful description of the 
stages through which policy moves, has its lim itations (Althaus, 
Bridgman and Davis 2007, ed. Colebatch 2006). In addition to the 
lim itations that have been discussed, it does not provide an explanation 
as to why a particular policy has developed in a particular way or why it 
was adopted by government. To explore this question this thesis uses 
the explanatory model proposed by Kingdon (1984, [1995] 2003).
2. Kingdon Model of Policy Stream s and W indows
The main area this thesis explores is how issues gain the policy 
attention of governments, and how and why a particular policy response 
(in this thesis using the area of mental health) is developed and 
subsequently adopted by governments. Of the many issues competing 
for the attention of government the thesis examines how the issue of 
mental illness reached the threshold for policy attention, during the 
twenty year period from 1998 to 2008.
In his landmark 1984 publication Agendas, Alternatives and Public 
Policies John Kingdon provided an important theoretical foundation for 
policy-making. He built on the work of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) 
who described organisations as 'organized anarchies'. Their approach 
contradicted those that were based on the assumption that policy-
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making was a rational process, arguing that policy decisions rarely arise 
from deliberate objective consideration of the various alternatives to 
solving a problem. In the ir'garbage can model' Cohen, March and Olsen 
described four separate streams running through 'organized anarchies'. 
These are problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. 
They described each stream as being independent and evolving largely 
unrelated to the others.
The model was adapted by Kingdon and specifically applied to 
government. Kingdon (1984, [1995] 2003) described policy adoption as 
being like natural selection in biology. Agreement on a problem and the 
technical feasibility of a response led to the selection of a small number 
of issues for further policy consideration with many problems, issues and 
possible responses discarded along the way. He identified those topics 
and issues most likely to reach the threshold for government attention 
as:
1. problems in existing programs that are of more interest than new 
problems;
2. issues that are attractive to politicians because of the challenge 
they pose to im portant values;
3. problems that attract unfavourable comparisons with other parts 
of the country or other nations;
4. problems which are attached to an im portant legal or ethical 
principle.
Kingdon ([1995] 2003, 16-7) identified three major streams: 
problem recognition; the formulation and refining of policy proposals; 
and politics. He described the first stream as one where various 
problems are identified and come to the attention of government. In the 
second stream a policy community, usually made up of specialists, 
generate policy proposals which can be coupled with problems to 
identify solutions. The third stream is the political stream where 
concepts such as national mood, electoral changes and political 
opportunism explain behaviour and decision making. When this stream 
connects with a sufficiently prominent problem that has a technically
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satisfactory policy solution, a window for action by a government can be 
opened.
The firs t stream according to the Kingdon model defines problems 
and how they come to the attention of a government. Problems can 
achieve prominence due to new information coming to light or changes 
in indicators used by government (in health such indicators could be 
rates of disease, immunisation rates, or infant mortality rates). What is 
considered new information or significant changes in indicators from a 
scientific perspective are not automatically perceived as a problem by 
government. The interpretation placed on the changes in the indicators 
is what is important. However Kingdon did note that the value of 
indicators is that problems are more likely to be identified if they are 
'countable'.
Within the problem stream Kingdon identified that, even more 
important than new information or changes in indicators, are focusing 
events or crises. He described how these focusing events and crises 
have more impact if they are connected to powerful symbols such as 
equity or human rights. Crises can be focusing events that either 
reinforce a pre-existing perception of a problem or bring a problem to 
light. Kingdon described how the perception of problems can wax and 
wane. They often fade from attention to reappear at a later time.
Kingdon described the difference between a social condition, an 
indicator and a problem. He noted that social conditions, even when 
measured by a relatively objective indicator, become defined as 
problems only when it is believed that something needs to be done 
about them. He described how values, comparisons and categories 
contribute to the translation from conditions into problems. The 
perception that a m atter is appropriate for government action is often a 
value judgm ent that brings a condition into the realm of being seen as a 
problem necessary for attention. He noted that comparisons made 
between governments can often be a reason for the view being taken 
that a m atter needs attention. He also described how categorisation is 
important and the change of an issue from one category to another can
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move a condition into the problem domain.
Kingdon noted problem recognition is not on its own sufficient to 
place a matter on the government agenda. There are many problems 
recognised by government and only a fraction of these are considered 
sufficient for government attention. Kingdon therefore identified two 
other important streams.
The second stream according to the Kingdon model is one that 
generates policy solutions. These are formulated by policy communities, 
composed of specialists in a given policy area such as health. They often 
exist independently of the problem stream. In concurrence with the 
Cohen, March and Olsen 'garbage can' model he described how this 
stream is independent of the problem stream. He described the 
characteristics of the policy communities, noting that when fragmented 
they are less likely to identify a coherent, broadly supported policy. A 
more tightly knit policy community can generate a more representative 
policy solution.
As discussed earlier Kingdon also identified the role of policy 
entrepreneurs and how they advocate for a particular policy solution. He 
also noted how they often have a particular policy position which can 
become a 'solution ... looking for a problem to which it could be 
attached'. This approach by policy entrepreneurs allows them to 
promote their values and to affect policy directions in a manner 
consistent with their philosophical beliefs.
Kingdon noted that political scientists are more familiar with 
concepts of power, influence, pressure and strategy than the ideas in a 
policy solution. He asserts that the power of the ideas in the policy 
solution is as important as other factors in shaping policy. Policy 
solutions are considered more likely to survive if they have both 
technical feasibility and value acceptability.
Kingdon described how a policy community will often produce a 
relatively short list of ideas and how these 'diffuse' through the policy 
communities. For a policy solution to emerge there needs to be an 
awareness of the problem(s) to which the ideas and solutions will be
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connected and agreement in the form of some broad consensus that the 
solutions are the right ones. Policy solutions and ideas then build 
momentum and the chances of a problem from the problem stream 
reaching the threshold for attention is dramatically increased if a policy 
solution is attached to it.
However, a clearly defined problem and a technically sound, 
broadly supported policy solution together are still insufficient for 
governments to act. These need to be connected to the third stream, 
the political stream. Kingdon described this stream as consisting of the 
public mood, pressure group influences and electoral political 
expediency. He described the importance of social movements and 
pressure groups and how they are more successful if well organised and 
well led. They can influence the national mood. Kingdon described how 
changes in government (elections leading to a change of political party 
in power) create opportunities for a change in the public mood with the 
perception that a new government will take action in a number of policy 
areas. He described the importance of consensus building in the politics 
stream and how this is more often the result of bargaining than 
persuasion (the latter being more common in the policy stream).
Finally, Kingdon described how these three streams can come 
together to open a policy window. He described the process of solutions 
being coupled to problems and these in turn being linked with political 
exigencies. Change usually occurs in response to developments both in 
the problem and political streams, not in the policy stream. Sometimes 
a policy window can be opened when a problem is perceived as so 
pressing or important that immediate government action is necessary. 
Often the policy window is opened by an event in the political stream, 
such as a change in government. The important conclusion of Kingdon 
was that while problems and politics by themselves can structure a 
government agenda, the probability of a decision being taken on a 
problem is contingent upon the joining of all three streams (problems, 
policies and politics). The problem needs to be perceived as sufficiently 
important to require action, a solution to that problem supported by a
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policy community must be available and the solution must be politically 
feasible and attractive.
Competition for a place on the policy agenda is fierce and 
opportunities for windows to open are relatively scarce. Kingdon noted 
that there are times in government when policy reform is a priority and 
windows open more frequently, while at other times little reform occurs 
and windows are scarcer. He also described how window opening is 
sometimes predictable (fo r example, at the start of a new term of 
government or in connection with the budget cycle) and other times 
where windows open in what appears to be an unpredictable and 
random way.
When they do open, policy windows rarely stay open for long. 
They can close because of a perception that the problem has been 
addressed or that there is no action capable of addressing the problem, 
or because the crisis which opened the policy window has passed or 
because a change in personnel at the political, bureaucratic or advocacy 
levels has resulted in momentum being lost.
The Kingdon model has been critiqued as being overly vague, and 
failing to arrive at a definitive theory of agenda setting (Durant and 
Diehl 1989, King 1985, Mucciaroni 1992). A major criticism is that the 
model does not generate testable hypotheses (Mucciaroni 1992, 
Robinson and Eller 2010, Zahariadis 2007). This lack of specification 
prevents the use of the Kingdon model as a predictive tool (Zahariadis 
2007).
A key assumption of the model - the independence of the three 
streams of problems, policy and politics - has been questioned by 
several authors, who contend that in reality the streams display varying 
degrees of interdependence (Durant and Diehl 1989, Mucciaroni 1992, 
Zahariadis 2007). The existence of linkages between the streams implies 
that the coupling of the streams is more intentional and strategic than 
Kingdon's model implies (Zahariadis 2007).
The Kingdon model has also been criticised for neglecting the 
importance of historical and structural factors in the decision-making
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process, and underestimating the importance of interests and expert 
networks (Mucciaroni 1992, Weir 1992, Zahariadis 2007, Zahariadis and 
Allen 1995, 763).
Despite these lim itations Kingdon's work on multiple streams was 
considered to be a m ajor theoretical breakthrough in the study of public 
policy (Sabatier 1999). His description of the three streams resonated 
with policy makers. His insight that, at critical points in time, the 
streams could be bought together and open a policy window allowing 
the issue to reach the threshold for policy attention, has been a useful 
organising concept. Robinson and Eller (2010) summarise the Kingdon 
approach:
Only when a prom inent problem  can be linked to a viable 
policy consistent with the national mood at a time when 
elective officials can make a decision will policy emerge 
(emphasis added).
The Kingdon model was originally utilised to empirically study the 
process of healthcare and transportation issues onto the federal agenda 
in the United States (Kingdon [1995] 2003). The model has since been 
used to explain policy formulation in a variety of other fields including 
agricultural policy (Ackrill and Kay 2011); prison privatisation (Culp 
2005); financial reporting policy (Ryan 1998); employment 
discrimination policy (Gates 2010); foreign policy (Mazarr 2007); tax 
reform (Mucciaroni 1992); national identification system policy (Ni and 
Ho 2008); environmental policies (Boscarino 2009, Pralle 2006, Rinfret 
2011); construction standards (Schwartz and McConnell 2009); 
education policy (Robinson and Eller 2010); social security reform 
(Weiner 2007); native affairs, the Canadian Constitution, the nuclear 
industry and capital punishment (Howlett 1998).
I t  has also proved a useful conceptual framework for health policy 
and health reform, including mental health policy, as is further discussed 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 9 (De Vries and Klazinga 2006, 
Guldbrandsson, Bremberg and Back 2005, Guldbrandsson and Fossum 
2009, Hamid and Everett 2007, Kruger 2001, Laraway and Jennings 
2002, Lenton 2008, Ritter and Bammer 2010, Zwi et al. 2011)
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Specifically Kingdon's model has been used to explore the formulation of 
drug and alcohol policy (DiChiara and Gallagher 1994, Howlett 1998, 
Lenton 2004, 2007, 2008, Ritter and Bammer 2010, Schmied-Blackman 
2005, Schwartz and Johnson 2010), drinking water guidelines (Driedger 
and Eyles 2003, Schwartz and McConnell 2009); child health promotion 
measures (Guldbrandsson and Fossum 2009); health insurance reforms 
(Kalu 2005, Kruger 2001, Laraway and Jennings 2002, Sardell and 
Johnson 1998); and health system reforms (Oborn, Barrett and 
Exworthy 2011, Strand and Fosse 2011).
3. Conclusion
This chapter briefly reviews a number of different models of 
policy-making, noting that each has its lim itations and there is no 
perfect model. The policy cycle model which describes policy as being 
developed through a sequence of explicit tasks is discussed in more 
detail, with the steps of problem identification, development of a policy 
option and policy adoption (where a political decision is reached) 
informing the areas of policy analysis discussed in the thesis.
One of the lim itations of the policy cycle model is that it does not 
provide a causal explanation for why a policy was developed. The 
Kingdon model of policy streams and windows was described as a 
framework for developing an understanding of how a particular area 
may gain the policy attention of governments, and how and why a 
particular policy response may be developed and adopted. Although it 
also has lim itations, for example being tautological, lacking testability 
and not generating a long term research program, it remains one of the 
most influential models in the policy field, generating interest in 
numerous social policy areas including health.
In the next chapter I briefly review the mental health policy 
literature and summarise the mental health policy situation in key OECD 
countries and in developing countries.
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CHAPTER 3 - Mental Health Policy Literature Review
The mental health policy literature describes cycles of reform that have 
taken place over the centuries. Allderidge (1979) described how health 
services had moved between institutional and alternative community 
based services in England periodically since the 13th century. Each 
attem pt to provide a policy solution was accompanied by public scandal 
or political concern about rising costs (Levine 1979). These cycles have 
also been well recognised in Australia, characterised by reform followed 
by scandal followed by public inquiry followed by further reform (Upton 
1983).
The literature contains many accounts of the cyclical nature of 
mental health policy, and what influences these cycles. Rochefort (1998) 
described mental health system reform as alternating between peaks of 
intensive policy and program activity followed by periods of 'stagnation 
and decline'. He explained how this pattern often accompanied the 
movement of mental health issues into and out of the public arena, 
often via the media. Within these cycles Rochefort noted how past policy 
themes were 'rediscovered', reemerging only to later recede into the 
policy background. He concluded that this lack of stability in mental 
health policy was related to a number of factors, including changes in 
the understanding of mental illness, exaggerations in mental health 
ideologies and rhetoric, the incomplete development of psychiatry as a 
scientific discipline, the ineffectiveness of mental health policies and 
programs, a mismatch between the goals of mental health policy and 
the means by which these goals were achieved, the impact of 
professional organisations and cyclical changes in public opinion brought 
about by evolving social changes. Rochefort also identified the political 
tenor of the time as an important factor in these cycles, for example 
noting that mental health reform was more likely during a period of 
broader political or social reform by an activist government. The 
ideological leaning of the government in power has been shown to be a
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major influence on the content of reform in health generally (Toth 
2 0 1 0 ) .
Much of the literature discussing mental health policy, particularly 
that which includes analysis of national examples, has as its focus 
descriptions of policy content or policy implementation (e.g. in 
describing changes in service delivery). Less attention has been paid in 
the literature to how and why a particular policy was adopted, although 
some authors have summarised the factors they believe have been 
influential on mental health resource allocation. For example, Corrigan 
and Watson (2003) identified the factors they thought had influenced 
policy makers to allocate resources to mental health: 1) perceptions of 
resource scarcity; 2) effectiveness of mental health programs; 3) 
consumer needs; 4) perceived personal responsibility and 5) political 
ideology. In all countries, the increased role of the consumer and carer 
movement in providing advocacy for mental health reform has been a 
dominant theme since the 1970s (Gawith and Abrams 2006, Smith and 
Gridley 2006).
Within the mental health sector there is a considerable literature 
on mental health policy. In 1974 a WHO expert committee considered 
how best to organise mental health services in developing countries. 
Recommendations included: (1) the development of national mental 
health policies and the creation of units within health ministries to 
implement policy; (2) the introduction of mental health budgets for 
workforce development, essential drug procurement, infrastructure 
development, data collection, and research; (3) the decentralisation of 
service provision and integration of mental health into primary health 
care; and (4) the training and supervision of primary health care 
providers in mental health using specialist mental health staff (WHO 
Expert Committee on Mental Health 1975).
In 1978, the International Conference on Primary Health Care in 
Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan, in what became known as the Alma-Ata 
Declaration (Lawn et al. 2008) reaffirmed the definition of health in the 
WHO constitution (WHO 1946) as 'the state of complete, physical,
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mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or 
in firm ity ' (WHO 2001b). I t  promoted health as a basic human right, 
endorsing the right of all citizens to participate in the ir communities and 
to maximise their self-reliance. Health reform began to encompass areas 
which had not previously been considered within the scope of medicine, 
such as the reduction of social inequalities, redistribution of wealth and 
political action (Navarro 2001).
The Declaration adopted a primary health care approach to 
service delivery with an emphasis on community care, intersectoral 
linkages and mutually supportive referral systems. I t  acknowledged that 
primary care requires a preferential share of health resources. The 
Declaration called on governments to formulate policies, strategies and 
plans that would sustain primary health care and achieve 'health for all' 
by 2000.
In 1982, the UN General Assembly adopted the World Programme 
of Action Concerning Disabled Persons at the end of the International 
Year of Disabled Persons. In this resolution, the UN General Assembly 
reiterated the equality of rights of all people with disabilities stated in 
earlier resolutions, including those with a mental illness and its resultant 
psychiatric disability. The resolution introduced concepts of equal 
opportunity and rights to full participation in medical treatm ent and it 
promoted the need for non-medical services to support people with 
psychiatric disability beyond medical treatm ent alone.
In 1991 the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental 
Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care were adopted by the 
UN General Assembly, with a specific focus on the rights of people 
admitted to mental health institutions. The twenty-five principles 
emphasise quality of treatm ent and care in the community and address 
issues such as individual freedoms and basic human rights in hospital 
and the community. Principle 23 specifically addresses mental health 
policy and legislative reform, stating:
States should implement these Principles through appropriate 
legislative, judicial, administrative, educational and other 
measures, which they shall review periodically; and should make
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these Principles widely known, through policy.
The World Health Report which has a specific health related focus 
each year was dedicated to mental health in 2001 (WHO 2001b) and 
made ten recommendations for action. These were: to provide 
treatm ent for people with mental illness in primary care and not just 
specialist services; make psychotropic drugs more widely available; give 
care in the community rather than relying predominantly on hospitals; 
educate the public about mental health and mental illness; involve 
communities, families and consumers; establish national policies, 
programmes and legislation; develop human resources; link mental 
health with other sectors; monitor community mental health; and 
support research.
Recommendation Six noted that mental health policy, 
programmes and legislation are necessary for significant reform and that 
these should be based on current knowledge and human rights 
considerations. WHO noted that mental health reforms should be part of 
the larger health system reforms in which there is no discrimination 
against persons with mental disorders. Recommendation Eight noted 
that sectors other than health, such as education, housing, welfare, and 
justice sectors need to be involved in improving the mental health of 
communities and providing support for people with mental illness.
In 2007 the WHO released a Mental Health Policy and Service 
Guidance Package consisting of a policy and plan checklist and fourteen 
modules for policy development and service planning. The package was 
developed following a review of the literature, consultation with policy 
makers, planners and health professionals and was underpinned by best 
practice examples of policy development and planning from a range of 
low, middle and high income countries (Funk and Freeman 2011). The 
checklists provide summaries of process and content issues that have 
been identified as im portant to mental health policy. National policy 
review bodies as well as stakeholders are encouraged to use these to 
facilitate local policy making and planning. Examples of process issues 
when considering a given policy include: the extent of the political
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mandate to develop the policy; whether the policy is based on a local 
needs assessment; the extent of the consultation process with 
stakeholders; and the level of research undertaken to develop the 
policy. Content issues include: the values and principles which have 
informed the policy; the inclusion of a statement of policy objectives; 
identification of areas for action; the use of language to describe action 
areas; and the degree to which the policy comprehensively addresses a 
range of areas such as human rights and prevention.
The consensus in the literature is that having a national policy on 
mental health is fundamental to promoting mental health in the 
population and delivering effective mental health services (WHO 2005b, 
Jenkins et al. 2002). The health and mental health policy literature 
identifies the context within which policy development takes place, the 
factors that influence the process and shape the content of the policy, 
the factors that impede or facilitate implementation, the extent to which 
an evidence base informs policy and the importance of the policy and its 
implementation in improving health in communities (Baker 1996, Lee, 
Buse and Fustukian 2002, Townsend et al. 2004, Walt 1994).
1. Mental health policy in OECD countries
According to the WHO Mental health atlas (2005a), by 2005 the 
governments of the m ajority of OECD member countries (27 out of 34) 
had endorsed a mental health policy, defined as
...a specifically w ritten  document o f the Governm ent or M inistry of 
Health containing the goals fo r im proving the mental health 
situation of the country, the priorities among those goals and the 
main directions fo r a tta in ing  them.
Table 1 lists OECD member countries by national mental health 
policy status (WHO 2005a).
39
Table  1: OECD countries  w ith  a m enta l hea lth  policy in 2 0 0 5
Country Mental Health Policy Year
form ulated
A ustra lia Yes 1992




Czech Republic Yes 1953








Ire land Yes 1984
Israe l Yes 1991
Ita ly Yes 1994
Japan Yes 1950
Luxem bourg Yes 1991
Mexico Yes 1983
N etherlands Yes 1999
New Zealand Yes 1994










United Kingdom Yes 1998
United States of America No
The literature on mental health policy is usually country specific 
and primarily describes the content and implementation in that country. 
In part this is because much of the literature and policy advocacy comes 
from public inquiries into deficiencies in services which are concerned 
with which services are provided (and not provided) to which consumer 
groups. Relatively little attention is paid in the literature to the broader 
factors which led to policy formulation and adoption. However there is 
some information in the literature that gives insights into the mental 
health policy process in these countries. I have chosen to briefly review 
the literature from seven OECD countries with different health and 
mental health systems which allow these insights, and the many 
commonalities, to be highlighted.
(a) United States of America (USA)
The USA has no national mental health policy by WHO definitions 
(Goldman 2009). However mental health reform has been 
described and in many ways is similar to other OECD countries. 
Gerald Grob, one of the earliest US writers on mental health 
policy, described (1987) the shift in policy direction from the 
psychiatric hospital as a place of 'asylum' and the centre of the 
public mental health system to a new policy direction in the 1960s 
when providing treatment and care in the community began to be 
pursued. These changes, as they took place in Australia, are 
discussed further in Chapter 4.
Grob (1994), in his structural analysis of US government 
and mental health policy, noted that the changes in mental health 
policy arose from the interaction of many different variables. 
Sometimes policy was shaped by overriding agreement on a
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specific priority area. For example, the initial creation of the 
psychiatric hospitals was centred on the belief that these were the 
ideal places for the care and treatm ent for those with severe 
mental illness. More often policy was shaped by the interaction of 
multiple factors, for example beliefs about the cause and nature 
of mental illness, changes in the psychiatric profession, changes 
in the composition of the patient population in hospitals, changes 
to funding mechanisms and to community attitudes.
Grob also noted how changes in intergovernmental 
relations that shape and transform social policy apply to mental 
health policy. In the USA, as in Australia, the federal government 
played little role in mental health policy for much of its history. 
However, in both countries the expanding role of the federal 
government created interdepartmental relationships which shaped 
both policy and service delivery. The US federal government 
introduced landmark mental health legislation in 1946 which 
greatly expanded the role of the federal government. This 
legislation promoted community based care and was subsequently 
followed by State legislation, with sim ilar policy intent.
Grob (1994) concluded from his analysis of mental health 
policy and reform in the United States that intergovernmental 
relations (between the federal and State governments) mediate 
and transform the content of a policy. This arises from the 
different roles of the federal and State government and the 
financial incentives provided by the federal government to the 
State governments. Grob noted that funding by the federal 
government was a powerful motivator that could act as a 
perverse incentive to policy distortion, if State level policy makers 
failed to take a sufficiently broad and balanced view of policy 
development and funding capture became an end in itself. While 
the USA has no national mental health policy, the Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) of 
the US Department of Health and Human Services (Power 2010)
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States that behavioural health care reform at a federal level has in 
recent years been guided by three documents: (1) the first 
Surgeon General's report on mental health in (Office of the US 
Surgeon General 1999); (2) the President's New Freedom
Commission report on mental health (2003); and (3) the National 
Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine report Im proving the 
Quality o f Health Care fo r Mental and Substance-Use Conditions 
(2005). Soon after the New Freedom Commission's final report, 
SAMHSA was charged with leading the efforts to transform the 
mental health system. SAMHSA reports (2005, 2008) chart this 
vision and describe the objectives required to achieve it (Power 
2010 ) .
I t  has been suggested that the groundswell of interest in 
mental health, coupled with efforts to reform the broader health 
care system, may have opened a policy window for mental health 
in the USA, with the focus being to improve the health and 
wellbeing of the most vulnerable populations (Druss and 
Bornemann 2010).
Another policy window opened to enable the passing of the 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act in 2008. This 
legislation was designed to eliminate historical disparities in 
insurance coverage for mental and addictive disorders relative to 
physical conditions, a problem which had been framed as 
discrim inatory (Barry, Huskamp and Goldman 2010, Barry 2006, 
Levinson and Druss 2000). At the national level, the first attempt 
to extend insurance coverage for mental disorders occurred 
during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s (Barry, 
Huskamp and Goldman 2010, Barry 2006). Kennedy has been 
described as one of the most active innovators of all US 
presidents in the field of mental health, and this is largely 
attributed to his personal experience of the consequences of 
ineffective mental health care provided for his younger sister 
(Stoil 2006). While, as Grob (1994) noted, the establishment of
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the US Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health received 
bipartisan political support when it was signed into law by 
President Kennedy in 1963, a dichotomy was established and 
subsequently increased between State psychiatric hospitals and 
federally funded community mental health services. For example, 
the expansion of US federal entitlements to disability programs 
and programs for elderly Americans led to an exodus of large 
numbers of elderly patients from State mental hospitals into 
community programs funded by the federal government. A sim ilar 
'cost shifting7 occurred in Australia (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988, 
Mental Health Task Force 1991).
Barry, Huskamp and Goldman (2010) described the years 
of political impasse on parity legislation tha t followed the Kennedy 
years, until a number of developments created the necessary 
conditions for the passage of the federal parity law in 2008. 
Firstly, new research demonstrated that comprehensive parity 
would not 'break the bank.7 Secondly, key parity advocates (most 
notably Senators Domenici and Wellstone and Congressmen Jim 
Ramstad and Patrick Kennedy) successfully garnered support in 
attributing personal experiences with mental illness as critical to 
their leadership and support of the reforms. Thirdly, the shrewd 
political strategies adopted by congressional champions of parity 
in the Senate and House of Representatives were critical to 
success.
Similarly to the experience of other countries, mental 
health policy reforms in the USA have occurred in the wake of 
tragedy. Following the 2007 'Virginia Tech massacre7 involving the 
murder of 32 students and faculty and the suicide of a 'deeply 
disturbed7 student, political support for mental health reforms 
which had already been proposed was galvanised and progress 
was accelerated (Bonnie et al. 2009, Hogan and Sederer 2009). 
The massacre highlighted numerous problems with the mental 
health service system in Virginia, which were already being
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studied by a Commission that had been established by the Chief 
Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court (Bonnie et al. 2009). 
Immediate action was the political imperative, the timeline for the 
Commission's report was accelerated, and State legislative 
reforms were adopted less than one year after the tragedy 
(Bonnie et al. 2009). Similar experiences had been documented 
earlier in New York State. In 1999 Kendra Webdale was pushed 
under a subway car by a man with a lengthy history of 'revolving 
door treatm ent' (Hogan and Sederer 2009). The incident drew 
attention to a fragmented mental health system, and led to the 
enactment of 'Kendra's Law' which granted judges the authority 
to issue orders for compulsory treatm ent (Hogan and Sederer 
2009).
(b) United Kingdom (UK)
Mental health reforms that moved the focus of the service system 
from hospital to community occurred in the UK as in virtually ail 
other OECD countries. More recent mental health policy 
development has been strongly influenced by the presumed need 
to prevent violence and alleviate public anxieties regarding the 
dangers of mentally ill people residing in the community 
(Davidson 2002, Hewitt 2008, Holloway 2006). Relative to other 
countries, risk management has been a more dominant policy 
driver in the UK (Davidson 2002, Hallam 2002). In an analysis of 
UK mental health policy as a 'wicked problem,' Hannigan and 
Coffey (2011) noted that the early policy focus on community 
care can be explained by concerns over homicides by people with 
mental illness, plus disquiet within the system regarding the 
'revolving door' of overstretched and underfunded services. 
Hewitt (2008) also discussed the influence that the threat of 
violence by people with mental illness had on mental health 
policy. She argued that mental health policy development since 
the 1990s in the UK had become increasingly influenced by the
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public perception tha t people living with mental illness in the 
community posed a danger to the general public. Similarly Pilgrim 
and Ramon (2009) identified the prioritisation of safety issues 
over treatm ent and care in UK mental health legislation during 
the 1990s. Although making up only a small proportion of people 
with mental illness, dangerous people with a mental illness had a 
disproportionate impact on policy, with relative neglect of the 
policy needs of much larger number of patients in primary care.
Specific government policy initiatives have been linked to 
individual cases. The UK 'Care Programme Approach' which 
emphasises risk management, care coordination and regular 
review was introduced in 1990 following the 1984 homicide of 
social worker Isabel Schwartz by a mentally ill former client, and 
a well-publicised inquiry (Davidson 2002, Glover 2007, Holloway 
2006). Two further influential sentinel events occurred in 1992. 
The first was the unprovoked attack and murder of a London tube 
passenger by Christopher Clunis, and the second was the case of 
Ben Silock, who was mauled by a lion when he climbed into an 
enclosure at the London Zoo (Davidson 2002, Hallam 2002, 
Hewitt 2008, Holloway 2006). Both men were suffering from 
schizophrenia, and both cases highlighted breakdowns in service 
provision. The report into the care and treatm ent of Christopher 
Clunis published in 1994 has been described as an 'iconic' source 
of information regarding dysfunctional mental health care in the 
UK, and a 'defining moment' in policy and public perception of risk 
(Hallam 2002, Holloway 2006). Following the considerable media 
attention devoted to these and sim ilar cases, the Department of 
Health implemented the Mental Health (Patients in the 
Community) Act 1995, with provisions for compulsory treatment 
in the community (Davidson 2002, Hewitt 2008, Holloway 2006).
Assertive Outreach Teams (AOTs) designed to reach 'hard 
to engage' patients with severe mental disorder like Christopher 
Clunis have been seen as a success in policy terms within the UK
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(Holloway 2006). Holloway links a number of factors relevant to 
the Kingdon streams to the success of AOTs in the UK. Firstly, 
AOTs address a longstanding and well publicised policy concern, 
that is, the failure of community care to follow-up high risk 
patients. Secondly, other simpler and cheaper measures (the Care 
Programme Approach and generic community mental health team 
model) had failed. Thirdly, the AOT model was an internationally 
recognised service delivery model with a clear and easily 
explained rationale. Fourthly, key stakeholders with high 
credibility and influence on policy (e.g. the Sainsbury Centre for 
Mental Health) were persuaded of the value of the AOT approach. 
Fifthly, measures of the fidelity of the model were available and 
finally, introduction of AOTs has been performance-managed by 
novel mechanisms of central control.
Cairney (2009) described mental health reform in England 
and Scotland, identifying two different approaches based on 
different policy imperatives. The UK, through its mental health 
legislation, emphasised public safety as the priority, rather than 
patient rights. Cairney noted that this alienated many groups and 
resulted in a stand-off between advocacy groups and the 
government, which was not resolved through bureaucratic 
accommodation. Cairney identified that the English mental health 
policy reforms were driven by
an unintended consequence of a reduction in hospital 
beds...[and] ... a rise in media and public concern towards 
dangerous people with mental disorders living in the 
community.
Cairney noted that this was exacerbated by the inquiries 
which kept the issue of mental health related homicides high on 
the media agenda. There was a perception that governments 
could be held responsible for not keeping the public safe. Thus, as 
previously identified, public safety became the overriding policy 
intent. Cairney noted that this was linked to the government's 
emphasis on crime and public order, thereby harmonising it with
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other social policies. The experience of Scottish policy was 
different, with a stronger emphasis on patient rights. In Scotland 
there were more hospital beds, fewer high profile homicides and a 
greater separation between mental health and crime, which 
meant different factors drove the policy agenda in Scotland to 
those in England.
The role of the media as an influence on UK mental health 
policy is prominent in the literature. Hallam (2002) noted that the 
policy of community care for people with mental illness came 
under intense media and public scrutiny during the 1990s 
following the disturbing incidents noted earlier. Hallam analysed 
the media coverage that two particular incidents received at the 
time and over the next eight years. She noted emotive and 
'headline catching language' was used to describe the incidents 
related to Christopher Clunis and Ben Silock. She concluded that 
the sensationalisation of the cases by journalists who appeared to 
have a limited knowledge about mental illness heightened the 
public's concern about the risks and dangerousness of people with 
mental illness generally. However she also noted that mental 
health advocates used the media coverage to campaign for 
increased resources for people with mental illness living in the 
community. Hallam also raised the concern that the responsibility 
for system failure was attributed to individual health service 
professionals and that this may have had long-term adverse 
implications for recruitment and morale in health and social 
services.
Scheid (2008), in attempting to understand the competing 
demands on mental health policy, described how an emphasis on 
efficiency, outcome assessment and cost containment can conflict 
with the goal of quality and access to effective services. She 
described the policy and organisational challenge to balance the 
conflicting demands for efficiency (cost containment) and 
effectiveness (quality and access). McGonagle and colleagues also
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make the point that when policy changes occur rapidly there is 
often insufficient time to implement the reforms, especially as 
many require changes in workforce numbers and practice, before 
the next policy change is adopted (McGonagle, Jackson and 
Baguley 2009).
(c) Canada
Public inquiries also appeared to have played a significant role in 
the mental health reforms which have occurred in Canada. Until 
recently, Canada did not have a national mental health strategy 
(Mental Health Commission of Canada 2012, Kirby 2008). The 
strategy was developed largely in response to the findings of the 
first national Canadian report on mental health -  the Senate 
committee report Out o f the Shadows a t Last (also known as the 
Kirby Report) (Kirby and Keon 2006, Kirby 2008). The Kirby 
Report provoked public debate and major mental health reform, 
including the establishment of the Mental Health Commission of 
Canada in August 2007, the articulation of a national framework 
for mental health in 2009, and the identification of recovery as 
the central guiding principle for mental health reform (Kirby 2008, 
Piat and Sabetti 2012).
Mental health reform in Canada also appears to have been 
impacted by what Kingdon ([1995] 2003) refers to as 'predictable' 
policy windows which occur, for example, in the wake of a newly 
elected government, in this instance in Ontario. In 1987 the 
Ontario Minister of Health appointed a working committee whose 
final report The Graham Report: Building Community Support for 
People, released in 1988 identified the need for collaboration 
between consumers, families and service providers and the 
income, employment and housing sectors (Hartford et al. 2003, 
Lurie 2005). The Graham Report also highlighted that whilst 
community mental health spending was increasing, mental health 
spending was actually declining as a proportion of health spending
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(Hartford et al. 2003, Lurie 2005). Although a committee was 
established to implement the recommendations of the Graham 
Report, another change of government in Ontario in 1990 meant 
the direction of mental health reform was outlined under a new 
rubric: 'Putting People First' in 1993 (Hartford et al. 2003, Lurie 
2005). There was another change of government in the province 
in 1995, and the Minister of Health was presented with concerns 
from stakeholders with regard to the lack of progress on mental 
health reform (Lurie 2005). Whilst stakeholders supported the 
policy directions of the Graham Report and 'Putting People F irs t/ 
they were disappointed with the lack of implementation (Lurie 
2005). The new minister accepted their criticisms and announced 
that a new policy framework would be developed to guide the 
implementation of mental health reform in Ontario, in addition to 
new funding to establish community mental health services (Lurie 
2005).
(d) New Zealand
In New Zealand, as in Australia, public inquiries have been the 
catalyst for many significant mental health policy changes 
(Brunton 2005, Gawith and Abrams 2006). Brunton (2005) 
conducted a review of the literature on the evolution, functioning 
and achievements of public inquiries as instruments of 
government policy making on mental health in New Zealand. Five 
inquiries were identified which contributed to national mental 
health policy in New Zealand since the institution of Parliamentary 
government in 1854. They were: (1) the Select Committee of the 
House of Representatives on a General Lunatic Asylum (1858); 
(2) the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Lunatic Asylums 
(1871); (3) the Board of Health Committee on Psychiatric 
Services in Public Hospitals (1957-60); (4) the Royal Commission 
on Hospital and Related Services (1972-3); and (5) the 
Ministerial Inquiry in respect of Certain Mental Health Services
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(1995-6) (also known as the Mason Inquiry).
The iast of these, which produced the iargest report of the 
five inquiries, was ordered following two fatal police shootings of 
persons with mental illness (Brunton 2005). The Mason Inquiry 
drew attention to funding issues, stigma and discrimination, and 
workforce problems as significant impediments to the delivery of 
mental health services in New Zealand (Gawith and Abrams 
2006). The New Zealand Mental Health Commission was 
established in response to an adaptation of one of the 
recommendations of this landmark report (Brunton 2005, Gawith 
and Abrams 2006). Brunton (2005) notes that each inquiry was 
formed when a systemic policy issue reached a level of political 
sensitivity and public significance sufficient to create a 'climate for 
action.' This idea of a 'climate for action' seems comparable to 
that of the opening of a Kingdon policy window.
(e) Turkey
Sometimes a major natural disaster triggers policy reform, and 
this even applies to mental health. In Turkey there were two 
major earthquakes in 1999 that drew attention to major 
deficiencies in the capacity of mental health services to respond 
to the psychological trauma and social dislocation caused by the 
earthquakes. Munir, Ergene, Tunaligil and Erol (2004) describe 
how the debate about the failings in the organisation and 
provision of mental health services in response to the earthquake 
escalated to encompass the broader, country-wide deficiencies in 
services. This opened a window of opportunity and created the 
political will for a coherent and clearly articulated national mental 
health policy. Although it took over a decade the Turkish 
government developed and finally adopted its first National Mental 
Health Plan on World Mental Health Day (10 October) in 2011.
(f) Sweden
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Parliamentary commissions have also influenced Swedish mental 
health policy. In 1992 a Parliamentary commission (the 
Committee on Psychiatric Care) reported that the psychiatric and 
social services for people with severe mental illness remained 
largely inadequate (Hansson 2006). The commission's report 
resulted in the adoption of mental health reforms in 1995 which 
aimed to address service provision for individuals suffering from 
severe and persistent mental illnesses (Hansson 2006). Hansson 
also describes the conditions which interacted in 2000 to facilitate 
a marked change in Swedish case management policy. These 
included academic evidence of the effectiveness of case 
management, influence from the 'user's movement' and a new 
political willingness and readiness of the government to adopt 
case management on a national level. Hansson (2006) links the 
'political readiness' to financial support from state subsidies for 
case management services. He goes on to highlight that despite 
several decades of international academic research demonstrating 
the effectiveness of case management services, it was not until a 
single Swedish study of 10 pilot services was published that case 
management was introduced on a national scale. Hansson 
believes tha t the policy may never have been adopted if there had 
not been strong concurrent humanitarian-based support from the 
user's movement, or the necessary political and financial 
readiness to endorse the reforms.
(g) Germany
Sometimes the history of a country impacts on mental health 
policy development. There are few OECD countries where this is 
more evident than in Germany. The events of World War II, 
including the cooperation with the Nazi regime, left the 
international reputation of German psychiatry in ruins. As such, 
discussions of German mental health care reforms tend to begin 
approximately 15 years after other western nations became
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engaged in the policy project of de-institutionalisation and 
community care, which took piace during the 1950s (Bauer 
1994).
I t  was only in the late 1960s, when the government changed from 
a conservative Christian democratic administration to a coalition 
of social democratic and liberal parties, that psychiatry and 
mental health again became a public issue. The atrocities by the 
Nazis against mentally ill people were brought to public 
discussion. By the early 1970s, the German Physicians' 
Conference, the Alliance for the Mentally III and the German 
Association for Social Psychiatry started to advocate for reform. In 
1975, an expert commission identified shortcomings in the 
provision of treatm ent and demanded reform which included 
restructuring of the larger psychiatric hospitals, the integration of 
psychiatric departments into other hospitals, the development of 
closer-to-home community services, the provision of assistance to 
support groups and the support of education and further training 
(Expert Commission 1975). The reunification of Germany resulted 
in East German psychiatry becoming progressively more aligned 
with Western rather than Soviet psychiatry.
Consistent with other OECD nations, national reports continued to 
be influential in the mental health reform process in (West) 
Germany (Bauer et al. 2001). Three national reports in particular 
are ascribed a foundational role, starting with the 1975 national 
enquiry into mental health care commissioned by the federal 
Parliament (Psychiatrie-Enquete) (Deutscher Bundestag 1975). 
The second was the 1988 report of the expert commission 
(Bericht der Expertenkomission) (Bundesministerium fü r Jugend, 
Familie, Frauen und Gesundheit 1988) and the third the 1992 
Federal directive on staffing in mental health inpatient services 
(Psychiatrie-Personalverordnung) (Kunze, Kaltenbach and 
Auerbach 1992), all consistent with WFIO mental health policy
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directions and aimed at bringing German mental health policy 
back into the mainstream.
2. Mental health policy in developing countries
Despite the relative lack of resources compared to the ir OECD 
counterparts, developing countries have also been involved in 
considerable mental health policy development and reform. I t  is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive review of these, 
however the countries mentioned, from South America, Africa, South 
East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Pacific islands, provide examples of 
the policy development that has been undertaken in these regions.
Alarcon and Aguilar-Gaxiola (2000) in the ir analysis of mental 
health policy developments in Latin America focused on changes in the 
structure of mental health services. They found that using information, 
in this case the introduction of indicators which helped assess the overall 
impact of mental health, was a catalyst for countries to update or 
redevelop their mental health policies. They also emphasised as 
influential the role of international agencies, for example the Pan- 
American Health Organization, a state of affairs seen more in developing 
countries than in established market economies.
Gureje and Alem (2000), describing mental health policy 
development in Africa, noted the importance of public beliefs and 
opinion in shaping policy. Stigma and lack of information about the 
nature and impact of mental disorders resulted in a low priority being 
given to mental health policy development, especially in the poorer 
African countries. They noted that mental health reform was more likely 
to be implemented when policies were embedded within initiatives for 
higher priority areas such as chronic or infectious disease, or post­
conflict reconstruction. Draper and colleagues (2009) while primarily 
describing the barriers to the implementation of South Africa's 1997 
mental health policy guidelines, noted the importance of national 
leadership in policy development and adoption, especially for 
overcoming regional fragmentation.
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Stockwell and colleagues (2005) examined mental health policy 
development in Cambodia as a case study. They identified the key 
issues which influenced not only the content of mental health policy but 
also why mental health was able to gain attention on the public policy 
agenda in this developing country. They found that the impact of the 
post-conflict context was important, as were the evolution and influence 
of stakeholder groups, the tim ing of policy development, key individuals 
within the government and the existence of clear directions in a plan. All 
these factors influenced both the content and the political adoption of a 
mental health policy.
Mental health reform in post-conflict countries was considered by 
De Vries and Klazinga (2006) in relation to Bosnia, Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. They examined how mental health reached the threshold for 
government policy attention in countries dealing with the legacies of 
armed conflict and, as had been determined by Stockwell et al. in the 
case of Cambodia, found that external agencies (such as the Post- 
Conflict Fund at the World Bank) were important. Agencies assisting in 
post-conflict reconstruction promoted mental health as an important 
part of social cohesion and enhancing human capital. However they 
were also a threat to the sustainability of reform once they withdrew. De 
Vries and Klazinga identified the potential for a lack of local ownership 
over the policy, disorganisation resulting from overlapping short-term  
mental health programs (especially those directed towards traumatised 
populations), rapid changes in healthcare financing and a rapid 
decentralisation of healthcare responsibilities. The authors concluded 
that to achieve sustainable mental health reform in post-conflict 
countries, there needed to be a balance between foreign influence and 
involving the local bureaucratic structures and stakeholder groups.
Zwi and colleagues (2011) discuss factors which influenced the 
development of mental health and psychosocial policy in the Solomon 
Islands. Again the importance of international players in influencing 
mental health policy and service reform was seen. They identified 
factors influencing policy change as sociocultural issues, bureaucratic
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motivation, the impact of international aid and the influence of research 
and evidence, with all this occurring in the context of political, security 
and economic concerns. Mental health was seen to be important 
because it represented a politically sensitive health and social problem in 
the community given the impact on the population of the preceding 
conflict. The analysis by Zwi and colleagues found strong support for 
Kingdon's proposition that problems, politics and policy come together 
to drive agenda settings. At a local level, Zwi and colleagues identified 
three influences - decision makers who are sensitive to the issues, 
donors and the resources they provide and data which highlights the 
need to revise the policy and improve services. Similarly to Gureje and 
Alem (2000) they concluded that the positioning of psychosocial and 
mental health in policy was enhanced by links to priority policy areas 
being pursued such as the contribution of mental illness to subsequent 
disability, to family and community instability, to violence and as an 
impediment to social and economic development.
3. Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief overview of the mental health policy 
literature and finds there is a consensus in the literature that having a 
national policy on mental health is fundamental for a country to promote 
mental health in the population and deliver effective mental health 
services. Cycles of policy and service reform have been taking place in 
mental health for centuries. Often these cycles are driven by local 
factors. Sometimes international developments are important. For 
example the decision of the World Health Organisation to dedicate the 
2001 World Health Report was to mental health (WHO 2001b) with 
recommendations for action was globally influential, as was the Global 
Burden of Disease (GBD) Study demonstrating that mental disorders 
were the leading causes of health-related disability in most countries 
(Murray and Lopez 1996b). These international actors raised the profile 
of mental disorders with governments.
In many countries, including Australia, each attem pt to provide a 
policy solution seems to have been accompanied by an emerging
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problem (such as public scandal or concern about costs) requiring a new 
or modified policy response. Mental health policy has been described as 
'unstable' with the literature identifying reasons for this over time as due 
to changes in the understanding of mental illness and the development 
of psychiatry as a scientific discipline, exaggerated fluctuations in mental 
health ideologies and rhetoric, the mismatch between the goals of 
mental health policy and the means by which these goals were achieved 
and cyclical changes in public opinion with evolving social changes. Much 
of the mental health policy literature comes from within the mental 
health sector itself and it is therefore perhaps unsurprising that most 
literature is about policy content or policy implementation and much less 
is about how and why the policy was adopted, which is the focus of this 
thesis.
The chapter concludes with a summary of the mental health 
policy situation in key OECD countries and in developing countries. This 
summary identified the importance of the history of a country and its 
political system (including the federated system of government as in 
Australia), concerns about cost blowouts, the influence of public 
inquiries and commissions in initiating policy change, the impact of a 
crisis or individual tragedy (e.g. violence by a person with mental illness 
or a natural disaster), the role of the media and public attitudes and 
beliefs about mental illness, and (for developing countries) the role of 
external funding agencies (with the conditions they attached to grants 
and loans). To a greater or lesser extent, each of these played a role in 
the development of Australian mental health policy discussed in Chapter 
5 and in the twenty years covered by this thesis, as discussed in 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7.
In the next chapter I describe the methodology and research 
design used in the thesis.
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CHAPTER 4 -  METHODOLOGY and research design
Seven steps were undertaken in carrying out the research for this 
thesis. The first was to clearly formulate the questions to be addressed. 
The second was to describe the sources examined to answer these 
questions. The third was to collect the data. The fourth was the analysis 
of the data from all sources to identify the key themes in mental health 
policy associated with three major periods within the twenty years under 
study. The fifth was to identify the problems, and policy solutions being 
proposed, for each theme, for each of the three time periods being 
studied. The sixth was to identify from the data sources how and why 
the policy window opened for the Commonwealth government to take 
specific political action ('opening of the policy window') in each of the 
three time periods. The seventh was to review the Kingdon model and 
the extent to which it adequately explains the data. The first four steps 
are described in this chapter. Steps five and six are described for each 
policy window in turn, in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. Step 
seven is addressed in Chapter 9. The research was approved by the 
Human Ethics Research Committee at the Australian National University 
(Protocol: 2011/279).
Historical works are often classified by their authors as belonging 
to one of two major types: narrative history, which describes events in a 
non-analytical manner, and interpretational history and which seeks to 
explain, evaluate and interpret relationships. Whilst the separation of 
narrative and interpretational history is somewhat artificial (Porter 1981, 
Previts, Parker and Coffman 1990), this thesis aims to interpret the 
major events that occurred in national mental health policy formulation 
between 1988 and 2008.
In choosing events or developments to subdivide the twenty years 
under analysis I looked beyond the obvious transition points of changes 
in government following elections, and the five year spans representing 
Commonwealth/State funding agreements (1993-98, 1998-2003 and
58
2003-08). While these historical events provide convenient markers for 
periods of time in which poiicy directions were revised, the processes 
over the lifetime of major policy reforms do not fit neatly inside these 
boundaries. Therefore I have taken other events into consideration in 
drawing boundaries, as described in detail below.
The first time period starts in 1988. In that year the 
Commonwealth Labor government began to consider national mental 
health reform. That year is chosen because it was when the 
Commonwealth government received a report it had commissioned on 
the state of mental health services and authorised the formation of a 
working group to advise the government on possible responses. Over 
the subsequent five years negotiations took place between the 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments and key stakeholder 
groups, which led to the adoption of the National Mental Health Policy in 
April 1992. The National Mental Health Plan 1992 (the firs t plan), which 
was unpublished, was also considered and accepted by health ministers 
in 1992. This plan became part of the 1993 to 1998 
Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreements. Therefore, the first period 
chosen for consideration commences in 1988, includes the adoption of 
the National Mental Health Policy and the first plan in 1992 (the first 
major policy window being considered) and ends in 1996 with the 
change in Commonwealth government.
The first plan ran from 1993 to 1998 and formed the content of a 
specific schedule (Schedule F) in the 1993 to 1998 Medicare 
Agreements. I t  would therefore seem reasonable that a revision of 
mental health policy would coincide with the expiry of the plan and the 
Medicare Agreements in 1998 and form part of the negotiations which 
surrounded the 1998 to 2003 Health Care Agreements. However there 
had been no Commonwealth commitment in 1992 to any new five year 
plan, and renegotiation of the Health Care Agreements at a 
Commonwealth level was carried out after the election of a Coalition 
government on 2 March 1996. As is discussed in Chapter 6 the reaction 
of the Howard government, and Health Minister Michael Wooldridge, was
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to revisit the Commonwealth government's involvement in national 
mental health reform. There was no new mental health policy but a new 
five year mental health plan was developed and adopted in April 1998 
(the Second National Mental Health Plan), and this continued the 
implementation of the 1992 National Mental Health Policy.
The second time period considered in the thesis starts in 1996 
with the election of the Coalition government, includes the 1998 decision 
by the Commonwealth government to endorse the Second National 
Mental Health Plan and to maintain involvement in mental health reform 
as part of the 1998 to 2003 Health Care Agreements (the second major 
policy window being considered). The time period ends with the 
conclusion of the second plan and the Health Care Agreements in June 
2003.
In July 2003 a National Mental Health Plan 2003-2008 (the third 
plan) was endorsed by Australian health ministers. Despite the 
preceding ten years of national mental health reform, there continued to 
be criticisms of the quantity and quality of mental health services 
delivered in Australia. These concerns reached the threshold where, in 
2006, mental health was placed on the COAG agenda. The issues which 
led to mental health being considered by COAG, and the subsequent 
adoption of the COAG National Mental Health Action Plan in 2006, is the 
third major policy decision considered in the thesis. COAG's focus on 
mental health is widely considered more important than the adoption in 
2003 of the third plan. A review of the relevant policy literature and the 
opinion of key stakeholders confirm that the second and third plans 
were very similar and the decision of the incumbent Coalition 
government to adopt the third five-year plan did not involve a major 
change in policy direction. A far more comprehensive policy review took 
place with the consideration and adoption of the COAG National Mental 
Health Action Plan. The third time period being considered therefore is 
from 2003 until 2008.
The time periods examined in the thesis are summarised in Error! 
Reference source not found..
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Table 2: Time periods and policy w indows examined in the thesis
Policy Period Policy W indow Health Care 
A greem ent
N ationa l Mental 
Health  Plan
1 9 8 8 -9 6  
(C h a p te r 5)
1992 (a d op tio n  o f 
N ationa l M en ta l Hea lth  
Policy  and f irs t  p lan)
1993-98 1992 -97  ( f irs t p lan)
1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 3  
(C h a p te r 6)
1998 (a d op tio n  o f 
Second N a tio na l M en ta l 
Health  P lan)
1998-2003 1998-03  (second 
p lan)
2 0 0 3 -0 8  
(C h a p te r 7)
2006 (adop tio n  o f
COAG N a tiona l M en ta l 
Health  A c tion  Plan)
2003-08 2 0 0 3 -0 8  (th ird  p lan) 
2 0 0 6 -1 1 (COAG 
A ction  Plan)
1. Research Questions
This thesis identifies the problems in the mental health sector 
confronting governments in Australia during three time periods (1988- 
96, 1996-2003, 2003- 08), what policy solutions were proposed to 
respond to those problems and why particular policy directions were 
adopted by the Commonwealth government during this time. Specifically 
the aim is to identify the issues that influenced the Commonwealth 
government's mental health policy decisions at three specific points in 
time (the opening of the policy windows).
• Research question 1 - what led the Labor government in 1992 to 
adopt the National Mental Health Policy and first plan?
• Research question 2 - what led the Coalition government in 1998 
to adopt the Second National Mental Health Plan?
• Research question 3 - what led the Coalition government in 2006 
to adopt the COAG National Mental Health Action Plan?
These overarching research questions are intentionally broad and open- 
ended to allow a wide-ranging analysis of the influences that led to the 
policy change. This approach was taken to guard against the potential 
for my own views as an expert key participant to affect the outcome 
through the framing of the questions to be asked, an issue that is 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
2. Data Sources
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To answer these questions I devised a research design to collect data 
from four sources:
• a systematic review of published literature to identify primary and 
secondary sources, using standard methodology for systematic 
literature review
• a review of Parliamentary records, primarily Hansard, for the 
relevant periods
• interviews with key informants
• my observations as an expert key participant in mental health 
reform
Each data source was chosen so as to examine and collate 
information from different perspectives, each of which bears on the 
research questions.
3. Data Collection
3.1 System atic review  of the literature
A systematic review was conducted in accordance with the guidelines 
proposed by the Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies in Epidemiology 
(MOOSE) group (Stroup et al. 2000). The major international health, 
psychology, psychiatry, and biomedical electronic databases Medline, 
PsycINFO and EMBASE were searched via OVID. Other electronic 
databases indexing the social sciences, public affairs, and news and 
commentary in the media with a focus on Australia (APAFT, Humanities 
and Social Sciences Collection, TV News, Rural & Remote Health 
Database, AMI, APAIS-HEALTH, CINCH-HEALTH, Health and Society 
Database, Health Collection, Media Scan) were interrogated via Inform it. 
The following search string was used to retrieve documents containing 
these terms/phrases in abstracts and titles: Australia* AND (National OR 
Federal OR Government* OR Commonwealth) AND (Reform* OR 
Strategy OR Plan OR Policy) AND (Mental Health OR Mental Illness* OR 
Mental Disorder* OR Psychiatric D isorder*). Specific search strings were 
also tailored to databases with controlled subject retrieval via a 
thesaurus of indexing terms (Medline, PsycINFO, EMBASE, APAFT,
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Health and Society Database, and AMI). These were designed to 
increase the 'conceptual saturation' desired for qualitative search 
strategies (Thomas and Harden 2008). These search strings are included 
as appendices A-F. All search strings were developed with the 
assistance of a research librarian. Databases were searched from 
January 1980 until April 2011. There were no lim itations to the language 
of publication.
Citations were downloaded or manually entered into an Endnote 
X3 bibliographic database, where duplicates were removed and titles 
and abstracts were assessed for relevance. Reference lists of these 
articles were also searched manually to identify additional material. The 
mental health section of the Commonwealth Department of Health and 
Ageing website
(http://www.health.qov.au/in ternet/m ain/publishinq.nsf/Content/publica 
tions-Mental% 20health) was also hand searched for further relevant 
publications.
To be considered for inclusion articles were required to provide 
information which related to the adoption of one of the three policy 
decisions, the adoption of the National Mental Health Policy and first 
plan in April 1992, the second plan in April 1998 and the COAG National 
Action Plan on Mental Health in July 2006.
Once identified the literature was separated into primary and 
secondary data sources.
3.2  Search of Parliam entary records
Commonwealth Parliamentary records for the three periods were 
searched via the website of the Australian Parliament 
(h ttp ://parlin fo .aph.qov.au). The collections searched were House of 
Representatives and Senate Hansard, Committees (including Senate, 
House of Representatives, Joint and Estimates), Bills and Legislation, 
The Australian Constitution and Publications (House and Senate 
Publications, tabled papers, budget papers).
These collections were searched for the terms mental* OR
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psychiatric* recorded during the following periods (which it was 
considered would capture the majority of the comments relevant to the 
budget decisions or adoption of the relevant policy decision):
• 1 April 1991 (one year before the endorsement of the National 
Mental Health Policy) up to 30 June 1994 (one month after the 
1994 Commonwealth Budget);
• 1 April 1997 (one year before the adoption of the second plan) up 
to 30 June 1998 (one month after the second plan was 
incorporated into the Australian Health Care Agreements); and
• 1 April 2005 (one year before Prime Minister Howard announced 
Commonwealth funding for the third plan) up to 31 August 2006 
(one month after the third plan was signed).
3.3 In terv iew s w ith key inform ants
Advantages and caveats in the use of key informants were described by 
Sjoberg and Nett (1968). Interviews with key informants provide 
information which complements that found in the literature. Interview 
data can provide information on the motivation of various groups or 
individuals who were influential in the policy process. However, well 
identified problems with key informant interviews are recall bias and 
interviewer error (where the respondent fails to fully report what they 
know) (Romney, Weller and Batchelder 1986).
Fifteen key informants were selected because they held positions 
within and outside government which are considered to have provided 
them with a perspective that allowed them to comment on the period 
being studied. The key informants are drawn from four groups, with 
some informants having worked in areas encompassing more than one 
group.
• Group 1 -  the government m inister responsible for mental health 
(for the first policy window) or the ministerial advisor with 
responsibility for mental health (fo r the second and third policy 
windows);
• Group 2 -  Commonwealth and State/Territory government
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officials -  the senior Commonwealth government bureaucrat 
covering the period from the time of the establishment of the 
Commonwealth mental health policy area and State directors of 
mental health from five State government (New South Wales, 
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania) 
who between them cover the periods in which the three policy 
windows opened;
• Group 3 -  four community advocates who were mental health 
experts and/or representatives of non-government organisations 
and who between them were advocates for mental health reform 
across the period covered by the thesis;
• Group 4 - two independent consultants who were contracted to 
provide technical advice on mental health reform to the 
Commonwealth government and who between them were 
consultants continuously from 1990.
For Group 1, attempts were made to contact each person who 
held the position of Minister of Health (Brian Howe, Michael Wooldridge 
and Tony Abbott) at the relevant time. Mr Howe and Dr Wooldridge 
agreed, although Dr Wooldridge was subsequently unavailable for 
personal reasons. Mr Abbott was still a Member of Parliament and his 
office declined. For Group 2, each person who held the position of 
Commonwealth Director of Mental Health at the relevant tim e was 
contacted and all agreed. Although the Commonwealth was focus of the 
thesis it was considered important to include a state perspective and 
four former state Directors of Mental Health (one of whom had served in 
two states) and who between them covered the three periods in which 
the policy windows opened agreed to be interviewed. For Group 3 a 
large number of possible individuals could have been interviewed and I 
chose the CEO of the Mental Health Council of Australia (the peak 
Commonwealth government advisory body), the CEO of a national NGO 
primarily dealing with individuals with severe mental illness (Mental 
Illness Fellowship of Australia) and the CEO of a national organisation 
primarily dealing with individuals with common mental disorders
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(beyond blue). To provide a state perspective I included the CEO of a 
peak state mental health NGO (Queensland Mental Health Alliance). To 
provide a professional provider perspective I chose the Royal Ausralian 
and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists as this was the only group 
actively involved with the Commonwealth across the twenty year period. 
The two technical consultants interviewed were considered to be the 
most influential consultants used by the Commonwealth in the twenty 
year period.
The names, positions held by the key informants and dates of 
interview are provided in Appendix 3. Interviews were conducted by the 
candidate either by telephone or face-to-face and transcribed in full. 
Each interview was semi-structured and each interviewee was asked to 
provide responses disregarding any previous professional or personal 
relationship with the candidate). The first question was open ended:
• Why do you think the Commonwealth...?
Then more specific questions were asked about:
• the factors that led to mental health becoming recognised as a 
problem requiring policy attention;
• how the government responded to these factors; and
• how the government provided a policy solution.
Answers to the following were also elicited during the interview:
• was the policy decision consistent with party policy and 
principles?;
• was there consultation with political advisors?;
• was there agreement amongst policy elites?;
• what were the expected electoral impacts?; and
• what was the expected media reception?
When the information provided by the key informant during the 
interview is used as a data source, the reference 'key informant 
interview' in brackets appears after the name of the key informant.
4. My role as an inform ant
I was an expert key participant as well as an observer of mental health
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reform in Australia during the period covered by the thesis. Being a 
participant working in the environment and engaged in the process 
allowed for observations and a description of events unobtainable 
through other techniques (Ross and Ross 1974).
In 1989 I was appointed Director of Mental Health in the 
Queensland Department of Health and until the end of 1996 when I was 
appointed Director of Mental Health in the Commonwealth Department 
of Health and Ageing, I represented Queensland at 
Commonwealth/State meetings and on national working groups during 
which the proposals for the National Mental Health Policy and first plan 
were developed. Specifically I was the Queensland representative on an 
advisory group and then a mental health taskforce established by the 
Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council (AHMAC) to advise them on 
the options for a national mental health policy in response to the Eisen 
and Wolfenden report. I was then the Queensland representative on the 
Commonwealth/State working groups that drafted both the National 
Mental Health Policy and the firs t plan.
In 1992 I was a member of the working group which drafted 
Australia's mental health goals and targets for the Commonwealth 
government. From 1992 to 1993 I was the Queensland government's 
representative on the strategic planning group for the 
Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreements in which mental health was 
incorporated for the first time, as Schedule F to the 1993-98 Medicare 
Agreements. Between 1993 and 1998 I was chair of the AHMAC National 
Mental Health Working Group (NMHWG) which oversaw the 
implementation of the first plan. Also between 1993 and 1995 I chaired 
the National Mental Health Information Strategy Committee. In 1996 I 
chaired the Commonwealth ministerial taskforce which established the 
national mental health peak body, now the MHCA.
During 1997 and 1998 I was the Director of Mental Health in the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing. In 1999 I was 
appointed mental health specialist at the World Bank in Washington DC. 
In 2001 I took up my academic position at the University of Queensland
67
and from this position served as an advisor to the Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Ageing.
In 2002 I was the jo in t chair of the reference group established 
by AHMAC to provide advice on the 2003 to 2008 Australian Health Care 
Agreements. During 2002 and 2003 I chaired the steering committee 
which evaluated the second plan and during 2002 and 2003 I also 
chaired the steering committee which drafted the third plan 2003-2008. 
Between 2006 and 2008 I chaired the steering committee to revise the 
National Mental Health Policy.
During the period covered by this thesis, and since, I individually 
and with colleagues have published on the developments in Australian 
mental health policy. A summary of the positions I held during the 
relevant periods covered by the thesis and my main publications 
relevant to the thesis is at Appendix 4.
Participant observation is a well described methodological 
approach applied within the social sciences, particularly anthropology 
and sociology (Guest, Namey and Mitchell 2012, Kawulich 2005, 
Macionis and Plummer 2008), for collecting information. During 
participant observation research, the observer is engaged, either overtly 
or covertly, in the social environment which is being studied. In most 
participant observation research the social scientist is an observer but 
not often an authentic participant (Guest, Namey and Mitchell 2012, Lee 
2001). My role was as an authentic participant.
Participant observation has considerable utility in a field such as 
political science, although such techniques are an underused 
methodology (Bostitis 1988, Gillespie and Michelson 2011, Lee 2001, 
Ross and Ross 1974). Political scientists have studied US Congress 
whilst employed as legislative assistants and committee staff, allowing 
them direct access to the behaviours they wished to observe (Bostitis 
1988, Ross and Ross 1974). For example, as a participant in the daily 
routines of the Senate, political scientist Ralph Huitt was privy to 
intimate details of conversations, exchanges of favours, informal 
communication networks and patterns of deference and dominance
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(Bostitis 1988, Ross and Ross 1974). This information allowed him to 
analyse and describe the internal power system of the Senate, and its 
resistance to reform. Such an analysis would not have been possible 
without Huitt's active participation in the Senate. Similarly, form er 
member of the Wisconsin State Assembly and State Senate Mordecai 
Lee reported on his experience as an active participant observation in 
the Wisconsin Legislature (Lee 2001). Based on participant observation, 
Lee evaluated the nature of relationships between the politicians he 
served and administrators. He concluded that elected officials make 
decisions based on political expediency as opposed to a comprehensive 
norm defining the ir relationship with administrators.
The 'observer effect' where individuals being studied modify the ir 
behaviour due to awareness of the researcher's presence is avoided 
when the observer is a legitimate, active participant, as was my 
situation. However, a common problem is that some loss of objectivity 
can occur through being part of the group (Macionis and Plummer 
2008). To address this problem the thesis uses my observations as only 
one source of information; cross-correlating the information from all four 
sources together helps control for lim itations and bias from any 
particular source.
The influence of my perceptions on the research including on the 
thematic analysis below is a source of potential bias. Efforts were made 
to overcome this by having the coding of the themes independently 
confirmed by a research assistant. With respect to the interviews with 
the key informants, as noted all were asked to respond w ithout being 
influenced by any current or prior personal or professional relationship 
with the candidate. Whilst I believe each person did respond in this way, 
I have no way to independently confirming this.
5. Data analysis
The nature of the research questions and data collected precluded the 
adoption of a conventional meta-analytic approach. Thematic analysis 
has been identified as a solution to the synthesis of qualitative data
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(Braun and Clarke 2006, Dixon-Woods et al. 2005, Thomas and Harden 
2008) Thematic analysis:
...involves the identification of prominent or recurrent themes in 
the literature, and summarising the findings of different studies 
under them atic headings (Dixon-Woods et al. 2005).
Guidelines for the conduct of a thematic analysis vary (Braun and 
Clarke 2006); this thesis follows the stages of data coding described by 
Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006).
Eligible documents for which full text versions could be identified 
were imported for coding into the qualitative analysis software program 
QSR -  NVivo (version 9.2). An initial deductive coding manual was 
created (see Figure 3), which was informed by a preliminary 
examination of the available data. Given the large volume of literature 
to be searched the thematic analysis was limited to critical sections of 
documents. For large reports and documents executive summaries and 
introductions were analysed. The results, discussions and conclusions 
sections of peer reviewed journal articles were coded. For articles which 




The search strategy identifying the number of data sources is 
summarised in Figure 2.
Figure 2: search strategy flow chart
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Via OVID (n = 181)
Via In fo rm it (n 320)
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generic search string 
applied to  abstracts 
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EM BASE (n = 601) 
MEDLINE (n = 409) 
PsycINFO (n = 212)
AMI ( n -  108)
Health & Society (n -  251) 
APAFT (n -  326)
318 sources w ith data eligible fo r
thematic analysis
Grey literature sources (n -  142)
Peer reviewed journal (n = 132)
Media, conference or web based sources 
(n = 37)
Books (n -  7)
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During the them atic analysis of literature sources, 5 themes became 
evident (see Figure 3).






























The progression through documents led to the identification of new 
inductive codes which were subsequently applied to earlier data sources. 
The coding manual was refined through discussion and juxtaposition of 
codes to ensure an accurate representation of the material was being 
developed. The final set of codes and themes is in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Final set of codes and them es
Themes










• Human rights violations/ inequality/ 
discrimination




• Unmet/ met need
• Deinstitutionalisation -  shortcomings, 
failures, consequences
• Linkages -  intersectoral (between 
health and housing, employment, 
welfare), and within the health sector
• Service focus/ responsibilities -  
promotion, prevention, early 
intervention, diagnostic severity/ 
emphasis, State vs. federal
• Infrastructure
• Financial
• Human - workforce
• Outcomes
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In a subsequent analysis, these themes were applied to 
Parliamentary records. This complementary analysis aimed to 
investigate the level of agreement between themes identified during the 
analysis of literature sources, and the relevant content discussed in the 
Commonwealth Parliament and its committees during the periods of 
interest.
There was a steady increase in the frequency of references to 
mental health over the twenty year period covered by the thesis. When 
limited only to the Hansard search there was a steady increase in 
references to mental health issues over the period with a dramatic 
increase just prior to the COAG meetings in 2006 (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Record over tim e of the number of references to 'm ental, m entally, 
psychiatric, psychiatrically, psychiatry, or psychiatrist' in Senate and House 
Hansard
Number of references
r ? f -
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When all Parliamentary collections were searched, the number of 
references to mental health increased dramatically from 2000, to over 
10,000 references in 2005 (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Record over tim e of the number of references to 'm ental, m entally, 





To conclude, a systematic search of the published literature from 
January 1980 until April 2011 produced 318 primary and secondary 
sources with data eligible for thematic analysis. From the thematic 
analysis, five themes within mental health policy were evident -  human 
rights and community attitudes; community need; service structure; 
service quality and effectiveness; and resources. A search of the 
Parliamentary records was also undertaken covering the three relevant 
periods, 1 April 1991 to 30 June 1994; 1 April 1997 to 30 June 1998; 
and 1 April 2005 to 31 August 2006. The information from the key 
informant interviews, when combined with that from the literature 
search and Parliamentary collections search, allow data triangulation 
(Patton 2002). My views as an expert key participant observer provide a 
fourth perspective.
The information generated by the literature reviews on both the 
problems facing mental health, and policy solutions proposed, is 
organised under the headings of these five themes for each policy 
window in chapters 6 to 8. Quotations from primary and secondary 
source literature and the key informant interviews are provided where 
relevant to illustrate the content coded within each theme.
In the next chapter I describe the developments that have 
occurred in mental health services historically and more specifically in 
Australia in the decades prior to 1988. By doing this the chapter sets the 
context for the mental health policy and service reform that occurred 
between 1998 and 2008.
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CHAPTER 5 -  The Context for Mental Health service reform
Chapter 3 provided a brief overview of the mental health policy 
literature. This chapter describes the developments in mental health 
services generally and in particular focuses on the provision of mental 
health services in Australia prior to 1988. This context is im portant as 
mental health policy and service reform is, as already noted, cyclical and 
the developments that are described over the 20 years in this thesis 
occurred within the context of the preceding policies and services.
1. Historical context for m ental health services
I t  is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the history of mental health services, which has been well 
documented elsewhere (e.g. Lewis 1988, Shorter 1997). Identifiable 
descriptions of states we would today call mental disorders or illness are 
known from the world's surviving ancient medical texts as well as 
traditional beliefs persisting in modern societies. Maladaptive mental 
states, persistent distress, altering of the psyche, changes in 
socialisation and other diagnostic features may predate written records 
and the origins of agriculture (Millon 2004, 460). Historically,
management of mental illness has been characterised by variations in 
approach due to evolving and conflicting influences in the wider social 
environment (Lewis 1988, Shorter 1997, Zaehner 1969). Factors which 
have been shown to influence mental health policy and the management 
of mental illness include prevailing ideology about the causes of mental 
illness, societal stigma, economic and political conditions, and the 
influence of key public figures (WHO 2001a, Lewis 1988, Rocheford 
1997, Shorter 1997).
Historically the societal stigma attached to mental illness, cultural 
conservatism and an intolerance of abnormal behaviour often led to the 
marginalisation within society of people with mental illness. The
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industrial revolution between the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries 
resulted in major social and economic changes in Europe and North 
America. In many countries, urbanisation resulted in crowded living in 
larger population centres and a breakdown of extended family supports 
often found in smaller provincial towns and villages which had 
traditionally provided for care for disabled individuals (including people 
with psychiatric disability arising from mental illness). The societal 
response was to remove individuals whose behaviour was considered 
deviant (for example those with mental illness, substance abuse or 
neurological conditions) into custodial settings and alms houses 
(Mandiberg 1996, Munakata 1986, Shorter 1997).
Over time these facilities grew in size and became known as 
asylums. Asylums were established in virtually all the colonies occupied 
by European countries and today asylums are found throughout Africa, 
the Indian subcontinent, Asia, North and South America as well as 
Australia and New Zealand. The movement of people with mental illness 
into asylums was in some countries based on the assumption that 
relocating these people, with poorly understood illnesses and disabilities, 
from the newly industrialised centres into rural areas would in some way 
improve their condition. However the asylums were not well supported 
by financial or human resources and very few effective treatments for 
mental illness were available. As a result physical and behavioural 
restraints and institutional control became the norm and human rights 
abuses were commonplace (Shorter 1997).
Moves to improve the conditions in the asylums were promoted 
by individuals such as Philippe Pinel (1794-1826), William Tuke (1732- 
1822), and Dorothea Dix (1802-87). They were critical of the harsh 
conditions and custodial settings which gave rise to the abuse of human 
rights, and questioned the practice of institutionalisation as an 
instrument of social control over those with mental illness. By the late 
1800s, changes had been made to the environments of some asylums in 
an attempt to provide more humane care.
Other attempts to provide better care introduced in asylums in
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North America and Europe included moving individuals to smaller 
communities in rural settings. This involved individuals with mental 
illness being encouraged to undertake manual work (Friedman 1990). 
However the lack of effective treatments for mental illness still meant 
that care was largely custodial and punitive behavioural management 
was often used to control the more overt disturbances caused by mental 
illness.
There were virtually no effective medical or psychological 
treatments for mental illness until the early 1900s. Freudian 
psychoanalysis was introduced in the 1890s and early 1900s but did not 
prove effective for those patients in the asylums (but was arguably more 
effective for mild mental disorders which were treated in non-inpatient 
settings). In 1917 in Vienna, Julius Wagner-Jauregg (1857-1940) 
successfully treated some patients with psychosis by inoculating them 
with malaria to induce high fever. These patients had a mental illness 
caused by neurosyphilis (then called general paresis of the insane). For 
this work Wagner-Jauregg won the 1927 Nobel Prize in Medicine. The 
discovery of the bacterial basis of brain diseases (which paralleled 
developments in other areas of medicine) started to change the 
therapeutic pessimism which existed amongst many mental health 
practitioners.
There were further developments in therapy including the 
introduction of electroconvulsive treatm ent by Ugo Cerletti in 1937 and 
the discovery of the first effective antipsychotic medication, 
chlorpromazine, in 1952 by Delay and Deniker (Lopez-Munoz et al. 
2005). There followed a series of effective pharmacological treatments 
which controlled the symptoms of, but did not cure, mental illnesses.
Prior to the introduction of these effective pharmacological agents 
asylums had become 'vast warehouses for the chronically insane and 
demented' (Shorter 1997). Grob described the factors that shaped the 
transformation of public policy from an institutional to community focus, 
between the 1940s and 1960s in the United States and these also 
applied to varying degrees in Australia. One of the drivers was the
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changing profile of the patient populations in those hospitals, with short 
stay acute admissions gradually replacing iong-term institutionalisation. 
He described how this change in the patient population contributed to 
the creation of a more 'depressing internal institutional environment that 
appeared to have few redeeming qualities' (Grob 1987). As the patient 
population changed over decades, the initially therapeutic intent of 
these facilities changed to a more custodial role.
At the same time, advances in academic psychiatry were 
predominantly in areas (such as psychoanalysis) that provided 
treatments for individuals with less severe mental disorders, not those 
disorders seen in the psychiatric hospitals. Similarly, attention directed 
to improving treatm ent of m ilitary personnel returning from World War I 
and World War II did not benefit the long term institutionalised patients, 
as they used clinical interventions that were short-term  and undertaken 
outside hospitals. These developments further marginalised psychiatric 
hospitals from 'm odern' psychiatric practices.
By the early 1960s the place of the psychiatric hospital as the 
centre of mental health policy was over. The development of new 
psychotropic drugs and a change in community attitudes to institutional 
care as well as media criticism of the conditions in the psychiatric 
hospitals all led to the promotion of community care as a viable policy 
alternative. Community mental health services expanded throughout 
most developed countries during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, although 
the extent to which these services provided adequate care for those 
individuals discharged from, or who could no longer be admitted to, 
psychiatric hospitals was very limited (Drake et al. 2003).
2. Mental health and related services in Australia before 1988
The history of mental health services in Australia to 1980 has been well 
documented (Lewis 1988). Along with other countries Australia has seen 
enormous changes to mental health services since Governor Macquarie 
established the first psychiatric hospital in a converted farmhouse at 
Castle Hill in Sydney in 1811. Prior to this psychiatric hospital (asylum)
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being opened patients were kept in Parramatta gaol. In 1825 the 
farmhouse at Castle Hill was found unfit for habitation and patients were 
moved to Liverpool Court House, which served as an asylum until 1838 
when the firs t purpose-built mental asylum was built, the Tarban Creek 
Asylum which eventually became part of the Gladesville Psychiatric 
Hospital. Psychiatric hospitals were subsequently established throughout 
New South Wales starting with the asylums at Parramatta in 1848, 
Newcastle in 1872 and Goulburn in 1894 (New South Wales Government 
n.d.). Psychiatric outpatient clinics were also subsequently established 
at general hospitals.
Psychiatric hospitals were established in every State, although not 
in the Northern Territory or the Australian Capital Territory because of 
the ir smaller populations. In Victoria the Yarra Bend Asylum opened in 
1848, the Ararat Asylum in 1865 and the Kew Asylum in Melbourne 
(later known as Willsmere Hospital) in 1871 (Malcolm 2009). Before the 
turn of the century five more asylums were built in Victoria (Stoller and 
Arscott 1955). Queensland's first asylum, Woogaroo Asylum, was 
opened at Goodna near Brisbane in 1865 and patients were transferred 
by river to the hospital from Petrie Terrace ja il. Following the 
establishment of Woogaroo facilities were opened in Toowoomba and 
Charters Towers in north Queensland (Patrick 1987). In Western 
Australia, the Fremantle Asylum was established in 1861 and in 1903 
the Claremont Hospital for the Insane near Perth was opened (Skerritt 
et al. 2001). In South Australia a rented house was gazetted as a public 
asylum in 1846. In 1852 the Adelaide Asylum was opened and in 1870 
the Parkside Asylum (now Glenside Psychiatric Hospital) opened 
(Goldney 2007). In Tasmania, New Norfolk, 22 miles from Hobart, the 
Convict Invalid Hospital (later The Hospital for the Insane) opened in 
1831 and was used as the first asylum in that State (Piddock 2001).
At Federation on 1 January 1901 the six self-governing British 
colonies became the original States. Section 51 of the Australian 
Constitution allocated a very small role for the Commonwealth 
government in health matters, essentially assigning only quarantine
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powers to prevent disease entering the country (ABS 1980, 225). In the 
period up to World War II, State government raised funding to provide 
services through a range of State based taxes, the most important of 
which was personal income tax. In 1942 the Commonwealth 
government unilaterally used its expanded wartime powers to assume 
control over income taxation. The loss of States tax powers made them 
reliant on Commonwealth government grants for a large proportion of 
the revenue they require for expenditures in the ir areas of responsibility 
such as health services. The response to this mismatch between 
revenue raising and expenditure responsibilities, known as vertical fiscal 
imbalance, was for the Commonwealth government to make transfers to 
State governments to help fund State run services.
Prior to 1948, the Commonwealth government had no 
involvement in the provision of public mental health services. In 1946 
the Chifley Labor government introduced an amendment to Section 51 
of the Constitution, which enabled the Commonwealth government to 
legislate on 'pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits and medical 
and dental services'. As part of these reforms in 1946 the 
Commonwealth government introduced hospital benefits for patients in 
public hospitals. No provision was made for patients in psychiatric 
hospitals at that time.
However, to help meet the cost of maintaining patients in these 
hospitals the Commonwealth Parliament passed the Mental Institutions  
Benefits Act in 1948. This Act allowed the Commonwealth government 
to enter into agreements with the State governments. These 
agreements provided that State governments would cease making 
charges for the maintenance of psychiatric patients and in return the 
Commonwealth government would pay the State governments a benefit 
based on the amount which had been previously collected by the States 
from the relatives of patients in psychiatric hospitals by way of charges 
for maintenance. These agreements operated for five years and 
terminated in the latter half of 1954. The amount contributed by the 
Commonwealth government during the operation of the agreements was
83
approximately one shilling (ten cents) a day for each patient (Bureau of 
Census and Statistics 1966, 560).
Victoria was the firs t State to commence the reforms to the 
psychiatric hospitals (Lewis 1988). As early as 1948, Director of the 
Victorian Mental Hygiene Authority Dr Alan Stoller (1948) had argued 
that mental health services needed to be broadened to take a public 
health approach and that mental health policy should not be dominated 
by the role of the psychiatric hospitals. Stoller argued that the 
Commonwealth government should assume responsibility, including 
financing, for mental health care. When the Mental Institutions Benefits 
Act agreements term inated in 1954, the Commonwealth government, 
with the cooperation of the State governments, held a national inquiry 
into the state of the psychiatric hospitals carried out by Stoller and 
Arscott (1955). Their report argued that while overcrowding in the 
hospitals was a major problem and the provision of more beds the most 
urgent need, other accommodation and rehabilitation facilities were also 
required. The history of the lack of suitable care for patients in these 
hospitals is well documented (Lewis 1988).
Another report by the Australasian Association of Psychiatrists 
(the predecessor of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Psychiatrists (RANZCP) formed in 1946) criticised the overcrowding and 
poor conditions in State psychiatric hospitals in 1950 (Pargiter, 1991). 
In response to these reports the Commonwealth government changed 
its involvement from providing a bed day subsidy to providing funding 
for capital works (Pargiter, 1991).
The Health Minister Earle Page told the Commonwealth Parliament 
in September 1955 that overcrowding was the most urgent problem, 
and that the Commonwealth government would provide State 
governments with £10 million towards the cost of 10,000 new beds, on 
the basis of a £1 subsidy for each £2 spent by the State governments 
(Parliament of Australia 1955). This funding was provided through the 
States Grants (Mental Institutions) Act of 1955 which revoked the 
Mental Institutions Benefits Act 1948. All State governments accepted
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the Commonwealth government offer of additional finance for these 
beds but were left with bearing the fuli costs of maintaining patients in 
the psychiatric hospitals (Lewis 1988, 78).
Because each £1 of Commonwealth government funding had to 
be matched by £2 from the State governments, by 1963 one quarter of 
the total grant under the States Grants (Mental Institu tions) Act 1955 
had not been distributed. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth government 
announced in November 1963 its intention to continue assistance to the 
State governments towards capital costs on a sim ilar basis for a period 
of three years. In May 1964 the States Grants (Mental Institutions) Act 
1964 was passed to provide for the continuation of Commonwealth 
government aid of £1 for every £2 of capital expenditure by the State 
governments on mental health facilities. The provisions of this Act 
continued until 30 June 1973 when it was replaced by the Mental Health 
and Related Services Assistance Act 1973 which was introduced by the 
Whitlam Labor government that had been elected the previous year. The 
new government promoted community care in health and disability 
services and took a wider view of mental health services. The capital 
grants under this legislation provided funding for community services 
including alcohol and drug dependence services (ABS 1975, 456). The 
funding was not to be used for psychiatric hospitals but did include 
funding for supported accommodation facilities in the community. In 
addition to the funding for capital works, the legislation provided grants 
to meet the maintenance costs of approved non-residential services as 
well as teaching, research and evaluation programs in the mental health 
sector (Scotton and Ferber 1980, 246). In the first two years $7.5 
million per year was provided.
Final payments under the States Grants (Mental Health 
Institu tions) Act 1964 were made in 1973-74. Expenditure after this was 
made under the Community Health Program and the Hospital 
Construction Program, controlled and funded by the Hospital and Health 
Services Commission (ABS 1976, 460). From 1973-74 to 1974-75 
grants totalling $45.7 million were made to the State governments
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under the Community Health Program. The grants were directed to the 
development of community-based health services such as health centres 
and centres providing services for mental health, alcoholism, drug 
dependency (ABS 1976, 575) and the treatm ent of repatriation patients 
(ABS 1978, 232). The Labor government provided funding for 90% of 
the operating costs in 1974-75 but the Coalition government reduced 
this to 75% in 1977-78 and 50% in 1978-79 (Lewis 1988).
The Whitlam Labor government's Medibank scheme, Australia's 
firs t universal health insurance scheme, commenced on 1 July 1975. The 
Medical Benefits Schedule released in April 1975 included subsidies for 
private sector general practitioners and psychiatrists treating patients 
with mental illness.
The 'Hospitals' section of the Medibank scheme resulted in 
agreements between the Commonwealth government and the State 
governments for the Commonwealth government to share equally with 
the State governments the net operating costs of recognised (i.e. public) 
hospitals covered by the agreements. The agreements commenced on 
the following dates: South Australia and Tasmania, 1 July 1975; Victoria 
and Western Australia, 1 August 1975; Queensland, 1 September 1975; 
and New South Wales, 1 October 1975 (ABS 1976, 450). The 
agreements included psychiatric patients admitted to psychiatric wards 
in general hospitals, but not those in separate psychiatric hospitals, 
even if they were acute patients similar to those admitted to general 
hospitals.
In 1976, after the Fraser government was elected, the State 
governments attempted unsuccessfully to have Commonwealth 
government funding provided for psychiatric patients, as the following 
response to a question on notice in Parliament by the Health Minister 
Ralph Hunt indicates (Parliament of Australia 1977):
Under the provisions of the Health Insurance Act, psychiatric 
patients in private hospitals and in public/general hospitals are 
eligible for insurance coverage of the ir hospital expenses, but 
patients treated in State mental hospitals are not.
At the 1976 Health Ministers' Conference a submission was made 
by the States that patients in acute psychiatric hospitals-defined
86
as hospitals or designated portions of hospitals which provide 
facilities, services and trea tm en ts  equivalent to those provided by 
s im ila r sections of public hospitals- come under the Medibank 
cost-sharing arrangem ents. This submission was closely examined 
and, while I have some sym pathy fo r the views of the States, I 
would find it particu la rly  d ifficu lt to put forward such an increase 
in costs to the Com m onwealth in the present economic clim ate.
The Governm ent could not accept these changes at the present 
tim e, but we will be looking at the issue w ith the aim o f achieving 
the best results fo r these patients. Nevertheless, I m ust point out 
tha t the raising of charges is a State responsibility.
Funding for non-clinical community services had been provided 
initially under the Commonwealth Handicapped Persons Act of 1974 and 
social income support and labour market programs underwent a major 
overhaul to meet the requirements of people with disabilities. However 
these focused predominantly on people with physical, sensory and 
intellectual disability. During the 1980s new Commonwealth government 
policy frameworks were introduced for people with disabilities living in 
the community. Following the re-election of the Labor government in 
December 1983, the Home and Community Care Act 1985 established a 
framework for the delivery of community care services in Australia. It 
was a jo in t Commonwealth/State program funded under section 96 of 
the Constitution. The program was designed to assist State, Territory 
and local governments and non-government organisations (NGOs) to 
provide basic community support and maintenance services, particularly 
for the aged and disabled in need of long-term care in the community at 
risk of long term institutionalisation. Services included domestic 
assistance, personal care, respite, nursing care and transport.
The Home and Community Care Bill 1985 (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) amended four existing Acts (the Delivered Meals Subsidy 
Act 1970, the Home Nursing Subsidy Act 1956, the States Grants (Home 
Care) Act 1969, and the States Grants (Paramedical Services) Act 
1969), and consolidated them within a single program, the Home and 
Community Care (HACC) Program. From its inception HACC was 
oriented towards the needs of older adults. However, younger people 
with moderate to severe disabilities were also recognised within the
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legislation as a target population. Numerous groups advocated for the 
HACC program to include people with psychiatric disability as qualifying 
people for new services (Parliament of Australia 1985b, 3074). However, 
there was concern from the Commonwealth government that, given the 
large (but unmeasured) proportion of the HACC target population 
classified as psychiatrically disabled, the State and Territory 
governments may shift costs from psychiatric institutional care (a State 
responsibility) to the Federal Budget. According to the responsible 
Minister, Senator Grimes (Parliament of Australia 1985c, 569):
...The home and community care program is designed to provide 
home services for people who need them, again to keep them out 
of institutions, both people who are disabled and people who are 
aged. Obviously, some people under this care will be classified as 
being psychiatrically ill and, therefore, one cannot arbitrarily 
exclude them from such a program.
I qualify all that by saying that I do not believe it would be right 
for State governments -  I am not suggesting that any State 
government would be so outrageous as to do so -  to believe they 
could take advantage of these programs to transfer the funding 
from programs that were traditionally theirs to the Federal 
Budget. Should they do so they will not get much co-operation 
from me or from the Treasurer.
This view was reinforced during the second reading speech for the 
Bill by Senator Grimes in December 1985 (Parliament of Australia 
1985a):
I suppose if I had any aims or a dream in this area it would be 
that one day we would have in this country the provision of 
adequate services for people who need them for post-acute care, 
for palliative care, for people who have psychiatric as well as 
physical disorders, for disorders of the aged and other disabilities 
... [however] we are inhibited from developing such a utopia, I 
suppose, by basically two things. The first, obviously, is a lack of 
funds. The cost of producing such universal services is 
considerable ... The second thing that bedevils us is history ... the 
States will do what they have done since Federation - they will 
attempt, w ithout any ill will, to transfer the cost of the ir programs 
to the federal government. I t  was for this reason that we decided 
that the predominant services that we would provide under the 
home and community care program would be for aged and 
chronically disabled people. We decided that psychiatric services 
would be excluded ... but people with psychiatric disabilities have 
access to HACC services if they are otherwise assessed as being in 
need of these home and community care services and these 
services are not being used as a substitute for State services.
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The policy interpretation placed on this was that people with a 
mental iilness could access HACC services if they met the eligibility 
criteria, other than for the ir psychiatric disability. Similarly people with 
psychiatric disabilities were initially excluded from coverage in the 
Disability Services Bill 1986, however there was mounting public and 
political opposition from both the Opposition and the Australian 
Democrats to this exclusion evident when it was being debated:
One of our most compelling concerns relates to the need to 
ensure equity as between people with a disability. By excluding 
those organisations for people with a predominantly psychiatric 
disability from becoming eligible organisations for the purposes of 
this legislation, we think the equity principle has been breached ... 
Therefore, we will move the amendment we have circulated or 
support the amendment that the Australian Democrats have 
circulated, to include those with psychiatric disability within the 
purview of the Bill as a target group, because we think that is fair 
and logical (Parliament of Australia 1986d).
It is of concern, however, to the Australian Democrats that people 
with psychiatric disabilities are excluded from the ambit of this 
legislation ... people with psychiatric disabilities have particular 
needs ...[a] very sim ilar list to the list of needs which people with 
other disabilities are recognised as having. The Minister has 
argued that psychiatric disability should remain a State 
responsibility [but] the Commonwealth government gets involved 
in a range of areas which can be seen to be significantly within 
the responsibility of State governments. The exclusion of the 
psychiatrically disabled has been noted by the Human Rights 
Commission as being a breach of human rights ... people with 
disabilities, whatever the origin, nature, type and degree of 
disability, have the same fundamental rights as all members of 
Australian society (Parliament of Australia 1986b).
The Opposition and Democrats forced an amendment to have 
psychiatric disability included in the legislation and the government 
accepted this (Parliament of Australia 1986c):
There are certain problems with the legislation ... The first 
difficulty are the exclusion, as some honourable senators see it, 
from the target group of people with psychiatric disability. The 
Opposition and the Australian Democrats wish to, and apparently 
will, add to the definition by including the term 'psychiatric'. The 
legislation will not fall as a result of that inclusion. The world will 
not change. If  the Parliament wishes to include it I will have to 
accept it.
Therefore under the Disability Services Act (DSA) 1986, clinical 
treatm ent for people with psychiatric disabilities remained a State and
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Territory government responsibility but these individuals became eligible 
for support services provided by the DSA. However the Commonwealth 
government maintained that the DSA created no obligation or 
responsibility on its part to provide these services. I t  was careful to 
distinguish eligibility from responsibility and this remained a contentious 
issue after the passage of the legislation, with different jurisdictions 
interpreting the legislation in different, and sometimes contradictory, 
ways (Lindsay 1996).
In practice, despite the amendment forced by the Senate, people 
with psychiatric disability were still informally excluded by being given 
low priority in access to DSA services with restrictive guidelines and 
informal barriers. This continued to be a m atter of political and 
bureaucratic controversy as, for example, during the October 1989 
Senate Estimates Hearings with Senator Baume questioning the First 
Assistant Secretary, Disability Programs Division, Department of 
Community Services and Health (Parliament of Australia 1989):
SENATOR PETER BAUME- Would it be unfa ir then to ask w hether 
th is is not a case where the Parliament has determ ined one th ing 
and the Executive governm ent has determ ined to do another 
thing?
MR FLETCHER- I th ink tha t is a m atte r of policy.
SENATOR PETER BAUME- I t  is a m atte r o f fact, I th ink. I am not 
asking advice, I am asking what the facts are. The Parliament has 
determ ined, over the objections of the Governm ent, tha t those 
w ith psychiatric disabilities should be included. The Governm ent 
has taken no action to include them . I th ink  tha t is the fact, is it 
not?
MR FLETCHER- When you say 'taken no action ', it has not 
positively gone out and said 'They are excluded' in the s tric test 
possible sense. What it is saying is tha t, given the rationing of the 
resources tha t are available, there are o the r d isability  types and 
services th a t need to be provided to them  which would be given 
p rio rity .
And again in Parliament (Parliament of Australia 1990):
Senator POWELL- My question is directed to the M inister 
representing the Minister fo r Com m unity Services and Health and 
relates to the Governm ent's trea tm en t of the psychiatricaily 
disabled under the provisions of the D isability Services Act. I 
remind the M inister of the statem ent made by Senator Grimes,
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the responsible Minister at the time of passage of that Act, that - 
and I quote from Hansard of 20 November 1986-'the world will 
not change' and 'the way I administer the legislation, in fact, it 
will not cost anything at all'. This statement was made during 
debate on the successful Australian Democrats amendment which 
included, as a target group, the psychiatrically disabled. What is 
the Government's current policy on funding of services targeted 
for people with psychiatric disability?
Senator TATE- Senator Powell was kind enough to give a little  
preliminary notice of this question, and I have received an answer 
from the Minister. There is no question that people with 
psychiatric disabilities are eligible for services under the Disability 
Services Act. At the present time, policy is that new services 
primarily targeted for people with psychiatric disabilities will 
receive a lower priority for funding under the disability services 
program. However, they are not excluded from services, and 
some are already receiving services.
A 1991 census which reviewed Commonwealth-funded disability 
services found that, although 26% of people receiving disability-related 
income support had psychiatric disability, people with psychiatric 
disability accounted for only 4% of long-term funded services and 2.2% 
of all new services (1991). Thus individuals with mental illness living in 
the community not only had limited access to clinical services but were 
largely excluded from accessing government-provided or subsidised 
accommodation and support services necessary to sustain a reasonable 
quality of life.
With the Commonwealth government remaining disengaged from 
mental health and each State and Territory retaining responsibility for 
planning, funding and delivering their public mental health services 
(Dewdney 1987) ad hoc reforms continued. Notwithstanding the 
concerns about their physical conditions and quality of care, psychiatric 
hospitals remained at the centre of the public mental health service for 
over a century. The relative size of the psychiatric hospitals remained 
constant from around 1900 until the mid-1950s (Doessel et al. 2005). 
Mental health services continued to be the subject of criticism or scandal 
often leading to a public inquiry after which there was a brief period of 
reform but then years of neglect. Lipton (1983) noted that as of the 
early 1980s there had been eleven boards of inquiry or select 
Parliamentary committees in Victoria alone. Most of these followed a
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media campaign indicting the government for the poor and inhumane 
care it had provided in the psychiatric hospitals. The other Australian 
State and Territory governments had sim ilar experiences. However, 
following these repeated and increasingly well-publicised inquiries, the 
introduction of effective psychiatric drugs and international trends 
toward less restrictive modes of treatm ent, the State and Territory 
governments began to decrease the number of beds in the psychiatric 
hospitals from around the late 1950s (Doessel et al. 2005, Lewis 1988). 
The reduction in size of these hospitals followed a process of preventing 
inappropriate admissions as well as discharging patients into the 
community. Dax (1961) described these two stages, with 'suitable 
patients from hospitals' discharged to various accommodation options in 
the community and patient certification and hospital admissions being 
avoided. This process was accompanied by the growth of private 
treatm ent and private hospitals and the establishment of psychiatric 
wards in general hospitals.
The population of the psychiatric hospitals declined from 29,500 
in the early 1960s, when Australia's population was 10.5 million (281 
beds per 100,000) to 6750 inpatients for a population of 17 million in 
1992 (40 beds per 100,000) (National Health Strategy 1993). This de­
institutionalisation was uncoordinated and under-resourced with funding 
generally not following patients to provide community mental health 
services. Even as recently as the early 1990s, over 70% of the State 
and Territory governments' mental health budgets were consumed by 
hospital services (National Health Strategy 1993).
Many people with mental illness who were moved into the 
community could not access sufficient clinical care, as much of the State 
and Territory governments' mental health budget were still being spent 
in the hospitals and most of the Commonwealth government-funded 
community support services remained inaccessible. The outcome was 
often that people became homeless, lived in unsatisfactory residential 
facilities in the community or were inappropriately placed in nursing 
homes or correctional facilities.
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3. Conclusion
There had been has been a general view that the Commonwealth 
government was not involved in assisting the States in the care of 
people with mental illness prior to the National Mental Health Policy and 
firs t plan in 1992. I t  is true that, prior to 1948 the Commonwealth 
government had no involvement in the provision of public mental health 
services. However in 1948 the Commonwealth government started 
contributing to care of patients in psychiatric hospitals. From 1955 the 
focus of Commonwealth support changed to a contribution to the cost of 
new beds, in an attem pt to address overcrowding in psychiatric 
hospitals. This support continued until 1973 when it was replaced by 
support for services in the community, including supported 
accommodation, but not for psychiatric hospitals. Under Medibank, 
introduced in 1975 the Commonwealth government contributed to the 
operating costs of public hospitals, including psychiatric patients in 
general hospitals but not to those in separate psychiatric hospitals.
The major Commonwealth funding initiatives for community 
support services, social income support and labour market programs for 
people with disabilities during the 1970s and 1980s did not provide for 
the inclusion of people with psychiatric disability, in large part due to 
concern the State and Territory governments might shift costs from 
psychiatric institutional care (then clearly seen as a State responsibility) 
to the Commonwealth. In addition State governments did not ensure 
adequate clinical services were provided in the community. This lack of 
access to services in the community was the major contributor to the 
personal and social problems that arose from de-institutionalisation, 
creating a major health and social policy problem for Australia (as was 
the case in other countries) as is discussed further in Chapter 5.
The next three chapters cover the periods 1988 to 1996 (Chapter 
6), 1996 to 2003 (Chapter 7) and 2003 to 2008 (Chapter 8). For each 
period I identify the problems that were prominent at the time, the 
solutions proposed for those problems and the prevailing 
Commonwealth political environment that led to the adoption of the
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1992 National Mental Health Policy and the firs t plan (Chapter 6), the 
Second National Mental Health Plan (Chapter 7) and the COAG National 
Action Plan on Mental Health (Chapter 8).
As described in Chapter 4, the thematic analysis undertaken of 
the published literature and Parliamentary records identified five themes 
that described the issues prominent in mental health:
1. Human rights and community attitudes
2. Community need
3. Service structure
4. Service quality and effectiveness
5. Resources
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 these themes are used as headings to 
structure the discussion of the most prominent problem areas and policy 
responses described in the literature.
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CHAPTER 6 -  a national mental health policy for australia
This chapter focuses on the years 1988 to 1996. In this chapter I 
describe the problems, the proposed solutions for these problems and 
the national political environment that led to the development and 
adoption of the 1992 National Mental Health Policy and the first plan for 
1993-98 (Australian Health Ministers 1992a).
As described in Chapter 4, the thematic analysis undertaken of 
the published literature and Parliamentary records for these years 
identified five principal emergent themes relating to the issues in mental 
health: human rights and community attitudes; community need; 
service structure; service quality and effectiveness; and resources. I use 
these themes as an organising framework to discuss the most prominent 
problem areas and policy responses described in the literature.
1. Themes
1.1 Human Rights and Community Attitudes  
Problem areas
I identified two main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme: human rights abuses 
and stigma and discrimination.
(a) Human rights abuses
I found references to overt human rights abuses and 
neglect in a number of treatm ent settings, particularly in 
stand-alone psychiatric hospitals. As noted in Chapter 5, 
problems were becoming increasingly evident in the larger 
of these institutions. Several highly publicised inquiries into 
the care of residents with mental illness had found 
negligent, unsafe, unethical and unlawful treatm ent 
practices within these institutions (Carter 1991, Hoult and
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Burchmore 1994, Slattery 1990, Tobin 1993). The 
literature provides an account of the public reaction to the 
disclosure of this abuse and neglect; specifically expression 
of feelings of guilt and a sense of obligation by members of 
the community to respond to the plight of individuals 
described in the intense publicity surrounding public 
inquiries. Such public reactions had often precipitated 
commissions or inquiries in one particular facility and local 
reform ist activity; but these were usually short lived and 
often followed by further years of neglect (Hoult and 
Burchmore 1994, Upton 1983).
However, over time the momentum for change built 
to a national level of support for a human rights approach 
to mental health policy. In June 1990 the firs t Federal 
Human Rights Commissioner of Australia Brian Burdekin 
announced a national inquiry into the human rights of 
people with mental illness which became known as the 
Burdekin Inquiry (HREOC 1993).
Public hearings commenced in April 1991 and were 
held over 15 months in all States and Territories with 456 
witnesses appearing before the inquiry during the hearings. 
Private hearings, informal meetings and public forums for 
consumers and carers were also held. Over 820 written 
submissions from individuals affected by mental illness, 
carers, community organisations, clinicians, other mental 
health professionals and government authorities were 
received. The final report was released in October 1993 and 
provided a comprehensive description of the significant 
problems experienced by people with mental illness and 
their carers, not only in hospitals but also in the community 
(HREOC 1993).
(b) Stigma and discrimination
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The second major problem identified in the literature was 
widespread ignorance regarding the nature and prevalence 
of mental illness in the community. Stigma and 
discrimination against people with mental illnesses was 
pervasive (HREOC 1993, Lea and Lowrey 1990, Raphael 
1984). The discharge of psychiatric patients into the 
community w ithout adequate support had reinforced pre­
existing public concerns about the dangerousness of people 
with mental illness (Best 1985, Upton 1983). A common 
public view was that there was a need for continued 
institutionalisation to ensure community safety. 
Stigmatising and discrim inatory attitudes were also held by 
those providing services needed by people with mental 
illness. These attitudes were described as systemic across 
the health, housing, employment and welfare sectors (Lea 
and Lowrey 1990, Burdekin 1990, Burdekin 1992).
For decades the mental health consumer movement 
lagged behind other areas of health related activism to help 
overcome barriers of stigma and discrimination (HREOC 
1993, 149-50, Tobin, Chen and Leathley 2002). Those in 
need of services were less organised and influential, 
compared with the ir counterparts in areas such as heart 
disease and cancer, and had commensurately less 
involvement in mental health policy and service planning. 
The stigma of mental illness contributed to the perception 
among other stakeholders, including health professionals 
and policy makers, that a person with a mental illness 
could not contribute to policy and service planning (Lea and 
Lowrey 1990).
Policy Responses
During the 1980s the Commonwealth government came under
increasing pressure from stakeholders to support a national
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approach, involving Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments, to mental health policy and service reform. There 
were several mental health groups tha t took the role of 'issue 
entrepreneurs' (Roberts et al. 2003) highlighting and promoting 
mental health as a problem needing attention. The mental health 
consumer movement began to grow in size and influence during 
the 1980s (Epstein 2005). Along with professional bodies, 
consumers began to advocate to become involved in developing 
national mental health policy and services, areas from which they 
had previously been excluded (Lea and Lowrey 1990, Beaumont 
1990).
The Australian National Association for Mental Health 
(ANAMH) and the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Psychiatrists (RANZCP) joined in an effort to increase the
influence of stakeholders. The coalition thus established between 
a mental health NGO representing consumers, carers and services 
providers (the ANAMH) led at that time by Professor Graham 
Burrows and a professional organisation (the RANZCP), led by 
Professor Beverley Raphael, acted along with others as issue 
entrepreneurs between 1984 and 1989. In 1984 these two
organisations formally proposed a policy solution to the problems 
of mental health in Australia in a submission to the
Commonwealth government. They proposed the development of a 
national mental health policy so that the Commonwealth and all 
State and Territory governments would commit to an agreed 
policy direction to correct the problems caused by de­
institutionalisation (Raphael 1984, Whiteford 1992b) and the 
considerable variation in service quality and capacity across 
jurisdictions. Between 1984 and 1989 these organisations were 
joined by individuals, other non-government bodies and 
professional organisations to agitate for national policy action.
Addressing abuses of human rights was a prominent theme 
in policy solutions proposed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A
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number of factors had coalesced: findings of substandard patient 
care by public inquiries into services, increasing advocacy by 
consumers and carers for attention to consumer rights as a way 
to improve mental health services (Lea and Lowrey 1990) and the 
June 1990 announcement of the National Inquiry into the Human 
Rights of People with Mental Illness (the Burdekin Inquiry).
The HREOC (renamed the Australian Human Rights 
Commission in 2008) was established in 1986 by legislation as an 
independent statutory authority charged with complaint handling 
as well as conducting inquiries and evaluating Australia's human 
rights compliance with international instruments to which it is a 
signatory. Commissioner Burdekin's powers did not include 
issuing enforceable undertakings, so he aimed at producing 
reports and mass media coverage potent enough to trigger 
political action.
For example, the Burdekin Report advocated for fairness in 
national consistency, on the argument that Australians should 
have sim ilar rights and expectations of their mental health 
treatm ent regardless of which State they resided in (HREOC 
1993, 896). Specific solutions were proposed to achieve this, on 
the grounds that State/ Territory mental health legislation should 
be consistent with Australia's international human rights 
obligations (ANAMH 1984, ANAMH 1985, Raphael 1984, Burdekin
1990) . In 1991 the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 98B, for the 'protection of persons with mental illness 
and the improvement of mental health care' (United Nations
1991) , providing further impetus for a human rights approach to 
mental health policy. Although not binding on United Nations 
member States, the resolution gave moral authority to the 
Commonwealth government to enter into consultation with the 
State and Territory governments about the rights of patients 
treated by the ir services (MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, 33).
A number of the policy solutions discussed in relation to the
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quality and effectiveness theme in 1.4, below, such as uniform 
standards for mental health services confirmed by independent 
accreditation agencies, and also in the structural reform of 
services such as the provision of treatm ent of people with mental 
illness within mainstream health facilities rather than separate 
psychiatric institutions, were seen as ways of safeguarding human 
rights as well as providing better quality care. Governments also 
established a mental health consumer outcomes taskforce which 
produced the National Mental Health Statem ent o f Rights and 
Responsibilities, adopted by Australian Health Ministers in March 
1991 (Australian Health Ministers 1991).
Policy responses to community stigma and discrimination 
were also proposed. These included recommendations for national 
public education and awareness programs with the goal of 
dispelling ignorance and misconceptions regarding mental illness 
(Lea and Lowrey 1990, Raphael 1984). I t  was also argued that a 
national advocacy body for mental health was needed (ANAMH 
1985), especially to continue the advocacy started by the HREOC.
1.2 Community Need 
Problem area
One problem area dominates the data sources from the literature 
review that coded to this theme -  the burden of care on families 
and carers.
(a) Families of people with mental illness
Although the theme is called 'com munity need', the 
problem area most closely related to this theme was at the 
individual level rather than at the community level. De­
institutionalisation had shifted much of the burden of care 
from hospital staff onto families, with consequent 
escalation in physical and mentai health problems for 
family carers (Beaumont 1990, McQueenie 1992). Some
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commentators suggested that w ithout adequate 
community-based mentai heaith services,
deinstitutionalisation would increase the prevalence and 
severity of mental health problems rather than reduce 
them (Beaumont 1990). Advocates argued that the societal 
burden of mental illness meant it should receive a higher 
priority than that historically allocated by governments 
(HREOC 1993, 143, Raphael 1984).
There was little in the debate at the time about the 
mental health of the broader population. However, experts 
noted the lack of epidemiological data about the mental 
health of Australians, as well as poor information systems 
specific to mental illness in the Australian population 
(Andrews 1991, Eisen and Wolfenden 1988, Raphael 1984). 
A national survey of the prevalence or service utilisation of 
people with mental illness had never been undertaken in 
Australia.
Australian researchers were therefore reliant on 
overseas data to estimate local population need (Andrews 
1991). Drawing upon these overseas studies they 
hypothesised that mental illness was prevalent in the 
community, causing significant disability and disruption to 
the family, personal and occupational functioning of those 
affected (Andrews 1991, Raphael 1984, Raphael 1993). 
Furthermore, experts suggested that there was a 
considerable unmet need for services, but that w ithout 
national data, this was impossible to confirm (Eisen and 
Wolfenden 1988).
Some experts argued that Australia was falling 
behind with regard to promotion and prevention services 
(Raphael 1993, Tippett et al. 1993) although this problem 
area did not attract much attention at the time. They 
argued that unwillingness to accept and develop preventive
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approaches as part of the service system was influenced by 
the view that since definitive 'causes' of many mental 
disorders had not been identified, prevention must be 
impossible (Tippett et al. 1993).
Policy responses
A shift was occurring in the policy agenda which had previously 
been dominated by concerns about the welfare of people 
discharged from psychiatric hospitals. The burden imposed on 
families of people with severe mental illness by de­
institutionalisation was becoming a priority for policy solutions. 
Advocates argued that existing State-based policies were 
outdated, unrelated to need, and failed to define either methods 
or responsibility for implementation. They rejected the piecemeal 
response to the social, economic and personal costs of mental 
illness as placing an unacceptable burden on families and argued 
a national response involving the Commonwealth government was 
needed (ANAMH 1984, Raphael 1984). Another argument used to 
make the case for Commonwealth involvement was that the 
human and social consequences of mental illness are matters of 
human rights and social welfare, policy areas ) that are the 
responsibility of the Commonwealth government.
Further, advocates proposed that a system of mental 
health indicators and/or a national mental health database should 
be developed which could collect and review morbidity data 
(Raphael 1984). Such a database was needed to monitor patients 
in treatment, especially in the community, and for the planning 
and evaluation of mental health services.
Although their proposals focused on responding to urgent 
and known unmet need, experts did also argue that the still 
speculative needs of the wider population should be planned for 
on the basis of epidemiological data (Andrews 1991, NATSIHC 
SHRG and AHMAC NMHWG 2004). Without this data, planning
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would remain restricted to those already known to services or 
most iikeiy to be in contact with a service, namely those 
individuals with more severe mental illness. In 1996 mental 
health was made one of the five National Health Priority areas 
reflecting the beginning of the recognition of the importance of 
population level mental health (AIHW and Department of Health 
and Family Services 1997).
1.3 Service Structure  
Problem areas
Problems with service provision for those with severe mental 
illness dominated the academic literature and public debates 
about mental health care. The fundamental flaw in the policy of 
de-institutionalisation had been the failure to establish an 
adequate system of inpatient and community treatm ent, 
accommodation and support services for those leaving, or no 
longer able to be admitted to, psychiatric hospitals. Beverley 
Raphael (key informant interview) identified the main problem 
confronting governments at this time as being 'a systems failure' 
in the delivery of mental health care. Gardner (1997) summarises 
the prevailing view in these comments:
despite the rhetoric and the pharmaceutical advances, de­
institutionalisation left a legacy of mistakes which saw 
many patients discharged from psychiatric hospitals 
w ithout adequate clinical or support services available in 
the community. The second problem area related to those 
patients who remained in hospital. Concerns about the 
quality of their care escalated.
In terms of the structure of services, three main problem areas 
identified in the data sources from the literature review that coded 
to this theme were identified.
(a) Separation of mental health from general health services
One of the major problems identified was that mental
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health services and general health service provision were 
mostly separate. True integration of these services was 
rare (Andrews 1991, Hoult and Burchmore 1994). 
Advocates argued that this separation reinforced stigma, 
denied mental health services access to the mechanisms 
for enhanced quality care existing in general healthcare and 
reduced equity of access to generic services (Mental Health 
Task Force 1991, 3, McQueenie 1992).
(b) Poor continuity of care between inpatient and community 
clinical services
The second major problem was that patients were often 
lost to follow up after discharge from hospital and did not 
connect with clinical community services. With this 
breakdown in care, the psychiatric condition of patients 
often deteriorated and relapsed, requiring their 
readmission. This placed great pressure on the remaining 
hospital beds (Burdekin 1991, Leonard 1994). These beds, 
already in high demand, were subject to increasing 
pressure from readmitted patients whose condition had 
deteriorated as a result of inadequate mental health care 
and/or the failure of accommodation services.
(c) Poor intersectoral linkages between clinical and other social 
services
The third major problem was the poor linkages between the 
sectors of health, housing, employment and income 
support (HREOC 1993, 555,561,909, Behan, Killick and 
Whiteford 1994). The failure to provide clinical and support 
services had resulted in responsibility for care being moved 
to another service sector. In facilities where adequate 
community and residential support services had not 
accompanied downsizing or closure of psychiatric beds,
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common consequences were substandard accommodation, 
homeiessness, incarceration and unnecessary admissions to 
hospitals (Hoult and Burchmore 1994, Raphael 1984). 
Commitment to implementing mental health service reform 
and willingness to expand community-based care varied 
enormously across jurisdictions (Beaumont 1990, 
McQueenie 1992)
Policy responses
The policy responses proposed during this period were almost 
exclusively focused on the service deficiencies arising from de­
institutionalisation for those with severe mental illness. They 
echoed the policy challenges posed by the State based inquiries 
(Richmond 1983):
That as a m atte r o f policy the highest p rio rity  in mental 
health services [m ust] be the com m unity-based care and 
rehabilita tion of the seriously m entally ill.
Scientific evidence supported the view that, with advances 
in treatments for severe mental illnesses, many individuals could 
indeed be cared for in community settings with only short 
inpatient admissions (Andrews 1991). However this required 
clinical services that could actually reach patients with the 
interventions and for com munity/ social support services to 
deliver replacement accommodation and support services that 
had traditionally been provided in hospitals.
Experts and advocates proposed policy solutions in three 
major areas to improve mental health services in the community 
(Best 1985, Gardner 1997, Upton 1983). The first was to change 
the way mental health services were administered. They 
suggested that mainstreaming mental health services within the 
general health sector would be necessary to ensure those with 
mental health problems were not treated differently to those with 
other health problems (Mental Health Task Force 1991, 3). They
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saw bringing mental health services into mainstream health 
services as a policy solution.
The second policy solution was in response to the problem 
that patients had not been receiving continuity of clinical care 
between the inpatient and community arms of the mental health 
service. Service integration was the solution to better continuity 
of care between hospital and community services, so that hospital 
and community services would be administered as a single 
seamless service.
The third policy solution was in answer to the lack of 
housing and support services for patients in the community. I t  
was in recognition of the reality that, in long stay hospitals, 
patients were provided with three types of interventions - clinical 
care, accommodation and support services, but when patients 
moved to the community these services became the responsibility 
of different government departments. Access to and coordination 
of the services was often poor. Advocates argued that the policy 
solution would require mainstream employment, housing and 
community services to assume responsibility for services their 
portfolios provided to people with disability, including those 
people with a psychiatric disability. At the time I argued 
(Whiteford 1994b):
No one service, in this case the m ental health service, 
should have control over the m a jo rity  o f services needed 
by a person. One of the aims of ins titu tiona l reform  was to 
break th is 'whole of life contro l' [ove r people w ith 
psychiatric d isab ility ].
Furthermore it was recognised that health professionals 
within the mental health services were trained to provide clinical 
diagnosis, treatm ent and rehabilitation. They did not necessarily 
have the training and skills to provide services such as disability 
support, housing or vocational training. Ian Hickie (key informant 
interview) noted that New South Wales had attempted to 'run 
housing within mental health services' but 'this was spectacularly
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unsuccessful'.
In principle the policy solution had a sound basis: it was 
discriminatory for people with psychiatric disability to be denied 
access to social and disability programs available to people with 
other forms of disability. Equity required people with psychiatric 
disability be treated on the same basis as people with physical, 
sensory or intellectual disability. Mainstreaming the provision of 
social and disability services could decrease the marginalisation 
and stigma which had been a barrier for people with mental 
illness living in the community. Broadening access to the services 
in the community available to other people would make the social 
environment for these individuals as normal as possible and 
promote social inclusion. However, as is discussed in the next two 
chapters, it was difficult to have this policy solution adopted and 
implemented, in part because it involved brokering agreement 
between multiple sectors on choosing a service model and 
resourcing it.
Some authors argued that long term inpatient facilities 
were still appropriate for those with disorders of a severe, 
unremitting and disabling nature (Andrews 1991, Eisen and 
Wolfenden 1988). A continuing role for hospitals as places of 
asylum as well as for the acute treatment and rehabilitation for 
those with severe mental illnesses was proposed for those who 
were too ill or disabled or dangerous to themselves or others to 
be adequately cared for in the community (Raphael 1984). These 
authors also highlighted, however, that these facilities would need 
to be upgraded in order to fulfil this function.
One area of policy work they undertook was to clarify and 
formalise Commonwealth government responsibilities in the area 
of mental health. This was not to include direct service provision 
but was in recognition of the financing provided by the 
Commonwealth government to mental health services now largely 
delivered outside the State-run psychiatric hospitals. Experts
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argued it was no longer possible to maintain the view that the 
Commonwealth government had no role in public mental health 
services, following the movement of State and Territory mental 
health services into mainstream health and community support 
services (Mental Health Task Force 1991, 3).
Advocates argued for inclusion of other areas of mental 
health policy, for example mental health promotion and illness 
prevention strategies (Raphael 1993, Tippett et al. 1993) making 
the argument that preventing mental illness could help m itigate 
the human and economic costs. Despite the ir efforts policy 
makers did not see initiatives in these areas as a priority.
1.4 Service Quality and Effectiveness 
Problem areas
Although they featured less prominently than service structure 
issues, I identified two main problem areas in the data sources 
from the literature review that coded to this theme. The poor 
quality of services both in the community and for those remaining 
in hospitals were identified by reference to a lack of national 
standards and a lack of information about the effectiveness of 
services.
(a) No national standards for mental health services
There were no national standards that defined the 
attributes needed in the delivery of mental health care. 
Mental health services were rarely accredited by an 
independent authority (HREOC 1993, 946, Raphael 1984).
(b) Lack of information on effectiveness
There was a lack of data on the cost effectiveness of 
service delivery. Service costs were being assembled but 
patient outcome information was needed to determine cost
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effectiveness:
Information necessary for effective management of 
services and for clinicians' evaluation of their 
activities is generally unavailable. Data collections 
focus excessively on service utilisation and resource 
in-puts. Within the lim itations of these collections 
they are not sufficiently used as an information 
source ... (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988).
Policy Responses
While most of the policy solutions being proposed in respect of 
services were about structure and governance, some attention 
was being paid at this time to service quality to improve 
outcomes in mental health. National standards for mental health 
services were proposed with the expectation they would improve 
service quality and, from a rights perspective, engage consumers 
and carers in mental health service developments (ACHS, CHASP 
and AIMHS 1996, Whiteford 1996). Advocates argued investment 
in research into the causes of mental health was needed to 
develop better treatments, as well as evaluation of the 
effectiveness of different models of service delivery on patient 
outcomes (HREOC 1993, 821). They also suggested cost
effectiveness studies of different providers of care and service 
models to define the optimal mix of providers at optimal cost 
(Raphael 1984).
Advocates proposed a system of mental health indicators 
and/or a national mental health database which would collect and 
review service data with the aim of improving the quality of 
Australian mental health services (Raphael 1984). The role of a 
well-trained and well-resourced workforce in improving the quality 
of care with better outcomes for patients was recognised as 
important not only in advocacy by professional organisations but 
in submissions to the Burdekin Inquiry and by the National Health 
Strategy review undertaken for the Commonwealth Health 




I identified three main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme. These related to 
inadequate financial and human resources and cost shifting 
between governments.
(a) Inadequate financial resources
The first resource problem I identified was the low overall 
expenditure on mental health and the inequity of the 
expenditure between hospital and community services. 
Experts considered that the distribution of funding for 
mental health services within the health budget was 
inequitable (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988, Raphael 1984). 
Even though the majority of people were being treated in 
the community, most State and Territory government 
mental health budgets were still spent on hospitals. I t  was 
estimated that, in 1992-93, 29% of State and Territory 
government mental health resources were directed towards 
community-based care and 73% of psychiatric beds were 
located in standalone hospitals that consumed half of the 
total mental health spending by the State and Territory 
governments. Less than 2% of resources were allocated to 
non-government programs that provided support services 
in the community (Whiteford, Buckingham and 
Manderscheid 2002). Community mental health services 
were under-resourced given the large number of patients 
they had to treat (Hoult and Burchmore 1994, HREOC 
1993, 908, Beaumont 1990).
(b) Cost-shifting between jurisdictions
The complex arrangements between the Commonwealth,
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State and Territory governments regarding the funding and 
administration of mental health services was cited as a 
major problem requiring a clear and coordinated national 
direction (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988, Raphael 1984). 
Specifically, the shift in emphasis away from State funded 
institutional services made existing Commonwealth/State 
monitoring of compliance with responsibilities increasingly 
ineffectual and outdated (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988, 
Mental Health Task Force 1991, 21). Public mental health 
services were regarded as a State and Territory 
government responsibility in terms of policy, financing and 
administration. However, most mainstream health and 
community support services were operated under mixed 
Commonwealth/State arrangements, and some (such as 
the Medicare Benefits Schedule and the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme) were solely a Commonwealth 
government responsibility. I t  was evident that since the 
State and Territory governments had shifted acute public 
mental health services to general hospitals and long term 
care away from State-funded psychiatric hospitals into the 
community, the Commonwealth government was now faced 
with increased expenditure in the sector for which they 
made a financial contribution (Mental Health Task Force 
1991, 21).
The cost shifting from the State and Territory 
governments to the Commonwealth government became 
an increasing problem. Experts described the lack of policy 
integration between jurisdictions as a significant factor in a 
readily identifiable waste of resources and cost-shifting was 
endemic (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988).
The States have for various reasons shifted public 
services to general hospitals, into the community 
and away from State funded psychiatric hospitals.
An efflux of psychiatrists, (and to a lesser extent 
other mental health professionals), from the public
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to  the  private sector, has brought w ith it increased 
expenditure by the Commonwealth in the private 
sector. Overall expenditure trends in health are in 
the same direction.
(c) Human resources
The other resource problem was in the area of human 
resources. Workforce shortages existed in the specialised 
public mental health sector. Experts believed that, following 
de-institutionalisation and the increasing Commonwealth 
government subsidy of the private sector, many 
psychiatrists elected to lim it the ir practises to urban private 
settings. This created a shortage of specialist medical 
services in community mental health care (Andrews 1991, 
Raphael 1984). The efflux of psychiatrists from the public 
to the private sector also brought with it increased 
expenditure by the Commonwealth government through 
the Medical Benefits Schedule (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988). 
There were concerns over whether the Commonwealth 
government's medical benefits payments for psychiatrist 
services were being directed to the highest needs groups 
(Mental Health Task Force 1991, 38, NATSIHC SHRG and 
AHMAC NMHWG 2004)
There was a need to ensure the accountability of 
mental health professionals (HREOC 1993, 870). This 
became particularly salient following the highly publicised 
scandals involving the abuse and death of institutionalised 
patients, which occurred due to the idiosyncratic use of 
power by mental health professionals (Carter 1991, 
Slattery 1990, Tobin 1993). Experts considered training of 
community mental health professionals to be seriously 
deficient. Processes to ensure accountability of those 
professionals employed were found to be either non­
existent or inadequate (Andrews 1991).
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Policy responses
Most policy responses called for increased Commonwealth 
government expenditure in mental health, especially community 
mental health. While care in the community was proposed as 
being less costly for governments overall, compared with hospital 
care, there was an acceptance that more financial resources 
would be needed for mental health.
While it was considered undesirable for the Commonwealth 
government to administer services centrally, it was proposed that 
responsibility for national policies, national standards, work place 
planning and training should be accepted by the Commonwealth 
government (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988). Attracting and retaining 
a skilled mental health workforce was expected to help ensure 
good practice and higher service standards (Andrews 1994, 
Solomon, Buckingham and Epstein 1993). Eisen and Wolfenden 
(1988) also argued that funding arrangements could not continue 
on an input resource model and needed to move to an outcome 
model in order to drive change.
2. The Political Response and the opening of the policy 
window
The Hawke Labor government was elected in March 1983. According to 
Brian Howe (key informant interview) the government had not been 
elected with a mandate to undertake mental health reform and the 
priority for the 1980s was reform of the Medicare health insurance 
system. The major problem areas identified in mental health (human 
rights abuses; the increasing burden on families of caring for relatives 
with mental illness; poor quality and organisation of mental health 
services; poor coordination of mental health with other social services; 
lack of funding and staff for mental health services; and cost-shifting 
from the State and Territory governments to the Commonwealth 
government) had been present for decades without a nationally 
coordinated policy response being seen as necessary. Mental health had
113
not been a politically attractive area and people with mental illness and 
their families had little political influence and limited capacity to 
advocate for themselves (Raphael 1984, iv). This began to change in the 
1980s with professional groups, consumers and carers becoming 
increasingly organised and vocal.
When confronted with the 1984 submission by the RANZCP and 
the ANAMH, which argued for a national approach to mental health 
service delivery (Raphael 1984), the Commonwealth government was 
reluctant to assume the responsibility that m ight come with a national 
mental health policy. As noted in Chapter 5, this would have a 
budgetary impact, involve them in the criticisms about the public mental 
health services and increase the risk of cost-shifting from the State and 
Territory governments to the Commonwealth government.
In response to the RANZCP and ANAMH submission, the 
Commonwealth Health Minister, Neal Blewett, commissioned a review of 
the Australian mental health system by Dr Peter Eisen and Mr Kevin 
Wolfenden. Their report, handed to the Commonwealth government on 
28 March 1988, identified a wide range of concerns about both service 
funding and organization (Eisen and Wolfenden 1988) and demonstrated 
a considerable Commonwealth government expenditure on services for 
people with mental illness. The report was presented to the Australian 
Health Ministers' Conference on 22 October 1988 and then publically 
released. Media reports based on its key findings discredited the view 
that mental health was a State and Territory government responsibility. 
For example in December 1988 the Sydney Morning Herald reported 
(Williams 1988):
the [Eisen and Wolfenden] report ... makes clear the [mental 
health] system is plagued by problems, inefficiency, wastage and 
a long-running feud between the Commonwealth and States over 
funding .... the Commonwealth bears two-th irds of the cost of 
mental health services - $1 billion in pensions to the mentally ill -  
yet does not monitor its spending and has no say in how the 
money is spent.
The report by Eisen and Wolfenden, while a complex document
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tha t many policy makers found difficult to digest, did include specific 
recommendations for a national mental health policy and 
Commonwealth government involvement in the coordination of service 
developments (Bland 2002).
The momentum for a national policy response to the problems in 
the mental health sector increased. Some public figures started to make 
reference to the need for a national policy. For example, in 1989 the 
Governor-General of Australia, Bill Hayden, commented in his opening 
address to the ANAMH National Congress 'Mental Health -  Who Cares? 
The Foundation of a Nation'(Hayden 1989):
I t  would be remiss if I did not say tha t I am also aware tha t one 
of the central issues you will be discussing is the need fo r a 
national policy on m ental health. Such a policy to coordinate and 
in tegrate existing services fo r clients including those who suffer 
mental illness is one of the recom m endations of the 
Eisen/Wolfenden consultants report last year... it does seem to  me 
tha t this report m arks something of a m ilestone in the 
assessment o f the needs of mental health services in Australia... 
the report does represent a clear indication of the Commonwealth 
governm ent's concern about mental health services... w hat is 
im portan t is tha t the opportun ity  created by the report should not 
be lost..
State and Territory government ministers conceded that the 
problems that arose from de-institutionalisation were in large part due 
to their failure to establish adequate community services for patients 
(1989):
While new trea tm en ts and new a ttitudes made it possible for 
more people to return more quickly to com m unity life follow ing a 
psychiatric adm ission, a ttem pts at de-institu tiona lisa tion  during 
the sixties and seventies were not backed up. There were few 
com m unity services of suffic ient qua lity  or quantity  needed to 
support fo rm er hospital residents and to ensure the ir qua lity  of 
life. This m eant h igher rates of re-adm ission (V ictorian Health 
M inister Caroline Hogg).
The Labor government was re-elected for a fourth term in March 
1990, again without a specific mandate to undertake mental health 
reform. However the wider reform agenda was shifting toward social 
policy reform with continued use of the 'super-departments' introduced 
in 1987 to improve coordination and efficiency across related policy 
areas (Disney and Nethercote 1996, 35). Mike Codd, Secretary of the
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Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1986 to 1992 was 
identified by Brian Howe (key informant interview) as having argued 
that the Labor government focus during the 1980s on microeconomic 
reform should move to a focus on social policy reform and reforming 
Commonwealth/State relationships during the 1990s. These broad 
directions set the context within which mental health policy reform took 
place. Mr Howe became the Minister responsible for the relevant 'super­
department'; Community Services and Health in 1990 and then Health, 
Housing and Community Services from 1991 to 1993. His role was 
essentially that of an 'issue entrepreneur' within government and was 
critical to mental health reform being adopted by the government.
Earlier in 1986, as Minister for Social Security during the 
Parliamentary debate on the Disability Services B ill, he expressed a 
personal view, different to that of Senator Grimes the Minister for 
Community Services responsible for the Bill:
I re fer particu la rly  to the concern raised by the honourable 
m em ber fo r Richmond (M r B lunt), the shadow M inister fo r Social 
Security [about] the exclusion of people w ith long term  psychiatric 
illnesses. I draw his a tten tion  to the statem ent made by Senator 
Grimes in the Senate. We are ta lking to some extent about a 
d istinction in areas of responsib ility between departm ents, but 
p rim arily  between the Commonwealth and the States. Senator 
Grimes referred to  th is  practice being trad itiona lly , w hether it is 
righ t or wrong, a State m atter. I have always taken the personal 
view tha t the Commonwealth has to take more responsib ility for 
psychiatric care. I believe tha t the trem endous problems 
associated w ith funding and the inequities tha t exist between 
psychiatric and overall health trea tm en t may not have arisen if a 
d iffe rent approach had been taken. I repeat tha t th is is a personal 
view, but Senator Grimes was essentially saying tha t clearly there 
would be great cost im plications fo r the Commonwealth 
(Parliam ent of Australia 1986a).
With this personal conviction regarding mental health and 
Commonwealth/State relations as a backdrop, Mr Howe undertook a 
review of Australia's health system, called the National Health Strategy, 
led by one of his senior advisers, Jenny Macklin (at the time of this 
writing the Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs and Minister for Disability Reform in the Gillard Labor 
government). The National Health Strategy resulted in the publication of
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a series of issues papers, one of which was on mental health, authored 
by myseif and colleagues (National Health Strategy 1993). Our analysis 
confirmed there had been limited reallocation of resources from 
psychiatric institutions to the community during de-institutionalisation, 
and consequently community-based services were inadequate and 
fragmented. We also confirmed that the extent of the Commonwealth 
government expenditure on people with mental illness was $2.58 billion 
in 1991/1992 (e.g.; on sickness benefits, pensions, Medicare benefits 
and pharmaceutical benefits). By contrast, the combined expenditure of 
the public mental health services run by State and Territory 
governments was only $871 million in tha t year, demonstrating that 
spending on services for people with a mental illness was clearly not 
solely a State and Territory government responsibility.
This mental health issues paper developed under the National 
Health Strategy reinforced the findings of the Eisen-Wolfenden report, 
showing again the inconsistencies in the existing Commonwealth 
government policy frameworks. For example, the Commonwealth 
government spent $1.45 billion in 1991/1992 on income security for 
people with mental illness and psychiatric disability, but excluded them 
from the range of support and vocational programmes designed to 
decrease dependence on welfare payments and help disabled people 
back into the workplace (e.g. in the Commonwealth Rehabilitation 
Service). I believe this information provided tools for policy advocates 
and helped establish the need for a national approach to mental health 
(Whiteford 1994a). Ian Hickie (key informant interview) commented 
that it had become clear the Commonwealth was the 'real payer' in 
mental health and therefore needed a policy framework for this 
expenditure.
Mr Howe also oversaw changes to disability services, including 
psychiatric disability. The 1990-91 Commonwealth Budget introduced 
the Disability Reform Package which clarified the responsibility for 
service provision between jurisdictions with respect to disability services 
and made it clear that people with psychiatric disability were as eligible
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as persons with any other kind of disability to participate in the 
programs. Under the 1991 Commonwealth State Disability Agreement 
the funding and administrative responsibilities for different types of 
services were rationalised with the Commonwealth government 
administering employment services and the State and Territory 
governments responsible for accommodation and community support 
services. Decisions on the allocation of specific services were to be 
decided by the type of service and not by the nature of the impairments 
of individual clients. This precipitated the following exchange in the 
Commonwealth Parliament (Parliament of Australia 1991):
Mr Mack asked the M inister fo r Health, Housing and Com m unity 
Services, upon notice, on 9 Septem ber 1991:
Do persons w ith psychiatric d isabilities receive a lower p rio rity  
than those w ith o ther d isabilities in claims fo r funding and 
services under the D isability Services Act; if so, why are they 
discrim inated against?
Mr Howe — The answer to the honourable m em ber's question is 
as follows:
Historically, most services fo r people w ith psychiatric illness have 
been the responsib ility of S ta te /Territo ry  governm ents. I t  is 
appropriate tha t services fo r people while they are psychiatrica lly 
ill should continue to be the responsibility of State health 
agencies. People w ith  stabilised psychiatric conditions who may be 
considered to retain a psychiatric d isability , are a leg itim ate  long 
term  responsib ility of the D isability Services Act (DSA). The 
involvem ent of the  Commonwealth in meeting the needs of those 
w ith psychiatric d isabilities was expanded in the 1990 Budget, 
w ith the establishm ent o f special Commonwealth Rehabilitation 
Service (CRS) units in all capital cities, Alice Springs and 
Shepparton. These will have people w ith psychiatric d isabilities as 
the m ajor ta rge t group.
In addition, it should be noted tha t Commonwealth and 
S tates/Territories agreed at the recent Joint Meeting of Health and 
Social Welfare M inisters to  have a National Mental Health Policy.
The contents o f the policy have ye t to be agreed between the 
Commonwealth and the S tates/Territories.
These developments took place while the bureaucratic 
consideration of the Eisen-Wolfenden report was underway, with advice 
being formulated for each government and Commonwealth, State and 
Territory positions being negotiated. In 1989, the Commonwealth, State
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and Territory governments established a working group of officials from 
each jurisdiction to develop a discussion paper on which consultations 
about the development of a national mental health policy could be 
undertaken (Howe 1990). I was the Queensland government
representative on this and subsequent working groups. A mental health 
taskforce of Commonwealth, State and Territory officials produced a 
report for governments (Mental Health Task Force 1991) and arising out 
of recommendations contained in that report, the detail of a national 
mental health plan was drafted (Whiteford 1992b). A motivation for the 
State and Territory governments to be involved in the negotiations was 
to gain access to Commonwealth government funding (Lyster 1992). 
The State and Territory governments needed Commonwealth 
government funding to help provide their mental health services,
especially given the need to increase the community-based services, 
since most patients with serious mental illness were living in the
community following de-institutionalisation (Blackwood, Meldrum, 
Groves, Buckingham and Solomon, key informant interviews).
Governments also established a mental health consumer 
outcomes taskforce which produced the National Mental Health 
Statement o f Rights and Responsibilities, adopted by Australian Health 
Ministers in March 1991 (Australian Health Ministers 1991). The
endorsement of this document by governments coincided with the 
adoption by the United Nationals General Assembly of Resolution 98B, 
the 'protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care' (United Nations 1991) and raised expectations for a 
formal commitment to national mental health reform.
As noted earlier, Mr Howe had a personal perspective on mental 
health reform and this was embedded in the larger social policy reforms 
being advanced by the Hawke Labor government. For example, the 
Department of Housing and Regional Development's Better Cities 
Program, a $816 million program aimed at urban and regional 
development, allocated $69 million from 1993-94 to 1995-96 to 
facilitate the process of downsizing psychiatric institutions and
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redirecting resources, mainly land suitable for residential development, 
to alternative uses (Commonwealth of Australia 1994). I t  was Mr Howe's 
desire to include a social agenda in the program which led to the funding 
of de-institutionalisation initiatives under the 'Better Cities Program' 
(Neilson 2008). Under this initiative Victoria received funding $52 million 
of the $69 million allocation which provided the basis for that State to 
move ahead with a plan to redevelop mental health services tha t was 
stalled due to the lack of capital (Buckingham, key informant interview). 
Buckingham (key informant) was of the view that the injection of 
Commonwealth funding from the 'Better Cities Program' was a key 
reason why Victoria took the early lead in the national mental health 
reform process; this outcome being a good example of policy 
convergence.
The economic reforms were less evident given the 'distractions' of 
the Hawke-Keating leadership conflict that followed the 1990 Labor 
election victory. Mr Howe (key informant interview) stated that, on his 
move from the Department of Social Security to the Department of 
Health, the government wanted to use 'super portfolios' to foster cross- 
sectoral reform. Examples given by Mr Howe were child support, 
employment, disability reform, jobs, education and training and it was 
'like the Blair government's joined-up government'. Mr Howe said he 
and Prime Minister Hawke saw potential in health and aged care for 
reform including constraining costs and creating efficiencies.
Mr Howe (key informant interview) commented:
mental health fitted nicely into cross portfolio reforms ... we 
wanted to become less dependent on tied grants ... focus more on 
outcomes. The national approach to mental health became one of 
the first moves towards transparent outcome driven social policy 
reform with clear benchmarks. It opened up a different way of 
working with the States ... it was part of the broader 
commonwealth State agreements [such as housing, disability and 
primary care].
The linking of the Kingdon's three streams occurred with adoption 
of the first National Mental Health Plan. From the problems stream the 
failures of deinstitutionalisation with human rights abuses, an increasing 
burden on families of caring for relatives with mental illness, low
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resourcing and quality of mental health services, poor coordination of 
mental health with other social services and cost-shifting from the State 
and Territory governments to the Commonwealth government had 
repeatedly been identified. New research (especially the report by Eisen 
and Wolfenden) demonstrated the large financial exposure of the 
Commonwealth government in mental health. Policy solutions emerged 
in areas of Commonwealth responsibility, especially social services for 
people with psychiatric disability now living in the community. Politically, 
microeconomic reform was being pursued by the re-elected Labor 
government with a focus on social policy reform and reforming 
Commonwealth/State relationships during the 1990s. A reform ist 
Minister (Brian Howe) had responsibility across the relevant policy areas 
(health, housing and community services) allowing him to coordinate 
intersectoral reform for people with psychiatric disability. Also from a 
political perspective the need to respond to the National Inquiry into the 
Human Rights of People with Mental Illness (the Burdekin Inquiry) 
helped galvanised the government to undertake mental health reform.
The National Mental Health Policy was adopted by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory health ministers in April 1992 and 
an implementation plan, which became the first National Mental Health 
Plan (Whiteford 1994a) was also adopted but never publically released. 
The content in the plan did however form Schedule F of the 1993-98 
Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreements. The 1992/1993 
Commonwealth Budget, with Mr Howe as Health Minister, announced 
$135 million for the implementation of the policy with most of this 
funding provided to the States and Territories through Schedule F of the 
Medicare Agreements. However not all the funds went to the States; a 
component was reserved for use by the Commonwealth for national 
initiatives. This was considered very important in giving the 
Commonwealth the means to embark on a range of nationally significant 
projects and other innovations, and to venture into areas that did not 
require State cooperation (Buckingham, key informant interview).
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Schedule F of the 1993-98 Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreements 
stated that Commonwealth funding 'w ill also be available over the term 
of this agreement for demonstration projects of national significance 
that will encourage innovation and accelerate mental health reform'. The 
first National Mental Health Report released in March 1994 (Department 
of Human Services and Health 1994b, 115-6) and the second National 
Mental Health Report released in May 1995 (Department of Human 
Services and Health 1995, 19-20) describes the national initiatives 
funded by the Commonwealth with this allocation.
This was the first nationally agreed approach to mental health 
reform in Australia. A requirement of receiving the Commonwealth 
money was that each State and Territory 'maintain its effort', with 
respect to mental health, a requirement meant to prevent jurisdictions 
substituting the new Commonwealth money for the ir own previous 
commitments (thus not increasing the overall financial commitment to 
mental health). This became known as the 'quarantining' provision and I 
and other key informants (Buckingham and Blackwood) considered it 
had been successful.
In discussing the decision to have mental health placed on the 
national health agenda and included in the 1993-98 Medicare 
Agreements, Mr Howe (key informant interview) recalled the 
government agreeing there needed to be 'a more sophisticated way of 
doing government'. He went back to the influential Eisen-Wolfenden 
report which had recognised 'the money that the Commonwealth spent 
on mental health for which we received no recognition'. He recalled the 
Department of Finance being 'worried about cost shifting from State to 
the Commonwealth and the [Commonwealth] taking on more 
responsibility', but that the argument that the Commonwealth already 
had a large, existing financial commitment with no policy framework 
'eventually won the day'.
As noted another political issue facing the Commonwealth 
government at this time, and identified by Mr Howe as influential in the 
decision to make a financial commitment, was the need to respond to
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the forthcoming HREOC report of the Burdekin Inquiry. All key 
informants for this period (see Appendix 3) mentioned the HREOC 
Inquiry as influential on national policy and I also hold this view.
The Commission announced its Inquiry in June 1990, hearings 
commenced in April 1991 and the final report was released in October 
1993. The criticisms made at the public hearings, reported in the media 
and later documented in the Commission's report were shaped so as to 
place them in the context of a failure by Australia to uphold its 
international human rights obligations as well as emphasising the 
inconsistency with State/Territory mental health and other legal 
provisions (HREOC 1993, 895-6).
The issues identified by the hearings of the HREOC Inquiry were 
used by the Commonwealth Opposition to criticise the Commonwealth 
government, placing the issues firm ly on the political agenda (Liberal 
Party and National Party of Australia 1992):
The Burdekin Enquiry into human rights and mental illness 
highlighted the harsh realities faced by people with mental illness.
Yet mental health has not received the attention it deserves from 
the Federal Government.
Though Commissioner Burdekin publically 'applauded the fact that 
since the inquiry began the Federal government has secured the States' 
agreement to a national mental health policy' (Burdekin 1993), on the 
release of the HREOC Report in October 1993 urgent government action 
was demanded (HREOC 1993, 15):
But the costs of our current neglect in terms of violations of the 
most fundamental rights of Australians affected by mental illness 
are clearly documented in this report. They demand an urgent, 
concerted and effective response.
Even though the National Mental Health Policy and the first plan had 
been announced with the $135 million committed in the May 1992 
Commonwealth Budget, there was a political imperative to be seen to 
respond:
I intend to push as hard as I can, given I am not directly 
responsible for mental health policy -  that is the responsibility of 
my colleague Brian Howe -  to get these services out of the cities 
and into the bush. That raises another question: there are not
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enough services in the  cities either. The Burdekin Report shows 
tha t there is a paucity of services righ t across the nation. That is 
som ething we will have to address w ith every State and T errito ry  
(Parliam ent of Australia 1993a).
C learly from listening to the com m ents th is  morning of State 
m in isters around the country o f both political persuasions, there 
remains much more to be done. C learly governm ents o f all 
political persuasions have used some sections of the Richmond 
Report from  the 1980s to save a lo t o f money by closing 
institu tions, but have never observed the second part of the 
Richmond Report to  spend tha t money in creating more 
opportun ities fo r com m unity care, and th a t is sad (Parliam ent of 
Australia 1993b).
There was initial confusion over whether there would be additional 
funding following the release of the HREOC report. Senator Graham 
Richardson had become Commonwealth Health Minister on 24 March 
1993, though Brian Howe, still Deputy Prime Minister, retained 
responsibility for mental health in his portfolio of Housing, Local 
Government and Community Services. The position of Mr Howe was that 
the government had pre-empted the HREOC report by releasing the 
National Mental Health Policy and the firs t plan with a $135 million 
commitment in the 1992/1993 Commonwealth Budget. Mr Howe and 
Senator Richardson made conflicting comments (Meade and Hole 1993):
The Federal Governm ent appears sp lit over its response to the 
critical Burdekin report on mental health w ith the Deputy Prime 
M inister, Mr Howe, ruling out more funding and the M inister fo r 
Health, Senator Richardson, guaranteeing more.
The Government would not allocate any more money fo r m ental 
health because the Burdekin report reinforced the policy directions 
of the National Mental Health Strategy ... Mr Howe said money 
was not the answer because an extra $135 m illion had already 
been allocated by the Federal G overnm ent fo r the national 
strategy .... "We don 't actually th ink  -  and I th ink  th is is an 
im portant point -  tha t funding is so much the issue," Mr Howe 
said. "B u t we do th ink  tha t we need to  develop a d iffe rent, more 
sophisticated approach to the way we manage the funds."
Senator Richardson told the Senate earlie r yesterday, however, 
tha t the Federal Governm ent would undoubtedly need to spend 
more on mental health. " I  th ink  it would be very d ifficu lt fo r any 
governm ent, State or Federal, to look at the Burdekin report and 
not realise tha t more money has to be spent," he said. "In  my 
view, the possibility o f offering no extra funds in the ligh t o f the 
Burdekin report would be n il."
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As preparations were made for the May 1994 Commonwealth 
Budget the government came under increasing political pressure 
to respond with a budgetary allocation but in February 1994 Mr 
Howe was maintaining the position he held during 1993 (Meade 
1994):
The Federal Government will not increase spending on mental 
health significantly in the May Budget despite last year's damning
report by the Federal Human Rights Commissioner ..... the
Government's first considered response to the Burdekin Report, 
released as a discussion paper yesterday, contained no promises 
of more funding in the area. Instead, the paper detailed what the 
Commonwealth was already providing in mental health services 
through the five year National Mental Health Strategy 
implemented in 1992. Last night, a spokeswoman for Mr Howe 
said the Budget would not contain a big increase in spending. 
Many of the areas were the responsibility of the States and 
Territories ... The Minister for Health, Senator Richardson, who 
embarrassed Mr Howe last year by saying the Government would 
need to spend more on mental health, will address a Burdekin 
Report conference in Sydney on Thursday.
Senator Richardson announced, days later, that he and Mr Howe
would take a submission to Cabinet for additional funding (Larriera
1994):
The Minister for Health, Senator Richardson, although not directly 
responsible for the mental health portfolio, said yesterday that he 
would join the Minister for Housing, Local Government and 
Community Services, Mr Howe, in taking a jo in t submission to 
Cabinet for additional funding.
The submission in fact secured substantial funding in the May 
1994 budget sufficient to almost double the Commonwealth government 
commitment (Commonwealth of Australia 1994) although by the time of 
the Budget Senator Richardson was no longer the Health Minister, 
having resigned on 25 March 1994 (and retired from Parliament) to be 
replaced as Health Minister by Carmen Lawrence (Middleton 1994):
Services for the mentally ill will receive an extra $169 million over 
the next four years as the Federal Government's response to the 
Human Rights Commission's damning report on mental health.
The Health Minister, Dr Lawrence, announced last night that the 
National Mental Health Strategy would receive $133.6 million of 
the new money, which represents a doubling of existing funding 
to a total of $250 million over the next four years. Dr Lawrence 
said the extra mental health funding would be used to address Mr 
Burdekin's primary areas of concern.
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3. N ationa l M ental H ealth  Reform  1993  - 19 96
The content of the National Mental Health Policy (and firs t plan 
contained in Schedule F of the Medicare Agreements) reflected closely 
the policy solutions that had been proposed by the policy community. 
The multilateral agreement to the policy and plan heralded a period of 
unprecedented Commonwealth/State collaboration and co-operation in 
mental health reform in Australia. To oversee the implementation of the 
National Mental Health Policy and plan the National Mental Health 
Working Group (NMHWG) was created (Whiteford 1994a). This group 
reported to the Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council (AHMAC) 
and had twelve members, one representative from each State and 
Territory health department, two representatives from the 
Commonwealth department of health (one of whom provided secretariat 
services) and the chair and deputy chair of the newly created National 
Community Advisory Group (NCAG) which comprised mental health 
consumers and carers. The appointment of community members to a 
Commonwealth/State body made up of government officials was 
unusual for the time, especially as it meant that individuals with a 
mental illness would have direct input into, and the ability to observe, 
intergovernmental processes (Behan, Killick and Whiteford 1994). At a 
broader level, support was provided to consumers and carers in all 
jurisdictions to develop the capacity to advocate and to engage in 
service planning and development (SPICE Consulting 1998), with 
Schedule F of the 1993-98 Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreements 
specifically requiring the establishment of State and Territory community 
advisory groups.
The AHMAC NMHWG established a set of national policy indicators 
in July 1993. There were 49 indicators drawn directly from the national 
policy and agreed upon in order to monitor progress towards the 
implementation of the policy (AHMAC Mental Health Drafting Group on 
Performance Indicators 1993). The indicators were collected for the 
1992/93 year and progress on implementation was published annually in 
national reports made available to the public. The first National Mental
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Health Report was released in 1994 (Department of Human Services and 
Health 1994b).
A major effort was launched to gather and assemble data to give 
as accurate a picture as possible of Australia's mental health services. 
There were no agreed data sets or even common definitions for 
describing expenditure and activity at the outset and emphasis was 
placed on establishing standard definitions and ensuring the 
comparability of data collected from the States and Territories. The 
AHMAC NMHWG established a Mental Health Information Strategy 
Committee which is still in existence at the time of this writing. The 
membership included all State and Territory health departments, the 
Commonwealth Department of Health, the NCAG, the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AIHW) and the Australian Private Hospitals' Association. This group 
developed a National Mental Health Data Dictionary and Minimum Data 
Set for Australia, and laid the foundations for the future national mental 
health information development strategy.
Legislative and services reform for those patients with severe 
mental illness were prioritised. The policy and plan required the 
mainstreaming of mental health services to bring them under the same 
administrative umbrella as other health services (Singh 1992, Whiteford, 
Macleod and Leitch 1993); the integration of hospital (inpatient) mental 
health services with community mental health services (Rosen, Miller 
and Parker 1989, Whiteford, Macleod and Leitch 1993); and 
intersectoral linkages requiring access to housing and community 
services (mostly operated outside of health departments) for individuals 
with mental illness and psychiatric disability living in the community 
(Whiteford 1992a, 1992b).
Whilst the responsibility for mainstreaming required mental health 
services to be delivered within the same administrative structure as 
other health services and for acute psychiatric care to be delivered in 
general hospitals alongside other acute health care services (Singh 
1992), integration required hospital and community components of the
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mental health service to become a single, functionally integrated service 
to provide continuity of care for people with long-term mental illness 
(Singh 1992, Whiteford, Macleod and Leitch 1993).
The third services policy direction, that of intersectoral linkages 
reform, was more complicated as it required the support and action of 
sectors other than health. As noted in Chapter 5 the Commonwealth 
Disability Services Act 1986 recognised psychiatric disability but afforded 
it a low priority (Whiteford 1994b). This was changed with the 
Commonwealth State Disability Agreement 1991. Under that Agreement 
the Commonwealth government had administrative responsibility for 
employment related services, the State and Territory governments had 
responsibility for accommodation and support services (including 
accommodation support, respite, recreation, independent living skills 
training and community access services, information and print disability 
services), and advocacy services and research and development were to 
be a jo in t responsibility. The State and Territory governments received 
responsibility for administering the bulk of the non-employment related 
disability services at a time where major implications for these services 
were surfacing as a result of the mental health and psychiatric disability 
reforms. The Commonwealth Disability Discrimination Act 1992 made it 
unlawful to discriminate against people with disability including those 
with psychiatric disability.
An attem pt was made to align the policies and programs of 
health, housing and community services departments in all jurisdictions 
when relevant Ministers in all jurisdictions endorsed findings of a Mental 
Health Forum on Intersectoral Linkages (Mental Health Forum on 
Intersectoral Linkages 1995). Nevertheless there remained a substantial 
problem in providing equitable access to people with psychiatric 
disability, given the relatively small growth in expenditure in that 
program in the 1990s, a problem which proved very serious as 
discussed in Chapter 8.
After several years in development, national standards for mental 
health services were adopted by all governments in January 1997
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(ACHS, CHASP and AIMHS 1996) and mechanisms put in place to assess 
whether services were meeting these standards. The standards were 
developed by a consortium comprising the Australian Council on 
Healthcare Standards, the Community Health Accreditation Standards 
Program of the Australian Community Health Association and the Area 
Integrated Mental Health Service Standards. They consisted of eleven 
major criteria, organised in three categories. Standards 1 to 7 relate to 
human rights, dignity and community acceptance. Standards 8 to 10 
address mental health service organisational structures and links 
between parts of the mental health sector. Standard 11 describes the 
process of delivering care on a continuum and the types of treatm ent 
and support that should be available to consumers. These standards 
were included in the 1998 -  2003 Australian Health Care Agreements 
and in the Commonwealth/State Mental Health Inform ation  
Development Plans (Department of Health and Ageing 2004). 
Consumers and carers were expected to use the standards to legitimise 
participation in service planning, development and evaluation, thus 
facilitating quality improvement through the development of a more 
consumer/ carer focused system (Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon 
Associates Pty Ltd 1997). The government also encouraged professional 
bodies to develop protocols for clinical treatment.
The Commonwealth, State and Territory governments agreed 
there should be nationally consistent State/Territory mental health 
legislation (Australian Health Ministers 1992b, 3, Department of Human 
Services and Health 1994c). Furthermore, it was accepted that all 
relevant legislation should be consistent with Australia's international 
human rights obligations as outlined in United Nations Resolution 98B, 
the 'protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care' (Department of Human Services and Health 1994c). 
The Commonwealth government developed model mental health 
legislation and also a Rights Analysis Instrument which was applied to all 
State and Territory mental health legislation in order to facilitate the 
process of achieving consistency across jurisdictions and nation-wide
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compliance with the UN principles and the National Mental Health 
Statement o f Rights and Responsibilities (Watchirs and Heesom 1996).
All State and Territory governments have since reviewed their 
mental health legislation for consistency with the United Nations 
principles and the National Mental Health Statement o f Rights and 
Responsibilities. The Australian Capital Territory adopted a new Mental 
Health Act in 1994, Western Australia in 1996, the Northern Territory in 
1998, Queensland in 2000, New South Wales in 2007 and South 
Australia in 2009. Victoria amended its 1986 Act in 2003 (with a new Act 
due in 2013).
In 1994 the Australian Health Ministers' Conference agreed that 
one of the key goals for the improvement of mental health up to the 
year 2000 was to reduce the rate of youth suicide (Department of 
Human Services and Health 1994a). In July 1995 the National Advisory 
Council on Youth Suicide Prevention was formed, comprising seventeen 
members representing government, the community, consumers, young 
people, service providers and researchers. The National Youth Suicide 
Prevention Strategy was the Commonwealth government's response to a 
series of national and international events that drew attention to the 
need for a concerted and coordinated approach to the prevention of 
suicide among young people (Mitchell 2000a). I t  was launched in July 
1995 and ran until June 1999 with $31 million allocated over four years.
The Commonwealth, State and Territory governments endorsed 
actions in many other areas including the development of national public 
education and awareness programs to decrease stigma regarding mental 
illness, getting epidemiological information about mental illness in the 
population to assist service planning, promoting research into the 
causes of mental illness, developing programs for special needs groups 
and the evaluation of the effectiveness of different models of service 
delivery. I t  is beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss all of these and 
the many other initiatives during the life of the first plan.
4. Conclusion
The opening of the policy window in 1992 can be seen to be the
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result of converging factors. There were escalating clinical and social 
problems for patients in the aftermath of psychiatric de­
institutionalisation. The services in the community for these patients 
was under resourced and often of poor quality. There was an increasing 
burden on families caring for relatives with mental illness. Community 
advocacy was becoming more vocal in proposing policy solutions. There 
was a high profile public inquiry underway that resulted in prominent 
media reporting of human rights abuses and service deficiencies. The 
Commonwealth government commissioned an influential report (the 
Eisen-Wolfenden report) which provided evidence of the previously 
underacknowledged high cost of mental illness to the Commonwealth 
Budget and unregulated cost-shifting from the State and Territory 
governments to the Commonwealth government.
At a political level there was a socially reform ist government 
Minister, Brian Howe, in a position of influence at a time when cross 
portfolio social policy reform was an emerging priority for his 
government. In addition there was a political necessity for the 
government to respond to the intense publicity generated by the 
Burdekin Report.
The opening of this policy window differed from the next two 
windows (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8) because there was no pre­
existing national mental health reform process. Once the National 
Mental Health Strategy commenced with the adoption of the National 
Mental Health Policy and firs t plan, the Commonwealth government was 
required to consider its position on involvement in national reform at the 
conclusion of each five year national mental health plan. The need for 
the consideration of its position necessitated the issue of mental health 
being placed on the Commonwealth political agenda.
The National Mental Health Policy and first plan (and Schedule F 
of the Medicare Agreements), responded to the problems identified and 
contained many of the policy solutions that had been proposed by the 
policy community. A major period of national mental health reform was 
launched in Australia with the implementation of the policy and plan
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focussing prim arily on the needs of those individuals with severe mental 
health illness, problem areas that had dominated the policy debate in 
the decades prior to 1992.
132
CHAPTER 7 -  the renewal of the National Mental Health Strategy by 
the Coalition government in 1998
This chapter focuses on the years 1996 to 2003, a period that begins 
with the election of the Howard Liberal-National Coalition government in 
1996, continues after the newly elected Commonwealth government 
considered its position at the conclusion of the first National Mental 
Health Plan in 1998, and concludes with the end of the Second National 
Mental Health Plan in 2003. The first plan focussed on services for 
individuals with severe mental illness for which State and Territory 
governments were primarily responsible. The first plan was oriented 
towards the needs of State and Territory governments as providers of 
community-based treatment and care for patients who had either been 
discharged from long stay hospitals or who could not be admitted 
because of bed closures.
Between 1992 and 1998 when the first plan ended, the political 
orientation of the Commonwealth and most State and Territory 
governments changed. These changes of government occurred in the 
following sequence: Victoria, October 1992 (the Labor Kirner 
government was replaced by the Liberal-National Kennett government), 
Western Australia, February 1993 (the Labor Lawrence government was 
replaced by the Liberal-National Court government), South Australia, 
December 1993 (the Labor Arnold government was replaced by the 
Liberal Brown government), Australian Capital Territory (ACT), March 
1995 (the Labor Follett government was replaced by the Liberal Carnell 
government), New South Wales, April 1995 (the Liberal Fahey 
government was replaced by the Labor Carr government), Queensland, 
February 1996 (the Labor Goss government was replaced by the Liberal- 
National Borbridge government) and, at the Commonwealth ievei, in 
March 1996 (the Labor Keating government was replaced by the Liberal- 
National Coalition Howard government). However, the first Plan 
continued essentially unchanged until June, 1998. In part, this was 
because substantial public expectation for reform had been raised,
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reinforced by annual reports issued by the Commonwealth Department 
of Human Services and Health/Health and Family Services which 
demonstrated progress in achieving this reform. Governments, with 
some short-lived exceptions, fe lt obliged to maintain the reform 
momentum. Another reason was that Commonwealth funding to the 
States and Territories for policy implementation was bound up with the 
five-year Commonwealth/State Medicare funding agreement. Over time, 
this apparent acceptance led to the perception that the National Mental 
Health Policy had bipartisan political support, further legitimising and 
reinforcing support for the reforms.
By March 1996, when the Howard Coalition government was 
elected and Michael Wooldridge became the Commonwealth Health 
Minister, the mental health policy making capacity of the Department 
had made significant advances since the commencement of the first plan 
in 1992. No identifiable unit dedicated to working on mental health 
policy had existed in the Department of Health before 1990 and the first 
mental health policy section was not established until 1992. At the 
meetings held with the Commonwealth to develop the first plan, State 
and Territory representatives provided most of the technical knowledge 
and expertise (Buckingham, key informant interview); consequently 
they were able to exert considerable influence over the content. 
However, by the time the Coalition government was elected in 1996, the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services, as the 
Department of Health and Ageing was then called, had an established 
mental health branch responsible for policy, had accumulated more 
technical expertise in mental health and had acquired much greater 
awareness of the Commonwealth government's responsibilities and 
commitments in the area of mental health. The bureaucrats in the 
mental health branch had translated the National Mental Health Strategy 
documents into a defined work program and the Commonwealth 
instrumentality was able to assert more influence in assessing and 
proposing national mental health policy to areas for which the 
Commonwealth government was responsible.
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Despite this evidence of bureaucratic commitment there was 
uncertainty as to whether the Commonwealth government would 
continue with the National Mental Health Strategy. No funding had been 
allocated in the Commonwealth forward estimates after 1997/98 and the 
uncertainty intensified over the first two budget cycles of the Howard 
government, given the focus on achieving savings. With the 
Commonwealth/State Medicare funding agreements coming to an end in 
June 1998, the new Liberal-National government had to decide whether 
to withdraw from, modify or maintain unchanged the national mental 
health reform initiated by the previous Labor government (James, key 
informant interview).
As I did in Chapter 6, I used the themes identified in Chapter 4, 
human rights and community attitudes; community need; service 
structure; service quality and effectiveness; and resources as an 
organising framework to analyse the problems described in the literature 
and policy responses proposed in the lead up to 1998.
1. Themes
1.1 Human rights and com m unity attitudes  
Problem areas
I identified a key problem area in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  community attitudes 
toward mental illness.
(a) Community attitudes toward mental illness
The sources indicate a shift in focus during 1996-03 with 
individual human rights becoming much less prominent, 
although concerns about community attitudes and stigma 
persisted as evidenced by demands to provide public 
education to improve the attitudes and knowledge about 
mental illness. Sensationalised media reporting continued 
to fuel fear and ignorance (Martin 1997, Singh and McGorry
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1998) and this was targeted for policy attention.
I also found a continued emphasis on the importance 
of consumer and carer involvement in mental health 
service delivery and planning at a local level with the 
extent of this involvement being monitored annually 
(Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon Associates Pty Ltd 1997, 
7,8,45). Carers and consumer advocates were worried that 
the NCAG, whose term was concurrent with the five years 
of the first National Mental Health Plan, would be disbanded 
in 1998 and the mental health sector would no longer have 
a peak consumer and carer national body.
Policy responses
As noted in Chapter 6, policy makers and bureaucrats were 
revising State and Territory mental health legislation to make it 
consistent with the United Nations principles and the National 
Mental Health Statement o f Rights and Responsibilities (Watchirs 
and Heesom 1996). National standards for mental health services 
were adopted in January 1997 in order to improve service quality 
as well as instilling a rights perspective (ACHS, CHASP and AIMHS 
1996, Whiteford 1996). Whilst Burdekin (1995) acknowledged 
that tolerance cannot be legislated, he advocated for changes to 
the law as a necessary precondition to bring about greater 
community understanding.
In conjunction with these legislative changes there were 
initiatives to increase community awareness of suicide and mental 
illnesses (Clausen 1999). National media campaigns were 
designed to increase understanding of mental health issues and 
reduce stigma (National Mental Health Strategy Evaluation 
Steering Committee 1997, 11). However policy advocates





I identified two key problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  lack of focus on 
common mental disorders and on suicide prevention.
(a) Lack of focus on the most common mental disorders
As noted, the policy directions of the firs t plan were in 
response to the legacy of 30 years of uncoordinated de­
institutionalisation. While the evaluation of the first plan 
established that a number of important reforms had been 
achieved, (Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon Associates Pty 
Ltd 1997, National Mental Health Strategy Evaluation 
Steering Committee 1997, Singh and McGorry 1998), 
during the five year life of the plan experts and advocates 
increasingly criticised it on the grounds that the patient 
focus of the first plan was too narrow, the threshold for 
access too high and desirable elements such as prevention 
and early intervention had been ignored (Ash et al. 2007; 
Raphael, key informant interview).
Many stakeholders expressed the opinion that State 
and Territory services focused on those diagnosed with 
severe mental illnesses to the neglect of others with a 
mental disorder deemed less severe (National Mental 
Health Strategy Evaluation Steering Committee 1997, 
Singh and McGorry 1998). The stakeholder community 
began to argue that a broader range of diagnostic groups 
should be seen as within of the purview of public mental 
health services. Barrand (1997, 147) summarised the 
argument as follows:
The NCAG [National Community Advisory Group] 
response stemmed from community consultation 
workshops and highlighted the importance of the 
redefining of the emphasis of the strategy to 
encompass not only 'serious mental illness' but,
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more appropria te ly, 'seriously m ental health care 
problem s' on the premise tha t mental health 
services should flow from  the level of illness and the 
corresponding level of d isruption to the life of the 
person and his or her carers, and not solely on a 
clinical diagnosis and trea tm en t regime.
A more radical argument was to broaden the policy 
scope even further, taking a whole of population approach 
so that people without mental disorders would be included. 
The argument in support was that mental health promotion 
and illness prevention for the whole population should be 
included for the policy to be as effective as possible. 
(Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon Associates Pty Ltd 1997, 
Baume 1995, Hunter 1997, Martin 1997).
Even those treatm ent providers responsible for State 
and Territory mental health services, whose client group 
comprised those patients with more severe disorders, 
argued for an expanded scope for services. For example, as 
early as 1994 the New South Wales Director of Mental 
Health, Dr Noel Wilton commented (Wilton 1994):
Priorities fo r mental health services have to date 
been m ainly fo r trea tm en t in tervention a fte r onset 
of illness w ith some increasing emphasis on 
rehabilita tion services of la tte r years. Prevention 
and prom otion in the fie ld have been sadly 
neglected.
Despite the persistent problems facing those with 
severe mental illness, advocacy to make the needs of this 
group a priority diminished, whilst stakeholders, including 
professionals, intensified their advocacy efforts in support 
of expanding the scope of mental health reform to include 
common mental disorders. Several influential studies were 
conducted around this time and new findings were 
published that helped define this problem area.
As one of six national priorities for mental health 
information development in the 1992 National Health 
Information Agreements, and as required by Schedule F of
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the 1993-98 Commonwealth/State Medicare Agreement, in 
1997the ABS conducted the first nationally representative 
survey of mental disorders in Australia, the National Survey 
o f Mental Health and Wellbeing (NSMHWB), using a 
household sample (ABS 1998). The NSMHWB was used to 
construct findings for advocacy purposes even before its 
official release in 1998, as the planning, undertaking and 
early advice to the Commonwealth on the likely findings of 
the survey influenced the thinking amongst the 
bureaucracy and its advisors (D. Casey, Buckingham, key 
informant interviews). Survey data indicated that 
depression, anxiety and substance misuse were the most 
common mental disorders in the Australian population. 
These disorders were less common in the population 
treated by public specialised mental health services, which 
the first plan had focused on reforming. Of those surveyed 
who met the diagnostic criteria for a mental or substance 
use disorder and who had accessed treatment, most were 
treated in primary care, the part of the health sector 
subsidised by the Commonwealth.
Another study published just before the NSMHWB 
had shown that around one third of people seen by general 
practitioners have a diagnosable mental disorder. A further 
one third of those seen suffer from significant psychological 
symptoms that do not meet the criteria for any specific 
disorder. Of those with a mental disorder, only half receive 
a diagnosis and, of these, only half receive specific drug 
treatment (Harris et al. 1996). In the NSMHWB, 65% of 
those with a disorder had not used any form of health 
service in the previous 12 months. This bought into sharp 
policy focus the role of primary health care, specifically 
general practitioners, and also those who were not 
accessing care, a population that had not been considered
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in the first plan.
In 1996, the first volume of final results and 
methods (Murray and Lopez 1996b) from the Global Burden 
of Disease (GBD) Study was published by Harvard 
University Press. In 1992, the GBD study was 
commissioned by the World Bank, with the 'early and full 
participation' of WHO, to 'quantify and project the health 
problems of populations to guide public health planning' 
(Murray and Lopez 1996a). In 1993 preliminary results 
from the GBD were published in the World Development 
Report, marking the introduction of a new metric that 
combined premature mortality and years lived with a 
disability, the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY). This 
metric allowed comparison of m ortality and morbidity 
between disorders and was used to demonstrate that 
mental disorders were the leading causes of health-related 
disability in most countries, causing more impairment than 
prominent disorders such as cancer and heart disease 
(Murray and Lopez 1996b). This study, which revolutionised 
the measurement of disease impact internationally, was 
also influential with the Commonwealth bureaucracy. In 
1998 an Australian (national) Burden of Disease Study was 
conducted at the AIHW that drew upon information about 
mental disorders in Australia from the NSMHWB and used 
the DALY summary measure. The AIHW report on the 
Burden o f disease and in jury in Australia found that mental 
disorders, predominantly anxiety, depression and 
substance misuse accounted for nearly 30% of all health- 
related disability, and that depression was the leading 
cause of disability among all health conditions for both 
sexes (Mathers, Vos and Stevenson 1999). This report 
reinforced the public health implications of the NSMHWB 
that common mental disorders were, at a population level,
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very important because of their prevalence. The fact that 
most people with these disorders received no treatm ent 
and those that were treated received it from primary health 
care services helped change the thinking about priority 
setting amongst the Commonwealth bureaucrats 
(Buckingham, D. Casey, key informant interviews).
(b) Lack of attention to suicide prevention
The neglected problem of suicide prevention gained greater 
policy attention during this period. Nearly ninety% of 
people who die by suicide have a mental disorder, the most 
common disorder being depression. Rising rates of suicide 
were of concern, particularly among young males (AIHW 
and Department of Health and Family Services 1997, 
Baume 1995, De Vaus 1996, Taylor 1996, White 1995). 
This attracted media attention which increased following 
reports that in 1991, deaths from suicide in Australia had 
overtaken deaths from motor vehicle accidents (Baume 
1995, White 1995) for the first time since 1930 (ABS 
1994). Baume commented:
A larm ing ly, in Australia suicide claims more young 
lives than m otor vehicle accidents. Of all external 
causes of death in 1991 suicide accounted fo r 31% 
of those deaths, followed by m otor vehicle 
accidents (Baume 1995).
Some advocates provided data suggesting Australia had 
one of the highest rates of youth suicide in the 
industrialised world (Taylor 1996).
Policy responses
One of the most consistent policy responses was to increase 
treatm ent rates amongst the high prevalence mental disorder 
groups (Singh and McGorry 1998) by targeting primary care, the
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part of the health sector where most of the people with those 
disorders in treatm ent could be found. This led to a focus on 
primary health care reform, which is discussed under the theme 
service structure. Experts recognised that such strategies could 
be at the expense of those with severe, lower prevalence mental 
illnesses (McGorry 1998).
As also noted in the discussion regarding, service structure, 
a second policy response was to develop and implement 
strategies to prevent the onset of mental illness and suicide, 
although it was recognised that these should be grounded in an 
understanding of risk factors and protective factors (Mental Health 
and Special Programs Branch 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000e, Buist 
2002 ).
Preventative activities targeting at-risk population groups 
were also proposed as potentially useful strategies in addressing 
the significant burden of mental disorders (AIHW and Department 
of Health and Family Services 1997). Pregnancy was identified as 
an opportunity for prevention because virtually all pregnant 
women have contact with a health professional and there is a 
higher risk of mental illness during the perinatal period (Buist and 
Bilszta 2006, Wooldridge 2001, Buist 2002, Kennett 2005, 2006). 
Children of parents with a mental illness were identified as 
another high-risk group that could benefit from targeted 
promotion and prevention initiatives (AICAFMHA 2001, 2004).
1.3 Service structure  
Problem areas
I identified two key problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  lack of attention to 
mental health promotion and prevention activities and primary 
care services.
(a) Lack of mental health promotion and prevention activities
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The release of the report Goals and Targets fo r Australia's 
Health in the Year 2000 (Nutbeam et al. 1993) contributed 
to a shift in the focus of mental health reform to the 
population as a whole, including those individuals with a 
mental disorder who were not in contact with the mental 
health system. However, in the period before the NSMHWB 
published its findings (ABS 1998), the lack of population 
information hampered this effort (Whiteford 1994a).
Professor Beverly Raphael was a strong advocate for 
the introduction of mental health promotion and illness 
prevention. As early as 1993 Raphael was making the case 
for a population health approach to the National Mental 
Health Strategy (Raphael 1993). The need for attention to 
mental health promotion and illness prevention was also 
advocated at the State and Territory level.
Primary Care had been ignored
While progress was made in the structural reform of 
specialist mental health services during the life of the first 
plan (Australian Health Ministers 1998, Manderscheid, 
Pirkis and Purdon Associates Pty Ltd 1997, National Mental 
Health Strategy Evaluation Steering Committee 1997, 
Singh and McGorry 1998), problems remained. Insufficient 
clinical resources were still being deployed to community 
care and there was a failure to improve access to housing 
and disability services as their capacity was insufficient for 
the large number of individuals with psychiatric disability 
(Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon Associates Pty Ltd 1997, 
Thornicroft and Betts 2002). The evaluation of the first plan 
(National Mental Health Strategy Evaluation Steering 
Committee 1997) noted:
despite the many positive developments, there is
widespread dissatisfaction w ith many aspects of
mental health services in Australia in 1997.
Consumers continue to report problems with access 
to services, poor service quality and stigmatising 
staff attitudes. Many believe they have been 
disenfranchised by the new focus on "serious 
mental illness". Carers feel they have been left 
behind in service developments, while providers 
struggle to find ways of responding to the apparent 
escalation of demands on the ir limited resources.
However, as noted earlier, the focus of service 
reform was shifting to primary health care and the role of 
general practitioners who were subsidised by the Medicare 
Benefits Schedule, a Commonwealth government program. 
Primary care medical practitioners complained that whilst 
they provided a large proportion of mental health care and 
were central to recognition and accurate diagnosis, little 
support was available to them in the management of 
mental health problems (Andrews 1994, National Mental 
Health Strategy Evaluation Steering Committee 1997, 
Henderson 1995). Evidence of problems in primary care 
was beginning to surface, for example that general 
practitioners were failing to recognise and therefore treat 
many patients who presented with mental disorders 
(Henderson 1995). The Joint Consultative Committee in 
Psychiatry of the Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners (RACGP) and the RANZCP commented that
while public psychiatry has received a lot of 
attention, another very active sphere of psychiatric 
service delivery -  primary -  has remained largely in 
the background. In some ways, primary care 
psychiatry could be regarded as the last frontier of 
mainstreaming (Joint Consultative Committee in 
Psychiatry 1997).
Policy responses
Advocates and experts argued that in a population-focused 
system, promotion, prevention and early intervention strategies 
should be greatly expanded to reduce suicide rates and the 
burden of mental disorders (Baume 1995, McGorry 1998, Taylor
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1996, White 1995). The concepts of 'indicated prevention' and 
'eariy intervention' emerged as potentially useful constructs for 
designing and planning services (Singh and McGorry 1998). Policy 
responses argued for changes in services operating beyond the 
boundaries of the traditional mental health sector to areas which 
had contact with populations likely to be at risk of mental 
disorder, such as child welfare, education, police and corrective 
services and non-government service providers.
However the importance of primary health care dominated 
the debate. Fostering partnerships between specialist mental 
health and the primary care sector was emphasised (Harris 
1994). This needed a change in direction as little attention was 
given to the private sector (primary or specialist services), 
subsidised by the Commonwealth government during the first 
plan (Whiteford, Buckingham and Manderscheid 2002).
The Joint Consultative Committee in Psychiatry of the 
RACGP and RANZCP (Joint Consultative Committee in Psychiatry 
1997) commented that
Australian general practitioners see three quarters of 
people who seek help fo r mental health problems and 
mental disorders, yet they are overlooked as mental health 
service providers. They have few tools to use, lim ited 
tra in ing  fo r the ir broad roles and often receive little  or no 
support from  specialist services.
The report from the Joint Consultative Committee examined 
the roles of Australian general practitioners and service linkages 
with specialist mental health services. In this report the 
Committee concluded that primary care psychiatry was 
underdeveloped in terms of skills, tools and resources, and made 
recommendations regarding general practitioner education and 
training in mental health. Recommendations for better links 
between mental health professionals, general practitioners and 
non-government service providers were made with action to 
assist general practitioners based on the RACGP and RANZCP 
report (Whiteford 1998) and various collaborative care models of
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cooperation proposed (Meadows 1998).
1.4 Service quality and effectiveness  
Problem areas
I identified two key problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  lack of standards for 
the clinical workforce and lack of measures which monitored 
patient outcomes.
(a) No standards for clinical workforce
The National Mental Health Service Standards, developed 
under the first plan, described what was needed for a 
service to be accredited as a mental health service. 
However it was argued that standards were needed for 
clinicians working in the mental health services to improve 
the quality of clinical treatm ent being given to patients 
(Buckingham et al. 1998, 273).
(b) No routine measuring of patient outcomes
While regular review of consumer outcomes was one of the 
original th irty-e ight objectives in the 1992 National Mental 
Health Policy, action in this area was not commenced until 
the 1996-2003 period. Most of the attention was towards 
process and structure rather than outcomes and 
achievements (Steering Committee for the Evaluation of 
the Second Plan 2003, Leonard 1994). Experts regarded 
the emphasis on inputs and counting activity rather than a 
system focusing on patient outcomes as a significant 
impediment to better quality care (AIHW and Department 
of Health and Family Services 1997, Singh and McGorry 
1998). A summary of progress in information development 
made over the period 1993-1998 under the first National
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Mental Health Plan can be found in the report prepared by 
of the National Mental Health Information Committee 
(Mental Health Branch 1999).
Policy responses
One policy response was to describe National Mental Health 
Practice Standards - the key professional competencies that 
clinicians needed to have to work in a mental health services 
(KPMG Consulting and AHMAC NMHWG Education and Training 
Steering Group 1994). I t  was also argued that clinical 
competencies which describe the attributes of clinicians in areas 
such as knowledge and skills be augmented by developing clinical 
treatm ent guidelines for the disorders being treated in the 
services (Grimshaw and Russell 1993).
Further it was proposed that Commonwealth, State and 
Territory mental health services embed the collection of routine 
consumer outcome monitoring within everyday clinical practice 
and ensure their information systems capture these data, in 
addition to the existing data on inputs (financial, human and 
capital resources) and processes (e.g. occupied bed days and 
occasions of service). I t  was proposed that consumer outcome 
data should be routinely collected to complete a national picture 
of service quality (Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon Associates Pty 
Ltd 1997, Morris-Yates and Strategic Planning Group for Private 
Psychiatric Services 2000, Stedman et al. 1997, Henderson 
1995).
The potential cost savings of effective promotion, 
prevention and early intervention strategies also began to be 





One key problem area was identified in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  lack of resources for 
primary mental health care.
(a) Poor resourcing of primary mental health care
Experts considered it was problematic that economic 
resources for mental health care were not distributed 
equitably within the total health budget (Andrews et al. 
1999). Historical funding arrangements based on advocacy 
and tradition were becoming increasingly outdated 
(Andrews 1997). There was concern that resources were 
being spent inefficiently, for example, where private 
psychiatrists were engaging in long-term psychodynamic 
therapy for individuals who did not meet the criteria for a 
mental disorder (Andrews 1994, Solomon, Buckingham and 
Epstein 1993, Morstyn 1995).
As noted earlier, general practitioners complained 
that whilst they provided a large proportion of mental 
health care and were central to recognition and accurate 
diagnosis, they were not resourced, and the structure of 
the Medicare Benefits table did not allow adequate time for 
management of mental health problems (Andrews 1994, 
Joint Consultative Committee in Psychiatry 1997, National 
Mental Health Strategy Evaluation Steering Committee 
1997, Henderson 1995).
Policy responses
In addition to the usual demand for increased financial allocation 
to mental health, strategies were proposed to improve the 
targeting of scarce resources (Manderscheid, Pirkis and Purdon 
Associates Pty Ltd 1997, Andrews 1997, Leonard 1994). I t  was 
suggested that a more equitable framework for resourcing mental 
health services could be based on disease burden and efficacy of
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interventions rather than advocacy and tradition Andrews 1994, 
1997, Murray and Lopez 1996a). The reports of Solomon, 
Buckingham, Epstein (1993) and the Tolkien report (1994) 
provided detailed descriptions of how governments could 
restructure funding in order to address workforce concerns.
2. The Political Response and the opening of the policy 
w indow
On 2 March 1996 the Howard Coalition government was elected and 
Michael Wooldridge became Commonwealth Health Minister. There was 
no specific mention of action to address mental health in the Coalition's 
health policy (Liberal Party and National Party of Australia 1996) and no 
clear electoral commitment for mental health reform (James, key 
informant interview). The five year first National Mental Health Plan 
ended on 30 June 1998 and this required the Coalition government to 
formally consider ongoing Commonwealth support for the national 
mental health reform agenda, an initiative of the previous Labor 
government. Financial commitment from the Commonwealth 
government to the State and Territory governments would require 
allocations to be made in the forward estimates of the Commonwealth 
budgetary process (Podger, key informant interview). Furthermore, to 
undertake reform in areas of mental health service provision identified 
as a Commonwealth government responsibility (e.g. the common 
mental disorders treated in primary care) would require funding to be 
redirected from State and Territory governments or additional funding to 
be secured.
The reform challenge was made more difficult as the first budget 
of the newly elected Coalition government, delivered on 20 August 
1996, was one in which public spending was reduced (Song and 
Freebairn 2006, Wanna, Kelly and Forster 2000, 240-69). The 1996 and 
1997 Commonwealth budgets were 'savings budgets' (Podger, key 
informant interview);whereas within the 1998 budget there was some 
room for new provisions, especially as this budget would provide the
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funding for the new Health Care Agreements which would cover the five 
year period 1998 to 2003. Continued Commonwealth government 
spending on mental health under the 1998-2003 agreement required a 
political imperative, as well as clearly defined solutions to the problems 
being identified.
Dr Wooldridge took the view that the Commonwealth government 
should remain involved in mental health reform and made the case for 
expanding the role of the Commonwealth government in mental health. 
His role as an 'issue entrepreneur' within government was critical to the 
Commonwealth government continuing to be involved in, and driving, 
mental health reform. The reasons for this included his view that the 
State and Territory governments had not handled mental health well 
(Podger, key informant interview) and there was a role for the 
Commonwealth government to continue to be involved. Personal 
interest played a role, as Rebecca James, an adviser to Dr Wooldridge, 
had a member of her extended family experience a mental health 
problem. She believed that Dr Wooldridge also had a personal 
commitment to reform in this area, having observed the Victorian 
mental health reforms while working as a general practitioner in that 
State. She believed there was still a need to respond to the issues raised 
in the Burdekin Report and in the public debate around de­
institutionalisation and the poor care provided to people with severe 
mental illness living in the community.
However mental health was not considered a politically attractive 
area (James, key informant interview). From discussions at the time I 
am aware there was not strong support within the government, given 
the budgetary constraints, to continue national mental health reforms 
using Commonwealth funding. I understood the members of the 
Expenditure Review Committee in their deliberations prior to the 2008 
budget were not unanimously in support of continued Commonwealth 
government involvement in mental health reform. Two external issues 
influenced the political decision making process.
The first was the Port Arthur shootings. Eight weeks after the
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Coalition government was elected a tragic event gained extensive public 
and media attention and influenced the response of government to 
mental health. On 28 April 1996, a lone gunman, Martin Bryant 
murdered 35 people and wounded 21 others at Port Arthur in Tasmania. 
Following the Port Arthur shootings, media reports suggested Martin 
Bryant had a mental illness, a claim later found to be incorrect (Mullen 
1996). Nevertheless debate occurred in both political and media circles 
for several days as to whether the problem that caused the tragedy, and 
therefore needed a policy response, was a dangerous mentally ill 
individual in the community (rather than in hospital) or the availability 
of guns (The Age (Melbourne) 1996, Barker 1996, Whiteford 2005).
New Zealand gun control researcher Philip Alpers presented 
publicly available data to a Melbourne conference (Alpers 1996) that 
showed that the majority of mass civil homicides are not committed by 
persons with known mental illness discharged from hospital and that 
most perpetrators held a license for their firearm (Cantor, Mullen and 
Alpers 2000). Media coverage and government consideration of this data 
were successful in helping turn the debate toward gun control 
(Whiteford 2005). The Australasian Police Ministers' Council convened a 
special meeting on 10 May 1996 and agreed to a national plan for the 
regulation of firearms—the Nationwide Agreement on Firearms. This 
agreement banned self-loading rifles and self-loading and pump-action 
shotguns, introduced a nationwide registration of firearms along with 
limitations to firearm ownership, and led to the Australian firearms 
buyback scheme.
Ironically, at the same time, the Commonwealth health 
department was developing a strategy to address the negative publicity 
associated with a spate of fatal shootings of people with mental illness 
by police. A taskforce of police and mental health officials had been 
established by the former Labor government in 1996 to develop 
strategies for improving mental health crisis intervention. The final 
report of the taskforce, including recommendations for crisis 
intervention reform, was finalised and implemented under the Howard
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Coalition government in 1998 (see Appendix 1).
I observed the significance of the political impact of the Port 
Arthur shootings on mental health policy at the time, and this view was 
also expressed by key informants (James, D. Casey) even though the 
debate had turned to gun control. There was still said to be concern 
amongst some senior politicians that Martin Bryant must have had some 
form of mental illness to have committed such a horrendous crime and 
that mental health services, especially for individuals in the community, 
were necessary. I was told at the time by more than one source that the 
Prime Minister had been 'spooked by Port A rthur' and withdrawal of 
Commonwealth government support from national mental health reform 
in the budget following the Port Arthur shootings was not considered to 
be politically defensible.
The second issue I and key informants (D. Casey, Raphael and 
James) identified as influencing the Coalition to support mental health 
was suicide prevention. This was an area of particular importance to the 
Prime Minister. One key informant (D. Casey) recalled being told by 
someone who attended a meeting where the Prime Minister spoke to 
parents who had lost children from suicide tha t the Prime Minister 'had 
tears in his eyes'. He also noted that all Commonwealth funding at the 
time for suicide prevention projects had to be approved through the 
Prime Minister's office.
The linking of the Kingdon's three streams occurred with the first 
National Mental Health Plan ending in June 1998 and the Coalition 
government needing to formally consider any ongoing Commonwealth 
involvement in national mental health reform. From the problems 
stream, research had shown common mental disorders caused the most 
health burden (as measured by premature m ortality and disability), 
were often not treated and when treated it was in primary health care, a 
Commonwealth government responsibility. Policy solutions in the area of 
general practice reform were being promoted and the Minister 
responsible, Dr Wooldridge (a former general practitioner) took the 
view, for pragmatic reasons and with a personal interest, that the
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Commonwealth government should remain involved. From a political 
perspective, after two 'saving budgets' (1996 and 1997) the 1998 
budget was an opportunity for new provisions, with an election due 
(subsequently occurring October 1998). Also from a political perspective 
external events (the Port Arthur shootings, a spate of fatal shootings of 
people with mental illness by police and the Prime Minister's interest in 
suicide prevention) galvanised the government to support the Health 
Minister.
While it was decided that the Coalition government would support 
national mental health reform through a commitment to a second 
National Mental Health Plan, politically it needed to 'brand' the second 
plan so it could be distinguished from the reform agenda initiated by the 
previous Labor government. Dr Wooldridge developed a strategy for this 
which was consistent with his view about the limitations of the first Plan 
(and essentially served as an alignment of Kingdon's politics stream with 
the problem and policy streams). There was a change in the focus of 
Commonwealth activities from severe mental illness toward more 
common mental disorders such as anxiety and depression, in response 
to the evidence showing the high prevalence and burden of this group of 
disorders. The focus also shifted from specialist mental health services 
(a State and Territory government responsibility) to primary mental 
health care (general practice), an area of Commonwealth government 
responsibility where the more prevalent mental disorders were treated. 
Ian Hickie (key informant interview) saw the Commonwealth focus on 
general practice and primary care as complementing the State and 
Territory focus on community mental health services.
Dermot Casey (key informant interview) recalled Dr Wooldridge 
started using the phrase 'mental illness is not them, it is us' which 
received wide media coverage. This phrase was seen to symbolise the 
change in focus from severe mental illness (e.g. psychosis) which were 
difficult for the general population to understand to anxiety and 
depression, common disorders with which the community could more 
easily identify. This change, and the emphasis on mental health
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promotion, illness prevention and suicide prevention, was used to 
distinguish Coalition mental health policy from the previous Labor 
mental health policy. Prominent NGOs were becoming more active and 
supportive of mental health, including mainstream organisations which 
would not have previously aligned themselves with mental health; an 
example of this is Rotary Health Research which adopted mental health 
as a key area to support from 1995 (D. Casey, key informant interview). 
In the 1997-98 Commonwealth Budget, funding was provided to:
maintain the momentum of mental health reform under the 
National Mental Health Strategy (NMHS) ... while the current 
NMHS does not cease until June 1998, the Federal Government 
has allocated funds in the 1997-98 financial year to enable 
developmental work to precede implementation of the 
Commonwealth's continued participation in the NMHS 
(Department of Health and Family Services 1997a)
On 30 July 1998 Commonwealth, State and Territory health 
ministers formally endorsed the Second National Mental Health Plan 
1998-2003. As noted above, the stated intention was to continue the 
reforms of the first plan and to broaden the reform context in three 
further priority areas for reform, promotion/prevention; the 
development of partnerships in service reform; and the quality and 
effectiveness of service delivery (Australian Health Ministers 1998, 6). 
Mental health was included as part of the Australian Healthcare 
Agreements 1998-2003 with specific funding provided (in Schedule G) to 
implement the second plan as it applied to the relevant State or 
Territory. However the areas specified for action were very general and 
there was no requirement that each State and Territory maintain its own 
financial effort in mental health, as there had been in the previous 
Medicare Agreements. Each State and Territory was required to provide 
data to the Commonwealth on its mental health programs for national 
reporting purposes. My view generally considered to be correct by 
stakeholders in the mental health sector and several key informants 
(Buckingham, D. Casey, Hickie) was that the Australian Healthcare 
Agreements 1998-2003 greatly reduced the capacity of the 
Commonwealth to influence State and Territory reforms, resulting loss
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of national focus within the activities undertaken by each State and 
Territory.
3. National Mental Health Reform 1996 - 2003
Although the stated intention was to continue the reforms of the first 
plan while broadening the reform to encompass the three priority areas 
of mental health promotion and illness prevention, development of 
partnerships in service reform and service quality and effectiveness was 
different in reality. Much more of the Commonwealth effort focussed on 
areas related to its jurisdictional health responsibilities than had been 
the case with the first plan. The States and Territories attempted to 
broaden the scope of their areas of mental health activity as required by 
the second plan.
Under the first plan, there was some attention to community 
education, focused largely on increasing public awareness of the extent 
of mental illness and promoting destigmatisation. This was greatly 
expanded under the second plan (Australian Health Ministers 1998, 12). 
One of the policy initiatives of the Commonwealth and Victorian 
governments, later supported by other State and Territory governments, 
was to establish the organisation beyondblue: the national depression 
initiative (beyondblue The National Depression Initiative 2013, Hickie 
2002). I t  was founded in October 2000 with initial support from the 
Commonwealth and Victorian governments, with other State and 
Territory governments providing financial support in the years after its 
establishment. One of the aims of beyondblue was to increase the 
community awareness of depression and to promote a reduction in 
stigma associated with depression and related disorders. With prominent 
former Victorian premier Jeff Kennett as Chairman the organisation 
achieved a high profile and there is good evidence for its effectiveness in 
its work for advocacy and promoting policy solutions (Highet et al. 2006, 
Jorm, Christensen and Griffiths 2006). There were many other initiatives 
in this area, for example StigmaWatch, launched by the non­
government organisation SANE Australia (SANE Australia n.d.) to
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monitor and report on inaccurate or discriminatory references to mental 
illness in the Australian media. The increasing willingness of public 
figures including former politicians, sporting identities, media, film and 
television personalities to identify with and advocate for mental health 
issues both represented and facilitated progress in reducing the stigma 
associated with mental illness.
The Commonwealth government responded to the concern among 
the consumer and carer community that, with the first plan and the 
term of the NCAG ending in 1998, that the mental health sector would 
not have a peak national organisation. In 1997 the Commonwealth 
government replaced NCAG with the MHCA (MHCA 2013) which had the 
remit of providing a national voice for a larger number of stakeholders 
with experience of, or an interest in, mental health issues (Department 
of Health and Family Services 1997b, Wooldridge 1997, Graham 1999). 
Michael Wooldridge specifically requested that the council be created 
with a membership representing not only consumers and carers but also 
professional organisations active in mental health. The intent was to 
have a body which could speak with one voice in areas related to mental 
health policy. Despite initial scepticism, including from myself, that the 
sector would be able to come to an agreed policy position on the topics 
being considered, the council did become an effective advocacy and 
advice body for mental health in Australia.
The first meeting of the interim council board was held on 26 
November 1997. The first chair of the MHCA was John McGrath, the 
former Victorian State Member for Warrnambool who is widely 
acknowledged today as being responsible for the MHCA being able to 
function as an effective body. There were two consumer and two carer 
representatives from each State/Territory community mental health 
advisory group and two from the National Mental Health Consumer 
Network. In addition there were individuals representing psychiatry, 
psychology, general practice, occupational therapy, mental health 
nursing and social work, plus representatives from non-government 
service providers and special needs groups including Indigenous and
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culturally diverse communities. Another ex-politician, the former 
Western Australian Health Minister, Keith Wilson, became the chair of 
the MHCA, replacing Mr McGrath in November 2002.
Consumer and carer representation continued in State and 
Territory mental health services, as required under the first plan and by 
2002, 77% of service delivery organisations had a formal mechanism for 
consumer representation on local decision making and advisory bodies. 
Progress had been slower than expected and all jurisdictions re­
committed to implementing this reform during the period of the 
Australian Health Care Agreements 2003-08 (Department of Health and 
Ageing 2004, 33).
Suicide continued to be a high profile public issue due in part to 
annual documentation by the ABS of the rise in suicides (ABS 2000). 
Commonwealth Health Minister Michael Wooldridge released the 
National Action Plan fo r Suicide Prevention in 1999 (Wooldridge 1999) 
which expanded the 1995 National Youth Suicide Prevention Plan into a 
National Suicide Prevention Strategy covering all age groups (Martin and 
Page 2009, 28-9).
As noted earlier, all governments were required to expand the 
scope of mental health reform. There was no specific national action on 
Indigenous mental health issues arising from the first National Mental 
Health Plan. Following the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody (1991), the Burdekin Report (HREOC 1993) and Ways Forward, 
the landmark report by Swan and Raphael in 1995 (Swan and Raphael 
1995) Indigenous mental health began to receive more policy attentionl. 
The Commonwealth government developed an Emotional and Social 
Wellbeing (Mental Health) Action Plan (Department of Health and Family 
Services Social Health Reference Group 1996) which was launched by 
Michael Wooldridge, in October 1996, during Mental Health Week with 
$20 million allocated to improve the mental health status of Indigenous 
Australians (NATSIHC 2003, NATSIHC SHRG and AHMAC NMHWG 2004).
Attention was also paid to services for people from a non-English 
speaking background, with the Commonwealth government establishing
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the Australian Transcultural Mental Health Network (now called 
Multicultural Mental Health Australia) in 1995. The aim of the network 
was to provide support for State and Territory transcultural mental 
health centres and improve mental health outcomes for people using 
those services. Multicultural Mental Health Australia now links a wide 
range of State and Territory mental health specialists and services, 
advocacy groups and tertiary institutions to promote the mental health 
and wellbeing of Australia's diverse communities (Mental Health in 
Multicultural Australia 2012).
In line with the emphasis on promotion, prevention and early 
intervention, there were many initiatives including support for the Early 
Psychosis Prevention and Intervention Centre, with the launch of the 
Australian clinical guidelines for early psychosis (EPPIC n.d.) and the 
establishment of a national early intervention initiative, AusEInet 
(Australian Network for Promotion Prevention and Early Intervention for 
Mental Health n.d.).
The Commonwealth government co-funded the Strategic Planning 
Group on Private Psychiatric Services in 1996 (in 2007 renamed the 
Private Mental Health Alliance) which became the vehicle to coordinate 
private sector reform (Whiteford, Buckingham and Manderscheid 2002). 
The secretariat for the Group was provided by the AMA and, in addition 
to the AMA, the members were the RANZCP, Australian Private Hospitals 
Association, Australian Health Insurance Association, Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Ageing, Department of Veterans' Affairs and 
the Private Mental Health Consumer and Carer Network. The aim was to 
address issues related to funding, classification, quality of care, outcome 
measurement, consumer and carer participation, and related topics as 
they affected the private mental health sector.
In June 1999, the Commonwealth government established a 
national primary mental health care initiative to provide education and 
skills-based training in mental health for general practitioners (Whiteford 
2008). The first major reform under this initiative came when the 
Commonwealth government provided $120.4 million over four years in
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the 2001-02 Budget for the 'Better Outcomes in Mental Health Care' 
program (Department of Health and Ageing 2011, Hickie and Groom 
2002). Its key components included a network of State-based mental 
health development and liaison officers supported by a national 
coordinator based at the headquarters of the Australian Divisions of 
General Practice (ADGP) in Canberra and a resource centre at Flinders 
University in South Australia. The network supported mental health 
programs in divisions of general practice including education and 
training programs. Financial incentives for general practitioners were 
introduced in the 2001-02 Commonwealth Budget. These were in 
response to complaints commonly expressed by general practitioners, 
such as the unmet need for relevant training, access to allied and 
specialist support and improved remuneration for the time spent on 
mental health consultations. The 2005-06 Commonwealth Budget 
continued this program, and included new funding of $42.6 million over 
five years to expand it. The key components of the initiative (Australian 
Divisions of General Practice 2005, Pirkis et al. 2006) were education 
and training for general practitioners; remuneration for a specific (3 
Step Mental Health Process) of assessment, planning and review; 
remuneration for general practitioners to provide psychological 
therapies; increased access to Allied Health Services; and increased 
access to psychiatrist advice. Formal structures were established 
between groups such as ADGP, beyondblue, MHCA, RACGP, RANZCP, 
the Australian Psychological Society, the Rural Doctors’ Association of 
Australia, AMA, and the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged 
Care (Hickie and Groom 2002) to progress these reforms.
In November 2000 the National Mental Health Promotion, 
Prevention and Early Intervention Action Plan was launched 
(Department of Health and Aged Care 2000) which provided the 
strategic framework agreed by the Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments for action in mental health promotion, illness prevention 
and early recognition and intervention.
National practice standards for mental health clinicians were
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developed under the second plan (NMHETAG, NETINMHT and National 
Mental Health Strategy 2002). In February 1999 the Commonwealth 
government released a report identifying mental health nursing, 
occupational therapy, psychiatry, psychology and social work as the key 
mental health professional groups. During a series of workshops 
involving these professions, common ground between all five disciplines 
working in the mental health sector was established and collaboration 
proposed between the higher education sector, the Commonwealth, 
State and Territory governments and the professional associations to 
train clinicians to agreed standards (Deakin Human Services 1999). 
These standards, released in 2002, identified the attitudes, knowledge 
and skills needed by the key mental health professional groups 
(NMHETAG, NETINMHT and National Mental Health Strategy 2002).
The RANZCP was commissioned to develop clinical practice 
guidelines that described the optimal treatm ent for six major mental 
disorders: anorexia nervosa, bipolar disorder, depression, panic disorder 
and agoraphobia, and schizophrenia; deliberate self-harm was also 
included. For each disorder or condition, two guidelines were developed, 
one for consumers and carers, and another for clinicians; these were 
released in 2003 (RANZCP n.d.). There is some indication that both 
versions were found to be useful (Codyre et al. 2008, Killackey 2008).
The establishment of a mental health work program within the 
AIHW in 1995 was considered an important initiative in mental health 
data development. Through its national role in health information 
management, the AIHW had the capacity to coordinate the development 
and implementation of a national minimum data set (NMDS) for mental 
health care in both institutional and community settings (Briggs 1999).
In 1999 all State and Territory governments agreed to implement 
a mental health information development agenda (Eagar, Burgess and 
Buckingham 2000). That agenda was outlined with the publication of the 
document, Mental Health Inform ation Development: National
Inform ation Priorities and Strategies under the second plan (Briggs 
1999). I t  committed all State and Territory governments to collect
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information about the cost, quality and outcomes of Australia's mental 
health services. Outcomes, accountability and key performance 
indicators were considered important to the process of monitoring and 
improving the quality of mental health services (MHCA 2006, 
Performance Indicator Drafting Group 2005, Burgess, Pirkis and Coombs 
2006). $38 million was offered to the State and Territory governments 
by the Commonwealth government through Information Development 
Agreements. These agreements acted as sub-agreements under the 
Australian Health Care Agreements, but provided much greater attention 
to detailing the specific requirements of States and Territories 
(Buckingham, key informant interview).
A key element of the Commonwealth/State Information 
Development Agreements was development of information infrastructure 
and workforce skills to support consumer outcome measurement. The 
National Outcomes and Casemix Collection was established in 2003 
(Pirkis et al. 2005) to measure changes over time in the health status of 
a consumer of a mental health service. This included both clinician and 
consumer-rated measures. The collection was introduced across all 
public mental health services in Australia in the 2003/04 year and is a 
key performance indicator based on the National Health Performance 
Framework which became linked to the strategic directions of the third 
plan. Australia's steps to implement routine outcome measurement in 
mental health services became recognised internationally as leading 
developments in this area (Buckingham, key informant interview).
With respect to service reform the Commonwealth government 
trialled mental health integration projects as a way of integrating private 
psychiatry and public sector mental health services to create a more 
flexible integrated framework in which mental health care could be 
delivered (Eagar et al. 1999). These trials did not lead to any long term 
change to mental health service delivery between the private and public 
sectors.
There were very few Commonwealth government initiatives 
targeting those people with severe mental illness who had been the
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focus of the first plan. One exception was attention to people with 
mental illness who had been involved with the criminal justice system 
and treated in forensic mental health services. Patients of these services 
were highly visible in the media, and this was one area where the public 
saw the provision of services as a means of enhancing public safety. The 
Commonwealth government funded the development of a national 
approach to forensic mental health which was released early in 2000 
and essentially served as a tool for discussion and planning for good 
practice (Briggs 1999). No resources were allocated.
4. Conclusion
The opening of the policy window in 1998 was the result of a 
convergence of factors. Unlike the 1992 policy window, the ending of the 
firs t Plan required the Commonwealth government to formally consider 
its position on involvement in the reform process. There was a growing 
backlash among stakeholders regarding the narrow focus of the firs t 
plan on severe mental illness. They were advocating for a broader focus 
on a wider range of mental disorders and a move to mental health 
promotion, illness prevention and early intervention.
New information became available from epidemiology and related 
research confirming the high prevalence and high burden (premature 
m ortality and disability) from common mental disorders which supported 
the need for a broadening of the policy scope. Further, evidence 
emerged at this time about the low treatm ent rates of common mental 
disorders. Most of these disorders were treated in general practice 
(primary mental health care), an area for which the Commonwealth had 
policy responsibility. There was evidence suggesting a need for 
improving the capacity of general practitioners in the diagnosis and 
treatm ent of mental disorders.
While in the 1996 and 1997 Commonwealth budgets expenditure 
on programs was reduced, the 1998 budget provided the funding for the 
new Health Care Agreements which would cover the five year period 
1998 to 2003. Continued Commonwealth government spending on
162
mental health for this period was achieved with the efforts of the Health 
Minister Michael Wooldridge who, for technical and personal reasons, 
took the view that the Commonwealth government should remain 
involved in mental health reform and made the case to his colleagues.
External factors were also crucial in securing political support 
within government. Responding to the tragedy of suicide was an issue 
strongly supported by the Prime Minister. The Port Arthur shootings, 
although resulting in a policy response based on gun control, was seen 
to have implications for mental health services, given the perception 
that violence in the community and mental illness were related. 
Withdrawing government support from national mental health reform 
following the Port Arthur shootings was not considered to be politically 
defensible.
Dr Wooldridge developed a policy direction within mental health 
that encompassed a broader population health focus and emphasised 
the role of primary care. This approach was supported by stakeholder 
advocacy and scientific evidence and also allowed the Coalition 
government an approach that distinguished it from that of the previous 
Labor government.
Despite the rhetoric that the Second National Mental Health Plan 
would also continue to drive the reforms started during the first Plan 
(the treatm ent and care of those with severe mental illness), the 
momentum in this area waned. The emphasis shifted to primary mental 
health care and promotion and illness prevention, areas for which the 
Commonwealth had jurisdictional health responsibilities. The States and 
Territories for their part attempted to broaden the scope of the ir areas 
of mental health activity as required by the Second plan with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm.
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CHAPTER 8 - the COAG national mental health action plan in 2006
In this chapter I focus on the years 2003 to 2008 and identify the issues 
that led the Howard Coalition government to adopt the Council of 
Australian Governments' (COAG) National Action Plan on Mental Health 
in 2006, two years before the end of the third National Mental Health 
Plan (2003-08) endorsed by Australian Health Ministers.
Policy cycles in a particular area are characterised by repeated 
attempts to resolve a particular problem that remains at best, only 
partially resolved. These attempts are often accompanied by a change in 
the way the problem is conceptualised, as justification for novel policy 
solutions. As policy windows open and close over time the costs of 
adopting innovative solutions can contribute to a corresponding if 
inadvertent neglect of those areas that had been the focus of earlier 
efforts. In chronically underfunded systems maintaining a delicate fiscal 
balance, reform ist planning is vulnerable to being overtaken by events, 
triggering another cyclical return to crisis management that policy was 
meant to forestall, thus demonstrating the need for the next policy cycle 
to refocus on neglected fundamentals. This is what happened in mental 
health.
Before 2006, mental health reform had been progressed through 
the national meetings of Health Ministers and the ir subordinate 
committees. The Australian Health Minister's Conferences endorsed the 
National Mental Health Policies and Plans 'subject to Commonwealth 
financial contribution' in 1992, 1998 and 2003. Meanwhile, the meetings 
held by first Ministers (the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers) 
from 1992 onward had become known as the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG). COAG meetings superseded the series of ad hoc 
Special Premiers' Conferences that began in October 1990. In the early 
years of the Howard Liberal-National Coalition government (1996-2007), 
COAG was little used as a mechanism for intergovernmental action, 
perhaps because of its association with Keating and Labor, as well as its
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acceptance of the States as collaborative participants (Parkin and 
Anderson 2007). In the later years of the Howard government, COAG 
was increasingly used to address and manage a number of national 
issues, including counter-terrorism, water trading and management, 
energy regulation and a range of health issues. By 2006, the exigencies 
of events dictated that mental health policy reform could no longer be 
left solely with Health Ministers, but must become a matter for COAG, 
leading to the adoption of the COAG National Action Plan on Mental 
Health in 2006, two years before the end of the third plan.
The evaluation of the second National Mental Health Plan (1998 to 
2003) noted that the broadening of the reform agenda to a wider 
spectrum of interventions including mental health promotion, illness 
prevention, early intervention and primary mental health care had lost 
the focus on services for those with more severe illnesses (Thornicroft 
and Betts 2002). Community consultations in particular revealed a high 
level of dissatisfaction with services for these patients. Progress on the 
reform areas started during the first plan had stalled, constrained by the 
low level of resources available and variability in degrees of commitment 
to ongoing reform among the State and Territory governments. This loss 
of momentum resulted in a provider and community backlash.
In the eighth year of the Howard Coalition government at the 
Commonwealth level, Health Ministers adopted the third National Mental 
Health Plan (2003-08). The content of this plan was essentially to 
continue the promotion, prevention and primary mental health care 
reform agenda of the second plan while emphasising the need to 
address the unfinished reform agenda of the first plan. In my analysis I 
found that the adoption of the third plan by Health Ministers did not 
meet the definition of a 'policy window' in the thesis, that is, an 
opportunity to make a case for change. The decision to consider ongoing 
reform was mandated by the end of the second plan and there was a 
consensus among governments that a third plan was needed. The 
content of the third plan was largely a continuation of the reform 
progressed in the second plan.
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However jus t as the third plan was starting, issues were emerging 
that coalesced and developed political momentum to the extent that 
mental health became an issue of vital concern to heads of 
governments, to be considered at the COAG meeting of 14 July 2006. 
This chapter describes the issues and circumstances that led to mental 
health reaching the threshold of political necessity required to attain a 
place on the COAG agenda, and then to the development of the COAG 
National Action Plan on Mental Health which ultimately superseded the 
third plan.
As in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I use the themes identified in 
Chapter 4, human rights and community attitudes; community need; 
service structure; service quality and effectiveness; and resources as an 
organising framework to assemble the problems described in the 
literature and policy responses proposed in the lead up to 2003.
1. Themes
1.1 Human rights and com m unity attitudes  
Problem areas
I identified two main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  a re-emergence of 
human rights concerns and the need for involvement of 
consumers and carers in service delivery.
(a) Re-emergence of human rights
Despite years of reform, problems in the area of human 
rights continued to be reported in Australia's mental health 
system. Whilst human rights had been a major focus of the 
first plan, it had not been a prominent issue during the 
second plan. However, stigma and discrimination, along 
with insufficient resources and inadequate facilities, were 
still causing concern 13 years after they were identified in 
the Burdekin HREOC report (MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005,
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Senate Select Committee on Mental Health 2006b, Steering 
Committee for the Evaluation of the Second Plan 2003, 
Haikerwal et al. 2005, Ozdowski 2005).
The Mental Health Council of Australia (MHCA), originally 
set up to provide external advocacy and public scrutiny of 
the mental health system, did jus t that and was responsible 
for a number of influential reports including the Out o f 
Hospital, Out o f Mind report released in April 2003 (Groom, 
Hickie and Davenport 2003). Basic human rights violations 
again became a pervasive theme for advocates. Stigma, 
discrimination, ignorance, and overt and covert human 
rights violations were shown to continue to impact on the 
lives of those affected by mental illness (AICAFMHA 2004, 
Carr, Halpin and Low Prevalence Disorders Study Group 
2002, Groom, Hickie and Davenport 2003, Hickie, Groom 
and Davenport 2004, MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, SANE 
Australia 2004, Senate Select Committee on Mental Health 
2006b, Griffiths 2006, Habibis 2005, Haikerwal et al. 2005, 
Hickie 2002, Kennett 2005, McGorry 2005, Newman 2005, 
Ozdowski 2005, Richmond and Savy 2005, Savy 2005).
Systemic failures to protect the rights of people with 
mental illness were reported, and attributed not only to the 
health sector but also to sectors such as employment, 
education, housing welfare and immigration (Senate Select 
Committee on Mental Health 2006b). The immigration 
system came to represent a particular problem area. People 
detained within the immigration system were considered to 
have been denied rights provided to other incarcerated 
individuals such as those convicted of crimes and serving 
custodial sentences (Freckelton 2005, McSherry 2005, 
Ozdowski 2004). Children in immigration detention were 
found to be at particularly high risk of serious mental harm
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and this attracted considerable criticism (HREOC 2004, 
MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, Ozdowski 2004).
(b) Consumer and Carer involvement in services
In addition to the human rights abuses described, many 
stakeholders were expressing disappointment that their 
expectations for meaningful consumer and carer 
participation in service planning and policy-making had not 
been fully realised (AHMAC NMHWG Information Strategy 
Committee 2005, Hickie, Groom and Davenport 2004, 
SANE Australia 2003, 2004, Senate Select Committee on 
Mental Health 2006b, Steering Committee for the 
Evaluation of the Second Plan 2003, Epstein 2005, Griffiths 
2006, Haikerwal et al. 2005, Hickie et al. 2005, Hughes 
2006, Kennett 2005, Stacey and Herron 2002, Townsend et 
al. 2006, Waghorn and Lloyd 2005).
Policy responses
The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), 
which had been less involved in mental health after the 1992 
Burdekin Report on the national inquiry into the human rights of 
people with mental illness (HREOC 1993), became active in the 
area again. Dr Sev Ozdowski was the Australian Human Rights 
Commissioner and Disability Discrimination Commissioner from 
2000 to 2005. In May 2004 he released the nine hundred page 
report A Last Resort? National Inquiry into Children in 
Im m igration Detention (HREOC 2004). The MHCA, with the 
assistance of Dr Ozdowski, undertook a review of mental health 
services and related social supports (Hickie et al. 2005). The 
resulting thousand page report, Not For Service: Experiences o f 
Injustice and Despair in Mental Health Care in Australia (MHCA, 
BMRI and HREOC 2005), urged a renewed focus on the human 
rights of people with mental illness. While the application of the
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Rights Analysis Instrum ent described in Chapter 6 to all Australian 
mentai health legislation had taken an important step towards 
quality assurance in mental health services by identifying gaps 
and best practices (Watchirs 2000, Watchirs 2005), The Human 
Rights Commissioner found that further progress, especially a 
change in attitudes and culture in human services, would be 
necessary in order to prevent breaches of human rights of 
persons with mental illness (Ozdowski 2004).
Activists and experts proposed that stigma and 
discrimination be addressed by encouraging more responsible 
media reporting of mental illness and population-based mental 
health promotion via established organisations such as 
beyondblue and SANE (Carr, Halpin and Low Prevalence Disorders 
Study Group 2002, Francis et al. 2001, Groom, Hickie and 
Davenport 2003, MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, SANE Australia 
2003, Chiroiu 2003, Haikerwal et al. 2005, Hickie 2000, 2004, 
Hickie et al. 2005, Jorm, Christensen and Griffiths 2005, Kennett 
2005, Stacey and Herron 2002). They suggested that community 
education campaigns should focus on reducing the disparity 
between public and political perceptions of 'health' and 'mental 
health' (Hickie and Groom 2002, Kennett 2006), and 
recommended that governments increase their commitment to 
consumer and carer participation through implementation of 
formal mechanisms to ensure their role in matters of service 
planning, delivery and policy (McGrath 2002, Townsend et al. 
2006).
1.2 Community Need 
Problem areas
I identified two main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  economic and social 
needs of consumers and the need for priority to be given to 
people with severe mental illness.
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(a) Economic and social needs
Epidemiological studies such as the adult, children and 
adolescents, and people with 'low prevalence' (psychotic) 
disorders components of the 1997-98 National Survey of 
Mental Health and Wellbeing demonstrated the high 
prevalence and low treatm ent rates for mental disorders 
(ABS 1998, Jablensky et al. 1999, Sawyer et al. 2001) 
while the Australian Burden of Disease Study (Mathers, Vos 
and Stevenson 1999) confirmed the high level of disability 
caused by mental disorders. Researchers and advocates 
continued to emphasise the high prevalence and significant 
disability caused by mental disorders. They reported on the 
economic and social costs of mental illness as well 
(Andrews and Tolkien II Team 2006, Burgess et al. 2002, 
Butterworth and Berry 2004, McGorry 2005, Pirkis et al. 
2006, Sanderson et al. 2003, Vos and Mathers 2000), and 
advocates used their findings, especially the data on 
suicide, high rates of homelessness, prolonged 
unemployment, incarceration or increased financial burden 
and poverty (MHCA 2006, MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, 
SANE Australia 2003, 2004).
The impact of the high prevalence of mental 
disorders in terms of labour productivity was at the 
forefront of these discussions (MHCA 2006, Butterworth 
and Berry 2004, McGorry 2005, Waghorn and Lloyd 2005) 
and the increasing recognition that the economic burden of 
mental illness, in terms of lost productivity, had been a key 
factor in spurring action in a number of countries (Saxena 
et al. 2007). The case for investment was made stronger by 
evidence (Wang et al. 2007) for a positive economic return 
on investing in treatm ent of mental disorders (Rosenberg, 
Hickie and Mendoza 2009):
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The 2006 [Australian] National Action Plan on 
Mental Health was inspired not merely by health 
concerns but also by economic factors. Numerous 
reports have detailed the negative impact on the 
Australian economy wrought by mental illness.
(b) Focus on people with severe disorders and social 
disadvantage
One of the main targets of the second plan, low population 
treatm ent rates for common mental disorders, remained of 
concern. Unmet need in primary care due to failure to 
recognise and treat mental disorders continued to be 
reported as problematic (Caldwell et al. 2004, Hickie et al. 
2001). However, along with the refocus of attention on 
human rights, there re-emerged a focus on the significant 
disability and unmet needs of those with more severe 
disorders who were the most socially disadvantaged 
(Harvey et al. 2002). Even the best services were shown to 
fail to meet the needs of those with complex problems 
unless there was close cooperation with housing, welfare 
and disability support services (Harvey et al. 2002). The 
mental health needs of sub-populations, such as asylum 
seeker detainees, particularly children and adolescents, was 
becoming a prominent issue (HREOC 2004, Palmer 2005, 
Ozdowski 2004).
Policy responses
Policy responses were to refocus attention in the areas of service 
reform, especially to those with more severe illness as described 
in the service structure theme 1.3 below, but also to those being 
treated in primary care.
In the area of primary care, where most people with 
common mental disorders were treated, many including myself 
argued for improving access to services by to enhancing the 
successful Better Outcomes in Mental Health Care initiative
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(Haikerwal et al. 2005, Harrison and Britt 2004, McCormack and 
Thomas 2004). I t  was proposed that short term psychological 
therapies that had been shown to be cost effective (Mihalopoulos 
et al. 2005) be expanded and subsidised in the Medicare Benefits 
Schedule. This policy proposal was recommended by m id-term 
reviewers of the second plan (Betts and Thornicroft 2001, 5-6), 
professional organisations (Senate Select Committee on Mental 
Health 2006b, 57,58,98-100,125,137), advocacy groups (MHCA 
2006, 8, MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, 177,342,802, SANE 
Australia 2004, 1), and the Senate Select Committee on Mental 
Health (Senate Select Committee on Mental Health 2006b, 6).
New service models that did not require face to face 
contact with a health professional were also proposed to improve 
access in a cost-effective way. Both e-health and tele-health 
initiatives represented potentially cost-effective vehicles for 
prevention, and could extend mental health services to difficult to 
reach populations e.g. people living in rural and remote areas 
(Andrews and Tolkien II Team 2006, Betts and Thornicroft 
2001:13, Christensen, Griffiths and Evans 2002, Griffiths, 
Blomberg and Christensen 2003, Urbis Keys Young 2002, Hickie, 
Davenport and Luscombe 2006).
To decrease the need for services, advocates and experts 
continued to press for expansion and replication of highly 
regarded health promotion and illness prevention programs for 
example MindMatters in schools, SANE Australia's StigmaWatch 
and public education campaigns like those by beyondblue) (Buist 
and Bilszta 2006, Chiroiu 2003, Hickie 2000, Hickie 2002, Kennett 
2005, Kennett 2006, Wyn et al. 1999, Wyn et al. 2000).
1.3 Service structure  
Problem areas
I identified two main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  a lack of access to
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services and the need to better coordinate services across
sectors.
(a) Lack of access to services
Mental health services were characterised as functioning in 
'crisis mode'. Lack of access was identified as a major 
problem for both people with common mental disorders 
such as anxiety and depression as well as those with 
severe mental illness, such as psychoses, who were unable 
to find hospital beds when requiring emergency treatment 
(although the latter was rarely clearly quantified). What 
was quantified however was that acute hospital units were 
overburdened with people suffering from chronic disorders 
who could not be discharged because community services 
were unavailable (Andrews and Tolkien II Team 2006, Betts 
and Thornicroft 2001:17, SANE Australia 2003, Andrews 
2005, Griffiths 2006, Newman 2005, Rey, Walter and 
Giuffrida 2004, Townsend et al. 2006, Woodruff 2006). 
Community treatment options, particularly residential 
services with links to clinical support were inadequate in 
the wake of de-institutionalisation (Betts and Thornicroft 
2001:12, Groom, Hickie and Davenport 2003, MHCA, BMRI 
and HREOC 2005, Steering Committee for the Evaluation of 
the Second Plan 2003, Newman 2005, Ozdowski 2005, 
Savy 2005, Smith and Gridley 2006, Woodruff 2006).
The same problems that had been the target of the 
1992 policy response in the first plan - de­
institutionalisation without adequate community care 
resulting in a new form of institutionalisation, homelessness 
and imprisonment - were again becoming prominent (New 
South Wales Legislative Council Select Committee on 
Mental Health 2002, xv, Griffiths 2006, Hickie et al. 2005, 
Savy 2005, White and Whiteford 2006). Many including
173
myself were concerned that prisons were becoming de 
facto psychiatric institutions (Griffiths 2006, Hickie et al.
2005, Ozdowski 2005, Savy 2005, White and Whiteford 
2006).
Crisis response services were only sufficient to 
intervene in the most severe situations, and were not able 
to respond to those needing early relapse response or 
ongoing treatment and support (Betts and Thornicroft 
2001:17). There were no coherent national strategies 
covering key issues such as dual diagnosis, rehabilitation, 
supported accommodation, and education and training for 
families and carers (Teesson and Byrnes 2001).
(b) Intersectoral service coordination
Whilst some advances had been made in forming 
intersectoral partnerships to address consumers' needs, the 
complexity of the system continued to create barriers to 
continuity of care, and intersectoral collaboration had not 
developed in a systematic or coordinated fashion 
(AICAFMHA 2001, AICAFMHA 2004, Steering Committee for 
the Evaluation of the Second Plan 2003, Townsend et al.
2006, Waghorn and Lloyd 2005, Waghorn et al. 2004).
There continued to be concerns about integration
within health services, particularly between hospital and 
community mental health services, for example follow-up 
care in the community following an acute inpatient episode 
of care, and between different parts of the health service, 
for example between mental health and substance abuse 
services (Steering Committee for the Evaluation of the 
Second Plan 2003, Teesson and Byrnes 2001, Ozdowski 
2005, Woodruff 2006).
Service coordination between the health sector and 
other human services, despite the focus on intersectoral
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linkages described in Chapter 5, had not been successfully 
implemented. A 'silo' mentality continued to exist within 
government departments at the Commonwealth and 
State/Territory level (e.g. mental health, health, housing, 
education, disability, geriatrics, child and family services) 
(Betts and Thornicroft 2001:12). Little was known 
regarding the factors which promote or inhibit intersectoral 
collaboration (St Vincent's Mental Health Service 
(Melbourne) and Craze Lateral Solutions 2005). There were 
persistent reports of fundamental service failures by 
disorganised and dislocated health and welfare systems, 
and a lack of coordination between welfare, housing, 
mental health, health, education, employment, disability, 
police, and emergency care services (Betts and Thornicroft 
2001:12, MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, SANE Australia 
2003).
These failures were attributed to fragmented 
governance, funding and service delivery models (Callaly 
and Fletcher 2005, Townsend et al. 2006). There was 
relatively little emphasis on the psychosocial components of 
mental illness and recovery/ rehabilitation typically 
provided by the psychiatric disability support sector 
(Harvey et al. 2002) which from this period onway 
assumed a grater focus in mental health reform.
The failure of intersectoral service linkages was 
summarised as follows by Waghorn and Lloyd (2005):
Australia has a national mental health strategy 
which guides on-going reform of mental health 
services. This strategy recognises the challenge of 
inter-sectoral [variant spellings SIC] difficulties in 
terms of disability support, education, housing, and 
employment. However, the intersectoral 
collaborations called for by the strategy have not 
been adequately evaluated. This is probably 
because no such collaborations appear to have 
materialised, even though these are recognised as 
essential to address the social and economic
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marginalisation of people with mental illness ...
The lack of inter-sectoral collaboration in Australia 
exacerbates the structural division of public mental 
health services from other key sectors such as 
housing and employment. This in turn obstructs 
inter-sectoral policy development as well as the 
coordination and delivery of mental health and 
vocational services.
Woodruff similarly commented that lack of coordination of 
services was exacerbating existing problems (2006):
The reasons above are complex but at one level 
they include the inadequate community support 
following de-institutionalisation, uncoordinated 
primary care, inadequate resourcing of public 
hospitals including a lack of psychiatric beds, and a 
lack of appreciation of non-medical factors 
contributing to the problems ... In addition 
however, there is a desperate need to co-ordinate 
Federal, State, and Local government initiatives, 
not just with respect to health spending but also to 
all the other areas which contribute to the terrible 
burden of mental ill-health such as welfare 
payments and housing.
Rey and colleagues (2004) emphasised that it was not the 
National Mental Health Strategy policy directions that were 
the problem but rather:
Implementation of the [National Mental Health] 
Strategy needs revision; the fact that after 10 years 
psychiatrists perceive that the quality of mental 
health care in Australia is not improving cannot be 
ignored. Policy, even good policy, by itself does not 
necessarily result in better clinical care.
Policy responses
For people with severe mental illness requiring specialist services, 
early intervention, particularly during early psychosis, was 
strongly identified as a strategy which could not only reduce the 
public health burden, but could do so cost-effectively (McGorry 
and Yung 2003). Other recommendations included that recovery- 
oriented services should be incorporated into all areas of routine 
practice, and that a fundamental reorientation to a more proactive
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approach would help prevent the development of crisis situations 
(Rickwood 2005, Rickwood and Mitcheii 2005, SANE Australia
2004) .
One typical media response to the 'crisis' in access to care 
for those with severe mental disorders was to recommend more 
inpatient beds be provided. Some experts criticised this 
commonly-proposed solution, however, noting that up to 40% of 
patients in acute mental health facilities could be safely 
discharged from hospital if adequate community based services 
and supports were available to them (MHCA 2006, Hickie et al.
2005) . Accommodation, rehabilitation, outreach and other forms 
of community support were generally supplied by NGOs which 
received around five% of the mental health budget nationally. 
This was considered an inadequate proportion as NGOs and 
families had taken on most of the burden of care after patients 
were discharged from hospital under deinstitutionlisation (SANE 
Australia 2003).
To improve services outside hospital required intersectoral 
coordination. Between 2004 and 2006, the MHCA advocated for a 
more coordinated service response from a range of 
Commonwealth government departments and agencies including 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), 
Department of Health and Ageing, Department of Employment 
and Workplace Relations (DEWR), Department of Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA) and 
Centrelink. Advocates argued that a whole of government social 
policy framework was necessary to solve the issues identified with 
housing, community support, and employment (MHCA, BMRI and 
HREOC 2005, SANE Australia 2003, Habibis 2005, Hickie et al. 
2005).
Specific recommendations were made for special 
populations. For example it was suggested that the detainee 
population could be provided with much more effective mental
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health care if psychiatrists' visits were more frequent, and the 
number and deployment of mental health trained nurses, 
psychologists and primary practitioners were reconsidered 
(Palmer 2005). Structural modifications and greater flexib ility 
were recommended avenues for governments to pursue in the 
improvement of mental health care to detainees (Palmer 2005).
1.4 Service quality and effectiveness  
Problem areas
I identified two main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  the need to measure 
service quality and to measure service outcomes.
(a) Measuring service quality
Measurement and monitoring of service quality remained 
an ongoing challenge for the complex systems that 
comprised mental health care, largely due to the lack of 
consensus regarding how performance measurement 
concepts should be applied to mental health care, and 
variable implementation by State and Territory 
governments (Performance Indicator Drafting Group 2005, 
Steering Committee for the Evaluation of the Second Plan 
2003, Technical Specifications Drafting Group and AHMAC 
NMHWG Information Strategy Committee 2003). I t  was 
recognised that definitions of quality were imprecise, and 
estimates as to whether the services provided to patients 
had increased in number or quality were lacking (AHMAC 
NMHWG Information Strategy Committee 2005, Hickie, 
Groom and Davenport 2004).
Progress in implementing standards for mental 
health care had not met expectations, and had been 
introduced in an ad hoc manner (Betts and Thornicroft
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2001, 13, Steering Committee for the Evaluation of the 
Second Plan 2003). Despite developments in mentai health 
data collection, it was not possible to monitor changes over 
time in the mental health of the Australian population, or in 
levels of unmet need (Steering Committee for the 
Evaluation of the Second Plan 2003). I t  was widely agreed 
that existing mental health information systems remained 
underdeveloped (Performance Indicator Drafting Group 
2005, Steering Committee for the Evaluation of the Second 
Plan 2003, Richmond and Savy 2005).
(b) Measuring service outcomes
Australia was relying on models of care without 
accountability for stipulated outcomes (Betts and 
Thornicroft 2001, 13). There was a lack of consensus 
regarding the routine use of appropriate outcomes 
measures, which was only jus t beginning to occur in 
practice (Betts and Thornicroft 2001, 13, Hughes 2006). 
Similarly there was concern that the long-term outcomes of 
promotion/prevention programs had not been evaluated 
properly (AICAFMHA 2001, 2004, Mitchell 2000a).
Service quality, accountability and transparency as 
well as coordination and linkages between them were 
considered to be lacking in sectors other than health, most 
notably within immigration detention, when dealing with 
people with mental health problems (Betts and Thornicroft 
2001, 12, Palmer 2005, Senate Select Committee on 
Mental Health 2006b, 235).
Policy responses
Major recommendations for improving service quality included 
better education for the mental health workforce regarding 
evidence based medicine (Andrews and Tolkien II Team 2006,
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Sanderson et al. 2003). Web-based education was considered a 
cost effective method for educating the broader workforce 
(Andrews and Tolkien II  Team 2006). Education strategies had 
particular relevance to the primary care sector, given the pivotal 
role of general practitioners in managing mental disorders (Mental 
Health and Special Programs Branch 2000d).
Following sim ilar reforms in the general health sector, 
governments were encouraged to implement a range of mental 
health service quality strategies including: (1) development of, 
and reporting against quality indicators; (2) consumer and carer 
participation initiatives; (3) quality accreditation using continuous 
quality improvement; (4) safety strategies; (5) workforce 
development including leadership development; and (6) evidence 
based practice (AHMAC NMHWG 2005, AHMAC NMHWG 
Information Strategy Committee 2005, Briggs 1999, Eagar, 
Burgess and Buckingham 2000, NMHETAG, National Education 
and Training In itia tive and National Mental Health Strategy 2002, 
Palmer 2005, Performance Indicator Drafting Group 2005, Pirkis 
et al. 1999, Technical Specifications Drafting Group and AHMAC 




I identified two main problem areas in the data sources from the 
literature review that coded to this theme -  insufficient resources 
and problems in the financing mechanisms.
(a) Insufficient resources
Insufficient financial resources continued to be reported. 
Advocates pointed out that, although mental illness was the
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third largest contributor to the total disease burden, and 
the largest overall cause of disability, it was oniy the 7th 
ranked disease area by expenditure in Australia, i.e. 
implying funding for mental health in Australia was not 
commensurate with the magnitude of the disease burden 
(Hickie, Groom and Davenport 2004, MHCA 2006, Griffiths 
2006, Haikerwal et al. 2005). Whilst resourcing for mental 
health had increased steadily over the previous ten years, 
this expenditure had risen no faster than health 
expenditure in general, suggesting that, proportionally, the 
National Mental Health Strategy had not resulted in an 
increased level of health sector resources as was required 
to address the level of unmet need for services and disease 
burden (Steering Committee for the Evaluation of the 
Second Plan 2003). Commentators did not attribute service 
'failures' to a lack of clear and appropriate policy directions, 
but rather to insufficient investment and commitment 
(Steering Committee 2003).
Insufficient human resources were also identified as 
a problem. Serious workforce shortages across all mental 
health professional groups was hindering the ability of 
government and non-government providers to meet the 
increasing demand for services (Betts and Thornicroft 
2001:11, COAG 2006b).
(b) Financing mechanisms
Multiple funding sources for mental health services had 
created duplication and gaps, opportunities for cost- 
shifting, and tensions between public and private sector 
services and providers (Eagar et al. 2005, Townsend et al. 
2006). The funding split between the Commonwealth and 
State/Territory governments for different forms of 
community services, including the social support services
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delivered by non-government agencies had resulted in poor 
intersectoral coordination and was a source of frustration 
for consumers (SANE Australia 2003, Eagar et al. 2005, 
Townsend et al. 2006). Callaly and Fletcher argued that 
better alignment of Commonwealth and State/Territory 
funding arrangements was needed to support the delivery 
of more integrated health care (2005).
Policy responses
There was a general consensus that funding for mental health 
services should be allocated on the basis of population need 
(Burgess et al. 2002). In his Tolkien I I  report prominent academic 
Gavin Andrews (2006) proposed that mental health services 
should (and could) be planned on the basis of need, and that this 
could be achieved in a cost-effective manner through a stepped- 
care service model (Andrews, Issakidis and Sanderson 2004). 
Policy makers, planners and clinicians were encouraged to take 
every opportunity to ensure that specialist resources were 
directed to those in greatest clinical need (Burgess et al. 2002, 
Rosen 2006).
Economic analyses (essentially cost-effectiveness analyses) 
were proposed as a way of assisting governments to estimate the 
health and cost benefit that would result from optimal mental 
health care, and thus inform policy makers regarding 'best buys' 
in mental health (Andrews and Tolkien II Team 2006, Eagar, 
Burgess and Buckingham 2000, Andrews, Issakidis and 
Sanderson 2004, Chisholm 2005, Haby et al. 2004, Singh, 
Hawthorne and Vos 2001). The Assessing Cost Effectiveness in 
Mental Health (ACE-MH) project explored options to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of Australia's mental health resources 
through the direction of available resources to 'best practice' cost 
effective services (Chisholm 2005, Haby et al. 2004, Vos et al. 
2005). Andrews in the Tolkien I I  report (2006) established that
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evidence based, cost effective treatments exist for most mental 
disorders and that optimal treatm ent could avert a greater 
proportion of the burden of mental disorders for no additional 
investment (Andrews 2005, 2006, McGorry 2005).
Following the Mental Health Classification and Service Cost 
(MH-CASC) study (Buckingham et al. 1998) there was growing 
interest in answering the following important questions: who 
receives what services from whom, at what cost, and with what 
effect (Eagar, Burgess and Buckingham 2000, Chisholm 2005)? 
The development and implementation of a national model for the 
collection and analysis of aggregated and de-identified data based 
on a minimum data set and outcome measures was proposed 
(Morris-Yates and Strategic Planning Group for Private Psychiatric 
Services 2000).
To meet future workforce demands it was suggested that 
the number of funded places and financial incentives for 
accredited medical and allied health training courses should be 
increased (Betts and Thornicroft 2001, Senate Select Committee 
on Mental Health 2006a, 2006b). Workforce development
initiatives to increase retention rates were also identified as 
critical (Betts and Thornicroft 2001).
Investment in new ways for the current workforce to 
deliver mental health services, such as new Medicare item 
numbers and innovative referral systems was suggested as a 
potential initiative for the improvement of linkages between the 
specialist and primary sectors (Betts and Thornicroft 2001, Mental 
Health and Special Programs Branch 2000d).
2. The Political Response and the opening of the policy 
window
That there had been some substantial changes in the mental health 
service system, in line with the directions of the National Mental Health 
Policy (James, K. Casey, Blackwood, Buckingham, Groves, Raphael, D.
183
Casey and Smyth, key informants interviews) during the time of the first 
and second plans was undeniable. Total government spending on mental 
health increased by 90% between 1993 and 2005, equivalent to $1.8 
billion or $73 per person per year. Spending on mental health in 2005 
was $3.9 billion, an 85% increase in real terms since 1993. 
Commonwealth government spending was $1.38 billion, State and 
Territory government spending totalled $2.38 billion and that of private 
health insurers $163 million. Mental health accounted for 6.8% of total 
national expenditure on health care and 7.3% of total government 
health spending nationally. However this proportion had not changed 
between 1993 and 2005, suggesting mental health spending had not 
increased as a proportion of total health expenditure (Department of 
Health and Ageing 2007).
Overall the number of hospital beds decreased. There was a 66% 
reduction in long stay beds in psychiatric hospitals between 1993 and 
2005. By June 2005, beds located in these hospitals accounted for only 
38% of Australia's total psychiatric inpatient capacity, compared with 
73% in June 1993. Those beds remaining in psychiatric hospitals 
provided long term care to people with very severe and ongoing mental 
illness and those detained on forensic orders. The number of acute beds, 
almost all of them in general hospitals, increased (416 beds), but their 
availability remained relatively constant when population growth was 
taken into account (Department of Health and Ageing 2007).
While overall bed availability decreased, community services 
expanded significantly. Spending by State and Territory governments on 
community based mental health services increased by 185% or $777 
million between 1993 and 2005. In 1993, 29% of State and Territory 
mental health spending was to provide services for people in the 
community. By 2005, the community share of total mental health 
expenditure had increased to 51%. The number of clinical staff providing 
community mental health care grew by 129%. While growth in the 
clinical workforce had not kept up with growth in spending, in 2005 
there were 4,340 more health professionals employed in State and
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Territory funded community mental health services than in 1993 
(Department of Health and Ageing 2007).
By June 2005, 78% of State and Territory services in Australia 
had been reviewed to assess their compliance with the National 
Standards for Mental Health Services and over 90% had begun 
collecting and reporting consumer outcomes information. Whether these 
changes had actually improved the clinical outcomes for patients was 
still unknown (Department of Health and Ageing 2007).
The m ajority of the key informants held the view that the 
availability and distribution of services had increased during the time 
they were involved with or had observed mental health reform and this 
was supported by the quantitative data on increases in funding, 
community services and staffing, and the use of service standards and 
patient outcome measures. Nevertheless prominent advocates 
categorised the mental health system as being in crisis (MHCA 2006, 
MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005, Raphael 2000, SANE Australia 2004, 
Hickie and Groom 2002, Sanderson et al. 2003, Woodruff 2006). The 
problem areas presented by the stakeholders covered the spectrum of 
issues seen during the life of the National Mental Health Strategy but, as 
described in this chapter, the most prominent ones were very similar to 
those articulated in the years prior to 1992: concerns about the human 
rights and influence of consumers on service planning and delivery; a 
focus on services for those with severe mental illness including problems 
with the quality and outcomes of clinical services, access to acute 
mental health care; the supply of and coordination with housing and 
community support services; the lack of financial and human resources 
and the way in which financing was provided.
This led to understandable questions as to why the system could 
be in crisis, if there had been reform consistent with the agreed national 
policy direction. When considering this in 2005 I commented (Whiteford 
and Buckingham 2005):
Given the current d isquiet about service delivery, has the direction 
of reform been the righ t one? Several evaluations of the S trategy, 
a recent review by the Canadian Senate and a prevailing view in
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the mental health sector support the directions of the Mental 
Health Strategy...
The main criticism has been of a perceived failure to implement 
the policy directions of the Strategy. However the evidence ... 
indicates that the service system is being reformed in the agreed 
directions. While the development has been uneven, with 
disparities in funding and services continuing between the States 
and Territories, change in many areas has been substantial ...
The key question therefore is not whether national policy settings 
are incorrect, or whether policy directions have been 
implemented, but whether the pace and extent of change has 
been enough. There are indications that it has not.
Compared to 1992, consumers, carers and advocates had become 
much more active and vocal with greater expectations (Whiteford and 
Buckingham 2005). A decrease in stigma and better community 
education meant the longstanding and significant unmet need was being 
addressed as more individuals sought treatm ent. Commonwealth, State 
and Territory mental health programs were reporting increased demand 
for mental health care (Department of Health and Ageing 2004) with 
data showing a steady increase in overnight admissions to acute 
psychiatric units (AIHW 2004). In 2003 the MHCA released a report, Out 
o f Hospital, Out o f Mind detailing problems with mental health services 
in Australia in 2002 and recommending priorities for the National Mental 
Health Policy 2003-08, especially in the areas of community services 
(Groom, Hickie and Davenport 2003). This report was a forerunner of 
the advocacy to come.
The overwhelming view was that the reform momentum started 
with the first plan had been lost. One key informant (Hickie) commented 
that 'the States dropped the ball' with respect to maintaining the reform 
agenda and that the Commonwealth 'pulled back to its area' and was 'no 
longer providing national leadership' in the lead up to the COAG 
consideration of mental health. Another key informant (Smyth) 
commented that mental health had not been given the attention needed 
to fix growing problems in the services, another (K. Casey) recalled a 
leading consumer advocate saying the Commonwealth had 'abandoned 
the real mentally ill', while another (Groves) commented that the third
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and fourth mental health plans had aspirations to be whole of 
government pians but in reality were oniy health plans. The view was 
summarised well by senior clinician and advocate Alan Rosen (Rosen 
2006):
The effects of competition for limited resources between core 
mental health service delivery and the shift to a population-based 
public health approach (to prevention of mental illness and 
promotion of mental health), leaves our services vulnerable to 
doing neither particularly well. The recent loss of momentum of 
these reforms, due to failure of governments to continue to drive 
and fund them adequately, is causing the erosion of their 
considerable achievements.
Appendix 1 provides an overview of one example in a high profile 
area, police shootings of people with mental illness. Gains from reforms 
introduced in 1995 as indicated by fewer shootings were slow and 
uneven and were not sustained. Intractable problem areas such as this 
frustrated mental health consumers, carers and advocates. John 
Mendoza (key informant interview) identified the police shooting in New 
South Wales on 2 December 2004 of Thuong Lam, a person with 
schizophrenia as an event that drew attention to persistent concerns 
about the adequacy of community services, although in this case the 
Coroner found that the treatm ent that had been received by the 
deceased had been 'appropriate at all relevant times' (New South Wales 
State Coroner 2006, 96).
Prominent professor of psychiatry Gavin Andrews (2005) 
summarised the prevailing view, that most criticisms were directed at 
the services for those with severe mental illness in specialist public 
sector services:
How is it that Australia's mental health services are in disarray? A 
Senate inquiry is mooted, and the press run stories of concern 
almost every week. Most of the stories are about failures in 
public-sector acute-care services that are the responsibility of the 
State and Territory governments.
The initial response of the Commonwealth government was to 
allocate responsibility for the inadequacies to State and Territory 
governments. At the release of the MHCA report Not for Service: 
Experiences o f Injustice and Despair in Mental Health Care in Australia
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(MHCA, BMRI and HREOC 2005) on 19 October 2005, the 
Commonwealth Minister for Health, Tony Abbott directed responsibility 
for the service failures at the State and Territory governments according 
to Hickie (key informant interview). Another key informant (Mendoza) 
described the States and Territories as being 'in denial' about the extent 
of the problems in their services.
The Howard Liberal-National Coalition government had been re­
elected on 10 November 2001 and 9 October 2004 with the next 
election due in 2007. There was no specific mention of action to address 
mental health in the 2001 Coalition health policy and no clear electoral 
commitment for mental health reform (K. Casey, key informant 
interview), however there was a commitment in the 2004 health policy 
to increase funding for mental health care by $110 million over four 
years, with an emphasis on youth mental health, enhanced primary care 
and increased community awareness of mental disorders (Hickie et al. 
2005). The Coalition government was seen to have strong credentials in 
economic management but had been criticised in a number of social 
policy areas and had been specifically attacked by the Opposition for a 
lack of attention to mental health (Gartrell n.d.):
The Howard governm ent has shown a complete lack of 
in terest and leadership in the area of mental health. Health 
M inister Tony Abbott has shrugged o ff most o f the 
responsib ility for mental health services, saying it is a 
State responsibility. He has also said tha t people w ith 
mental health problems already have "a reasonable range  
o f services available to th e m ."
So low does mental health rate w ith in the Howard 
governm ent tha t Tony Abbott has relegated responsibility 
fo r it to his Parliam entary Secretary. Further, there is no 
longer a Branch dedicated solely to  mental health in the 
Departm ent of Health and Ageing. From January 2004 up 
to the day the Federal Election was called, Hansard shows 
Tony Abbott spoke 400 tim es in Parliam ent and not once 
mentioned mental health.
The Prime Minister considered mental health an important piece 
of social policy reform that needed to be addressed (Smyth, key 
informant). Ian Hickie (key informant interview) believed for Mr Howard 
it was 'an opportunity to be socially progressive'.
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The Parliament had announced the establishment of a Senate 
Select Committee on Mentai Health on March 8, 2005, chaired by 
Australian Democrats leader Lyn Allison, to inquire into the provision of 
mental health services in Australia. The Committee was initially asked to 
report to the Senate by 6 October 2005, however a strong public 
response to the Committee's work led the Senate, on 18 August 2005, 
to extend the Committee's reporting deadline to 30 March 2006. A 
further extension was granted on 1 March 2006 allowing the Committee 
to report prior to 28 April 2006. The Committee tabled its first report on 
30 March 2006 and its final report on 28 April 2006.
The Committee's recommendations were wide ranging but served 
to refocus attention onto the services in the community for those with 
severe mental illness as a priority, to promote social reintegration and 
human rights with measurable specific targets for consumer outcomes. 
Although the Committee called for a balance between programs 
delivering mental health promotion, illness prevention, early 
intervention and the delivery of services for people with established 
mental illness, it was the recommendations about the need to address 
the unfinished agenda of the first plan that were widely supported. A 
content analysis of the submissions to the Senate inquiry found that 
stakeholder concerns about Australia's mental health care system could 
be described within themes relating to the broad range of clinical and 
support services needed in the community for those with established 
mental illness (Townsend et al. 2006).
The MHCA, among many others in the field, welcomed the 
outcomes of the Senate inquiry, pointing to the need to put in place:
The infrastructure to enable supported de-institutionalisation to 
occur - the infrastructure Australia should have built 20 years ago 
when the old asylums were closed (Dwyer and Leggat 2006).
There is a lingering concern however that although mental health 
reform in Australia has been heading broadly in an appropriate 
direction these reforms are already losing momentum; and core 
local mental health services are being eroded or have never been 
adequately developed ... there is further concern that the closing 
of institutions in Australia has been half-hearted and incomplete; 
that it has not been accompanied by full transfer of real 
investment in mental health services and facilities; and that
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under-resourced services are again being expected to be 
everyth ing to everyone (Rosen 2006).
Under pressure from strong stakeholder advocacy and the 
recommendations of the Senate inquiry, the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory governments began to formulate a response. They were 
lobbied strongly and continuously by advocates such as Ian Hickie, John 
Mendosa (who was CEO of the MHCA) and Pat McGorry. John Mendoza 
(key informant interview) referred to 'building a bonfire' which included 
Commonwealth government Parliamentary breakfasts attended by about 
two fifths of all Parliamentarians. Throughout 2005, the MHCA 
developed and executed a deliberate strategy to engage key media, a 
critical mass of politicians from all sides of the Parliament and the MHCA 
membership to build the case for national leadership and intervention in 
mental health services. Mendosa referred to the release of the Not for 
Service report as a 'lighting rod' for community concern about the state 
of mental health care across Australia.
According to Mendoza the MHCA strategy involved
'backgrounding key political jou rna lis ts  and producers of national 
in fluentia l media, hosting breakfasts and internal briefings fo r Federal 
Party Com m ittees; continuous stream of stories about the problems in 
mental health care (consum ers, carers, providers, o ther sectors such as 
Police); engaging with S ta te /Territo ry  sta tu tory  officers (Public 
Advocates etc). The net effect was tha t the media and political players 
were primed and well informed when the [Not fo r Service] report was 
released'.
Hickie has described being involved in four years of sustained 
national and State level advocacy in an essay in the Medical Journal o f 
Australia (Hickie 2009) and an op-ed in the Sydney Morning Herald on 
September 23, 2011:
In 2004 I traversed the country w ith colleagues docum enting the 
failings of our mental health systems. Our report Not fo r Service: 
Experiences o f In jus tice  and Despair stirred John Howard and 
Morris lem m a to in itia te  the investm ent of $5 billion between 
2006 and 2011 in reform  measures.
In the Commonwealth government, Parliamentary Secretary 
Christopher Pyne had responsibility for mental health. He was advised 
and his views influenced by advocates such as Ian Hickie, Pat McGorry,
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the MHCA (John Mendoza and Keith Wilson), beyondblue (Jeff Kennett) 
and SANE Australia (Barbara Hocking) (K. Casey, key informant). Mr 
Pyne was supported by several colleagues as he worked hard to 
formulate new reforms (K. Casey and Smyth, key informants). Ian 
Hickie (key informant interview) nominated assistant Treasurer Helen 
Coonan as an important supporter. Mendoza (key informant interview) 
nominated Warren Entsch, Kay Hull, Helen Coonan, Kevin Andrews, 
Brendan Nelson and Joe Hockey.
Key informants (Hickie, Mendoza and Smyth) also emphasised the 
important role played by Morris lemma who, following his elevation from 
Health Minister to NSW Premier in July 2005, made mental health one of 
the NSW government's priorities. Mendoza (key informant interview) 
said after the October 2005 launch Mr lemma wrote to Prime Minister 
Howard proposing a national summit on mental health and offered New 
South Wales as the host. Mr Mendoza believed that Mr Howard, rather 
than have a State government host a national summit, moved to put the 
m atter on the COAG agenda. Key informants (K. Casey and Mendoza) 
identified John Perrin, social policy advisor to the Prime Minister and his 
successor Perry Spurling, as well as the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff 
Arthur Sinodinos, as crucial in securing the Prime Minister's support.
As had occurred in the opening of the two previous policy 
windows there were events in the community that attracted 
considerable public and media attention and mandated a response from 
government. The most prominent were two Australians with mental 
illness, Cornelia Rau and Vivian Solon, detained in the immigration 
detention system (and in the case of Ms Solon unlawfully removed to 
the Philippines). The experiences of these two women highlighted 
systematic failures of the health and immigration detention systems and 
failings in inter-departmental coordination and cooperation (see 
Appendix 2) (McMillan 2005, Palmer 2005, Senate Foreign Affairs 
Defence and Trade References Committee 2005, Freckelton 2005, 
Griffiths 2006, McSherry 2005). The adverse publicity following 
revelations that the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and
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Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) had mistakenly detained these women and 
had ostensibly denied them adequate medical care was not able to be 
contained, coming as it did on the back of already considerable public 
disquiet about the treatm ent of non-Australian asylum seekers in the 
detention centres.
One of Australia's most senior political commentators, Michelle 
Grattan, noted that the case of Cornelia Rau resonated in the 
community for revealing that a mentally ill Australian could become lost 
in our detention system, and that the government was unable to lim it 
the debate once sparked (Prince 2005). Several key informants (K. 
Casey, Mendoza, Hickie, Smyth) identified the Cornelia Rau and Vivian 
Solon cases as influential in promoting Commonwealth government 
action and this is my view as well. Ian Hickie (key informant interview) 
referred to the Cornelia Rau episode as demonstrating 'the power of the 
individual case story'. Figure 5 shows the frequency of references to 
mental health over the twenty year period covered by the thesis peaked 
in 2005, with release of the Palmer Inquiry report on Cornelia Rau in 
July (Palmer 2005) and the Comrie report on Vivan Solon in September 
(McMillan 2005) cited in many of the Hansard references, along with the 
MHCA and HREOC Not for Service report released in October 2005.
During this period, personal experiences of mental illness in the 
political community also gained prominence in the media (Barns 2006). 
In 1997 Federal ALP Senator Nick Sherry attempted suicide (Ewing 
1997). In 2000, Labor MP Greg Wilton completed suicide (Mitchell 
2000b). In 2003, the leader of the Australian Democrats Senator 
Andrew Bartlett was involved in an alcohol-induced altercation, which 
the media associated with substance abuse (Brown 2003). In 2005, 
former NSW Liberal leader John Brogden attempted suicide (Seccombe 
2005). In 2006, all of these cases and mental health more generally 
received renewed attention in the media when Western Australian 
Premier Geoff Gallop resigned due to depression (Barns 2006). I t  was 
within this climate that the pressure for mental health reforms was 
growing. From a political perspective, this pressure was arguably more
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difficult to ignore when individual members of Parliament were seen to 
be affected and were willing to acknowledge it.
The linking of the Kingdon's three streams occurred with adoption 
of the COAG National Action Plan on Mental Health. From the problem 
stream prominent advocates described the mental health system as 
being in crisis (notwithstanding the evidence that the availability and 
distribution of services for people with mental illness had progressively 
increased). Better resourced, organised and articulate advocates 
(including the Mental Health Council of Australia (MHCA) reports, Out o f 
Hospital, Out o f Mind in 2003 and Not for Service: Experiences o f 
In justice and Despair in Mental Health Care in Australia in 2005) 
described human rights abuses, a lack of services for patients 
(especially those with severe mental illness), a lack of coordination 
between clinical, housing and community support services and problems 
with the deployment of limited financial and human resources.
Policy solutions in areas of Commonwealth responsibility, 
especially health and social services for people with mental illness and 
psychiatric disability, were identified by advocates and in the MHCA 
reports. From a Commonwealth political perspective there was also a 
need to respond to the policy recommendations from a Senate Select 
Committee on Mental Health (an interim report from which was released 
in March 2006 and a final report in April 2006). Also from a political 
perspective there were external events, specifically two Australians with 
mental illness, Cornelia Rau and Vivian Solon, detained in the 
immigration detention system that helped galvanise the government to 
support mental health reform and several high profile Australians 
experience mental health problems, including suicide.
Prime Minister Howard and New South Wales Premier lemma both 
agreed to place mental health reform on the COAG agenda where 
intersectoral policy areas such as health, housing, community services, 
and employment could be addressed simultaneously, along with those 
areas already being subjected to reform such as the police, justice and 
the immigration system. These two individuals were identified as
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performing roles most closely aligned with that of 'issue entrepreneurs' 
within government. Each was in a position to elevate mental health 
policy to COAG for consideration and Howard's decision (encouraged by 
key staff in his office) to support mental health reform was, of course, 
critical for Commonwealth government engagement.
At the 10 February 2006 COAG meeting it was argued that 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments needed to put funding 
into the mental health sector and a new multi-sector action plan 
covering the health, welfare and related sectors was required. The 
communique (COAG 2006a) from that meeting stated:
Additional resources will be required from  all governm ents to 
address the issues. COAG has asked Senior Officials to prepare an 
action plan ... no la ter than June 2006.
On 5 April 2006 the Commonwealth government announced a 
$1.9 billion package over five years as its contribution to the COAG 
national action plan and the funding was provided in the 2006-2007 
Commonwealth Budget on 9 May 2006 (Australian Government 2006). 
Christopher Pyne commented (Parliament of Australia 2006):
I t  is not a trad itiona l area of responsib ility of the Com m onwealth; 
it is a responsibility of the States. A fte r a great deal of debate and 
discussion in th is country over the last few years, it has become 
quite obvious tha t the States have not stepped up to the plate, no 
m a tte r how much political pressure has been applied to them . As 
a consequence, the Prime M inister decided tha t he would step 
forward and put $1.9 billion of Commonwealth spending on the 
table and ask the States to match tha t spending. The area of 
spending tha t the Commonwealth will be responsible fo r is more 
prim ary health and clinical services and some of th ings tha t we 
trad itiona lly  fund through Medicare. The States are responsible fo r 
acute hospital beds, prisons, crisis services and emergency 
services—the areas tha t they have been trad itiona lly  responsible 
for. This package does not delve into th e ir areas, but it tries to do 
the Com m onwealth 's part o f mental health well and then calls on 
the States to do the ir part of mental health well. We are not going 
to take over the ir areas of responsib ility but nor are we going to 
let them  o ff the hook by sim ply funding, through shared 
agreem ents, areas tha t we know they should be doing. We are 
going to do our areas well and expect the States to do th e ir areas 
well, which would be a nice change.
John Mendoza (key informant interview) believed the decision of 
the Prime Minister to announce the Commonwealth reform package on 5
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April 2006, well before the COAG meeting on 14 July 2006 'jumped the 
gun on the States' to apply political pressure on State and Territory 
governments to make a financial contribution and also to 'pre-em pt the 
Senate report' (the final report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Mental Health, chaired by the Australian Democrats (Senate Select 
Committee on Mental Health 2006b) released on 28 April 2006. Mendoza 
also commented that the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(PM&C) and the Prime Minister's office (PMO), as well as being 
'frustrated with the slow progress and lack of money on the table from 
the States and Territories were also frustrated with the progress by the 
Department of Health and Ageing (DOHA) ... the Commonwealth 
contribution to the mental health reform package was developed within 
PM&C and PMO. Howard played a hands-on role in some aspects 
particularly the 'Personnel Helpers and Mentors Program’ and splitting 
the responsibility between FaCSIA (the Department of Families and 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs) and DOHA.
At its meeting on 14 July 2006, COAG agreed on a National Action 
Plan on Mental Health 2006-2011 (COAG 2006b), a five year, $4.1 
billion government plan which covered the health and welfare sectors 
(COAG 2006b).
While the problems being addressed by the 2006 COAG National 
Action Plan on Mental Health covered a number of areas including 
improving access for people with common less severe mental disorders, 
it gave particular attention to the need to improve services to those with 
the highest need; specifically those individuals with severe and 
persistent mental illness. The highlighted failures for these individuals 
were not jus t in the health system but also in the disability support and 
housing sectors. This was essentially a return to the concerns raised in 
the initial intersectoral reform of the first plan endorsed by the then 
Commonwealth Labor government (Whiteford 1994b). The criticism of 
the first plan's 'narrow ' focus on severe mental illness, discussed in 
Chapter 7, was not evident in 2006. The language of the COAG National 
Action Plan o f Mental Health was to better address the needs of
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individuals with severe and persistent mental illness, whilst not 
abandoning the population health approach of the second plan which 
included illness prevention, health promotion and early intervention.
3. Conclusion
The opening of the policy window in 2006 was in response to 
problem areas concerning human rights of patients, deficiencies in 
services for those with severe mental illness including problems with 
access to and quality of clinical services, the supply of and coordination 
with housing and community support services; the lack of financial and 
human resources and the way in which financing was provided. 
Commonwealth, State and Territory mental health programs were 
reporting increased demand for mental health care along with evidence 
that the reform momentum achieved during the first plan had been lost. 
Policy solutions involved more than better clinical care. Non-clinical 
support services in the community and better coordination of the range 
of human services providing treatm ent and care was being demanded.
Consumers, carers and advocates had become much more active 
and vocal with greater expectations and exerted considerable external 
pressure on governments. There was a concerted lobbying campaign by 
individual advocates such as Ian Hickie, John Mendoza and Pat McGorry 
and organisations such as the MHCA, beyondblue and SANE Australia 
that had prominent and media-savvy leaders. The highly publicised 
plight of Cornelia Rau and Vivian Solon necessitated government action.
The Commonwealth government, needing to ensure it was not 
politically vulnerable in social policy and faced with an upcoming 
election, needed to respond to these escalating problems and demands 
as well as pre-empt the report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Mental Health. The Prime Minister, his staff and department took 
responsibility for the next stage of the mental health reform, supported 
by (and at times in competition with) State and Territory leaders, the 
most prominent of which was the New South Wales Premier, Morris 
lemma.
At its meeting on 14 July 2006 COAG endorsed a five year
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National Action Plan on Mental Health. However by October 2006 the 
Prime Minister was criticising the State and Territory governments for 
not allocating sufficient funding to the COAG National Action Plan 
(Abbott 2006) and the apportioning of responsibility for criticisms to 
other jurisdictions continued. On the motion of Senator Lyn Allison a 
new Senate inquiry into Australian mental health services was initiated 
on 28 March 2007 (Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs 
2008b, 1). This inquiry was launched with goal of ensuring the 
enthusiasm for the COAG reforms was translated into tangible outcomes 
(Parliament of Australia 2008, Senate Standing Committee on 
Community Affairs 2008b, 3-4). The Coalition lost the federal election on 
24 November 2007. The Rudd Labor government was sworn in on 3 
December 2007. Morris lemma was replaced as NSW Premier in 
September 2008. The final report of the Senate Committee inquiry 
Towards Recovery: Mental Health Services in Australia (Senate Standing 
Committee on Community Affairs 2008c) was tabled in Parliament on 25 
September 2008, and a fourth National Mental Health Plan 2009-2014 
was agreed by the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments in 
2009 (Department of Health and Ageing 2009). The government issued 
a formal response to the Inquiry on 25 August 2011 (Parliament of 
Australia 2011), and an independent summative evaluation of the 2003- 
08 National Mental Health Plan later described significant progress in 
Australian mental health service reforms since the inception of the 
Strategy (Curie and Thornicroft 2008). Nonetheless, the reforms 
proposed and undertaken by the Labor Commonwealth government 
continued to be criticised by stakeholders (Rosenberg, Hickie and 
Mendoza 2009, Rosenberg, Mendoza and Russell 2012, Sweet 2009).
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CHAPTER 9 -  Explaining TWENTY YEARS OF mental health policy 
reform
Changes in mental health policy have produced cycles of reform in 
services for centuries. However, the reforms undertaken during these 
cycles, while often producing some improvements, have rarely been 
sustained. As noted in Chapter 3, attempts to develop and implement a 
policy solution to perceived problems have often been accompanied by 
either the failure to solve the problem(s) or the emergence of new 
problems. These cycles have also characterised mental health reform in 
Australia (Lipton 1983) with mental health issues moving into and out of 
the public arena and government attention. A cyclical pattern was also 
evident during the twenty year period covered by the thesis with the 
three national mental health plans and the COAG national action plan. 
However it was a pattern different to one of policy and funding neglect 
followed by bursts of government action in these areas. There was 
continuous government attention in that some reform was underway 
throughout the twenty years, but with cyclical attention to and then 
relative neglect of different components of mental health reform.
As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, most mental health policy literature 
focuses on policy content. In this thesis I examine policy content in the 
context of other evidence to ascertain why certain mental health policies 
were adopted during three successive time periods (1988-96, 1996- 
2003, 2003-08). To do this I summarise the problems in the mental 
health sector confronting governments in Australia over that period 
(Table 3), the policy solutions proposed to respond to these problems 
and the policy directions that were adopted by the Commonwealth 
government during this time (Table 4). I undertook a systematic review 
of published literature as well as a review of Parliamentary records for 
the relevant periods. This was supplemented by information from key 
informants and my observations as an expert key participant in mental 
health reform.
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Table 3: Problem areas for each key them e and tim e period
1988 -19 96 1996-2003 2003 -20 08
Hum an R ights Hum an r ig h ts  o f Poor co m m u n ity Hum an r ig h ts  o f
and C o m m u n ity people  w ith  m en ta l a ttitu d e s  to w a rd people  w ith  m en ta l
A ttitu d e s illness and abuses m en ta l illness. illness in co m m u n ity
expe rienced  in and in hosp ita l.
hosp ita l care.
Need fo r  in vo lve m e n t
S tigm a  and o f consum ers and
d isc rim in a tio n  aga in s t ca re rs in serv ice
people  w ith  m en ta l d e live ry  to  decrease
illness liv ing  in the d isc rim in a tio n  and
co m m u n ity . im p rove  a ttitu d e s .
C om m un ity H igh burden  o f care Im p ro ve d  focus on P rio rity  to  be g iven  to
Need on fa m ilie s  and com m on m en ta l people  w ith  severe
carers. d iso rde rs . m en ta l illness.
Focus needed on Econom ic and social
su ic ide  p re ven tion . needs o f consum ers.
Service S epara tion  o f m en ta l Need fo r  focus on Lack o f access to
S tru c tu re hea lth  fro m  genera l m en ta l hea lth m en ta l hea lth  and
hea lth  serv ices. p ro m o tion  and 
illness p re ven tion .
social services.
Poor c o n tin u ity  o f Need to  b e tte r
care be tw een Need to  im p rove co o rd in a te  serv ices
in p a tie n t and p rim a ry  care across sectors.
c o m m u n ity  c lin ica l serv ices fo r  people
services. w ith  m en ta l illness.
Poor in te rsec to ra l 
linkages be tw een 
c lin ica l and o th e r 
social services.
Serv ice  Q u a lity No na tiona l s tanda rds Lack o f s tanda rds  fo r Need to  m easure
and fo r  m en ta l hea lth th e  c lin ica l se rv ice  q u a lity .
E ffectiveness services. w ork fo rce .
Need to  m easure
Lack o f in fo rm a tio n Lack o f m easures serv ice  ou tcom es.
on serv ice w hich  m o n ito r
e ffec tiveness . p a tie n t ou tcom es.
Resources In ad eq u a te  financ ia l Lack o f resources fo r In s u ffic ie n t resources
and hum an p rim a ry  m en ta l fo r  all m en ta l hea lth
resources. hea lth  care. services.
Cost s h iftin g  be tw een Problem s in financ ing
g ove rn m e n ts . o f services.
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1988 -19 96 _______
National Mental Health 
Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities 
(March 1991) and 
National Mental Health 
Plan required nationally 
consistent
sta te/territory mental 
health legislation.
Establishment of a 
national mental health 




requirement that each 
state and territory have 
a sim ilar body.
1996-2003
National Standards 
for Mental Health 
Services (January 








replaced by the 
Mental Health 





_____ 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 8 ____
Renewed focus on 
human rights of people 
with mental illness in 
community and in 
hospital.
Need for involvement of 
consumers and carers 




programs and agencies 
to promote public 





package in the 1991 
Commonwealth Budget 
included psychiatric 
disability for first time 
but the burden of care 
on families and carers 
remained largely a 
state responsibility.
In 1996 mental health 
made one of the five 








studies to establish 
community 
prevalence and 




Strategy (1995 -  
1999) expanded to 
all age groups in 
National Action Plan 
for Suicide 
Prevention in 1999.
Priority again being 
given to people with 
severe mental illness.
Economic and social 
needs of consumers 
beyond clinical care 
recognised in the 
Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) 
National Action Plan on 
Mental Health.
Emotional and Social 
Wellbeing
(Indigenous Mental 




National Mental Health 
Policy (April 1992) and 
National Mental Health 
Plan required 
mainstreaming of 
mental health services 
with general health 




Mental Health Plan 
(1998-2003) 
endorsed 30 July 
1998 and mental 
health included in 
the 1998 -  2003 
Australian Health 
Care Agreements.
COAG National Action 
Plan on Mental Health 
(2006-2011) agreed in 
July 2006 which 
covered the health and 
welfare sectors 
including improved 
access to primary 
mental health care and 
internet based
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services and improved 
linkages between 




Prevention and Early 
Intervention Action 
Plan launched in 
2000 .
therapies and a 
renewed focus to better 
coordinate clinical and 
social services for 










indicators of service 
effectiveness.





mental health care 
reform launched 
June 1999 with 
attention to broader 
private sector mental
health reform.______
Agreement that all 
mental health 
services accredited 
against the National 
Service Standards 
incorporated in the 




Standards for mental 
health clinicians 
developed in 2002.
Expanded focus on 
consumer outcomes 
with National Outcomes 
and Casemix Collection 
established in 2003 and 
introduced across all 
public mental health 
services in 2003/04.
Expansion of initiatives 
to improve quality and 
quantity of mental 
health workforce.
National agreement 
to collection of key 
information on cost, 
quality and outcomes 
of mental health 
services in 1999.
Resources $135 million over 5 Funding for mental In April 2006 the
years in 1993 and health included in Commonwealth
$169 million over 4 1997 Commonwealth announced $1.9 billion
years in the 1994 budget for Second over five years as its
Commonwealth National Mental contribution to the
budgets with most of Health Plan COAG national action
the funding provided to (delivered in the plan with this funding
the States and 1998 - 2003 provided in the May
Territories through Australian Health 2006 Commonwealth
Schedule F of the Care Agreements budget.
Medicare Agreements. (Schedule G)) with 
additional funding for Increased resources for
general practitioners primary mental health
in the 2001 reform in 2005
Commonwealth Commonwealth budget.
Budget.




The problems which emerged in the decades leading up to the 
adoption of the National Mental Health Policy in 1992 were a legacy of 
th irty  years of de-institutionalisation w ithout a corresponding 
establishment of adequate clinical, housing and support services for 
individuals with severe mental illness living in the community. When 
services, either in the hospital or community were accessed, quality 
treatm ent was not routine and some treatments constituted human 
rights abuse.
Policy solutions such as anti-stigma campaigns, legislating to 
protect patient rights, expanding community mental health services and 
integrating them with hospital services, improving the quality and 
quantity of the mental health workforce and expanding housing and 
support services for people with mental illness living in the community 
were strongly advocated. These solutions shared both technical and 
philosophical consistencies. Other policy solutions (e.g. re­
institutionalisation), were not considered as they were inconsistent with, 
or even in conflict with, the more strongly supported policy directions 
(e.g. promoting human rights and the delivery of care in the least 
restrictive mode).
While the problems were predominately those of the State and 
Territory governments, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the 
Commonwealth government quantified the cost of mental illness to its 
budget. The cost was found to be more than all State and Territory 
spending combined and exposed illogical policy settings, for example the 
Commonwealth spending more on income security for people with 
mental illness than the States and Territories on treatm ent services but 
excluding this group from access to Commonwealth programs designed 
to decrease dependence on welfare and assist people to return to the 
workforce. These issues along with concerns about unregulated cost- 
shifting from the State and Territory governments to the Commonwealth 
helped convince the Commonwealth that mental health was not only a 
State and Territory responsibility and it needed a policy framework for 
this area.
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At a political level there was a reformist government Minister, 
Brian Howe, the political imperative to respond to criticism from the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission and a period of 
social policy reform with reform of Commonwealth/State programs an 
emerging political priority for the Commonwealth government. These 
factors created an environment and a need to pursue mental health 
reform, leading to the opening of the 1992 policy window with the 
adoption of a National Mental Health Policy and the first National Mental 
Health Plan. This window was the most important as once the first five 
year plan started, a pattern was established where governments were 
required to consider whether they would maintain, revise or abandon 
mental health reform at the conclusion of each plan.
The problems that led to the opening of the policy window in 1998 
started, not because of a failure to implement the policy directions of 
the first National Mental Health Plan, but with a stakeholder backlash 
against the focus of the first plan on severe mental illness. I t  was 
argued that State and Territory services used an arbitrary definition of 
severe mental illness, essentially psychosis, to ration services in an 
inequitable way, excluding most other mental disorders. This was seen 
to abandon prospects for prevention and early intervention. 
Epidemiological research being undertaken at this time demonstrated 
that common mental disorders such as anxiety, depression and 
substance abuse and not low prevalence disorders such as psychosis 
caused most of the population burden attributable to mental disorders, 
usually went untreated, and treatm ent that was available was mostly 
provided in general practice, an area of Commonwealth policy 
responsibility.
Policy solutions such as community education campaigns, 
increasing treatm ent of common mental disorders, enhancing the 
capacity of primary care, or general practice to identify and treat these 
disorders and the introduction of more mental health promotion, illness 
and suicide prevention and early intervention programs were strongly 
advocated. Again there was a technical and philosophical consistencies
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shared by these solutions. Other policy solutions (e.g. those related to 
severe mental illness promoted in the first National Mental Health Plan), 
were inconsistent with the advocacy to shift the policy focus to a 
population (those with common mental disorders) neglected in the first 
Plan and to 'brand' the Second Mental Health Plan to align it with the 
politics stream of the new government.
Also again there was a government Minister, Michael Wooldridge 
who, for technical and personal reasons, promoted the view that the 
Commonwealth government should remain involved in mental health 
reform and made the case to his colleagues. Concurrently there was a 
political imperative to respond to the perception that individuals 
responsible for mass shootings, as had occurred at Port Arthur, would 
fall within the responsibility of mental health services as well as these 
tragedies needing other policy responses such as gun control. Dr 
Wooldridge was able to develop a policy direction within mental health 
that encompassed a broader population health focus and emphasised 
the role of primary care, was supported by stakeholder advocacy and 
scientific evidence and also allowed the Liberal-National Coalition 
government of the day an approach that distinguished it from that of the 
previous Labor government.
The problems that led to the opening of the policy window in 2006 
arose, again not primarily because of inaction in implementing the policy 
directions of the second plan, but because the service reforms started 
under the first plan had waned. The rights of patients, deficiencies in 
health, housing and community services for those with severe mental 
illness, the lack of financial and human resources and the way in which 
financing was provided again became prominent concerns of advocates.
Stakeholders and advocates were becoming more organised and 
vocal, with increased expectations around better access, quantity and 
quality of services. Policy solutions focussed on consumer (patient) 
rights, stigma reduction, increased access to services (including non- 
clinical support services), an improvement in the quality of care and the
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outcomes achieved by services which needed more human and financial 
resources. The State and Territory governments were arguing for more 
Commonwealth support with COAG increasingly being used as a vehicle 
for progressing intergovernmental relations. The range of policy 
solutions in the COAG plan incorporated health related solutions similar 
to those advocated in the first Plan (i.e. those related to severe mental 
illness) and those advocated in the second Plan (i.e. those related to 
common mental disorders) as well as reforms in non-health social 
sectors. This provided a political result seen to provide solutions meeting 
the expectations of the main advocacy groups which had emerged over 
the preceding twenty years.
These pressures on government for action over and above the 
Third National Mental Health Plan (which was seen to be 'more of the 
same') were added to by the highly publicised cases of Cornelia Rau and 
Vivian Solon and an imminent report from a Senate Select Committee 
on Mental Health. With an upcoming election where the Coalition was 
perceived to be vulnerable in social policy areas these factors united for 
the opening of the 2006 policy window. The Commonwealth Coalition 
government and the New South Wales Labor government took mental 
health to COAG and a whole of government COAG National Mental 
Health Action Plan was adopted.
1. Dynamics in m ental health reform
The literature refers to mental health reform as cyclical and, as 
noted earlier, there was a cyclical pattern evident during the twenty 
year period covered by the thesis but it was of attention to and then 
relative neglect of different components of mental health reform. The 
problems that led to the opening of the policy window in 1992 waned as 
a policy focus in 1998 but re-emerged as a focus in 2006. However with 
consecutive national mental health plans operating, reform driven by 
Commonwealth funding never ceased, and the results of this reform 
have been described in the regular National Mental Health reports 
(Department of Health and Ageing 2010). While there was no time when 
reform ceased several key informants emphasised that the plans
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produced varying degrees of success. A full assessment of policy 
implementation is outside the scope of this thesis.
The opening of the firs t policy window differed from the next two 
windows because there was no national mental health reform process to 
which the Commonwealth was politically or financially committed at the 
time of the adoption of the National Mental Health Policy and first plan. 
Powerful social, economic and political factors coalesced to open this 
window: escalating clinical and social problems for patients in the 
aftermath of psychiatric de-institutionalisation, the high profile public 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC) inquiry 
underway, recognition of the high cost of mental illness to the 
Commonwealth budget, unregulated cost-shifting from the State and 
Territory governments to the Commonwealth government, a socially 
reform ist government Minister with a personal interest and a 
government agenda promoting cross portfolio social policy reform to 
which mental health was particularly suited.
Subsequent policy windows were essentially a revision of the 
policy directions within the broad mental health framework of the 
National Mental Health Policy. Once signed up to the first National 
Mental Health Plan, the Commonwealth government was required to 
consider its position on involvement in national reform at the conclusion 
of each five year national mental health plan. The need for the 
consideration of its position necessitated the issue of mental health 
being placed on the Commonwealth political agenda. The establishment 
of the National Mental Health Strategy created community and 
professional expectations of an improvement in mental health services 
and provided a national agenda around which advocates could rally, 
building momentum and expectations for ongoing reform.
Another difference in the opening of each of the policy windows 
related to the role of advocates. In the lead up to the first window in 
1992 there was limited external advocacy, with the RANZCP and ANAMH 
almost alone in applying pressure to the Commonwealth government, 
although this changed when the HREOC inquiry started in 1991. All of
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the development of the National Mental Health Policy and first plan was 
done by government bureaucrats. By the time of the i998  policy 
window stakeholders and advocates, including NGOs, were more 
influential and their representatives were involved in the development of 
the second plan. In the lead up to the 2006 policy window there was an 
organised, concerted lobbying campaign by individual advocates and 
organisations with high profile leaders, the like of which had never 
previously been seen in Australia, though it was a harbinger to things to 
come. Thus it can be seen that a loose epistemic group of specialists did 
emerge over the twenty years.
As well as differences in the policy windows, there were factors 
common to the opening of each window. On each occasion there 
emerged from within the plethora of mental health issues confronting 
government, a set of defined problems and proposed policy solutions 
around which enough stakeholders and advocates rallied to allow 
government to perceive a consensus and be confident of enough 
stakeholder support. On each occasion there was also a highly publicised 
mental health issue that had dominated the media, which drove the 
public debate. In 1992 it was the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission (HREOC) inquiry, in 1998 the Port Arthur shootings and in 
2006 the Cornelia Rau and Vivian Solon cases, the most prominent 
amongst a plethora of examples. These greatly raised the political 
stakes for the government of the day, demanding a policy response. On 
each occasion, taking action in mental health reform suited the political 
agenda of the Commonwealth government at each particular time with 
the government able to adopt a policy direction that was consistent with 
and advanced its political aspirations.
Im portantly, also on each occasion there was a Commonwealth 
politician in an influential position who took an interest in the area, 
essentially fulfilling the role of an 'issue entrepreneur' within 
government, ensuring the political stream responded to policy demands. 
Although the reasons these politicians promoted mental health differed, 
the policy window would not have opened had it not been for their
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actions. This was demonstrated following the election of the Rudd Labor 
government in November 2007. This new government was under 
considerable pressure to continue mental health reform. Senate reports 
in 2008 and 2010 recommended action (Senate Standing Committee on 
Community Affairs 2008a, 2008c) and prominent Australians including 
psychiatrist Pat McGorry, Australian of the Year in 2010, advocated 
strongly for mental health. Despite positive government rhetoric at both 
the Australia 2020 summit in 2008 and the COAG meeting in April 2010 
(Crosbie 2009, McGorry 2010) no major policy announcements and no 
significant commitments were made in the 2009 and 2010 budgets. 
Health Minister Nicola Roxon indicated the Government intended mental 
health reform would occur at an unspecified date in the future (Smith 
2010) and it became clear to stakeholders that no political action was 
intended.
This led to a backlash against the Labor government with the 
highly public resignation of the Chair of the Commonwealth 
government's National Advisory Commission on Mental Health John 
Mendoza on the 18 June 2010. Mendoza identified a lack of political will 
for mental health reform by the Rudd government as main reason for 
his resignation (Mendoza, key informant interview; Yfe and Star 2010). 
This was accompanied by widespread lobbying by individuals and 
advocacy groups, including a public advocacy campaign by GetUp!, 
which eventually led to the new Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, to respond 
with the appointment of a Commonwealth Minister for Mental Health 
(Mark Butler) in September 2010 and a $2.2 billion investment in 
mental health over 5 years announced in the budget on May 10, 2011 
(Australian Government 2011). Mental health was clearly a more 
prominent public issue than it had been before 1992 and advocates were 
much more organised and influential.
Prior to 1992 there were a series of policy cycles where mental 
health was briefly an issue to which the Commonwealth government 
paid attention. However these short periods were followed by extended 
periods of relative political neglect (Upton 1983). This changed after
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1992, superseded by the need to have a permanent political and 
bureaucratic capacity within the Commonwealth government to respond 
to mental health as a policy issue. The cycles after 1992 were therefore 
about a change in an existing Commonwealth mental health policy 
direction rather than bringing a new mental health policy into existence.
2. Strengths and weakness of the Kingdon model applied to
m ental health and other health policy areas
I chose Kingdon's model which provides a framework for 
understanding most of the policy process examined in this thesis. 
Because the model was used to organise the information collected, any 
attempt to validate the model using this data would be tautological and 
therefore redundant as it could not independently establish the 
predicative validity of the model. Sabatier has criticised Kingdon's model 
as lacking testability (Sabatier 1999). However it is possible to identify 
areas where the data collected for the thesis seemed to fit the model 
and areas where it did not.
It was not difficult to find, for each policy window, clear problems, 
policy solutions and a political context within which the opening of the 
window occurred. This political stream was, on all three occasions, 
independent of the problem and policy streams. However these two 
streams were not independent. In most cases, the individuals who had 
identified the problems were also promoting policy solutions to those 
problems. These individuals were often technical experts in the field of 
mental health, had a strong sense of professional identity and a 
professional stake in solutions to policy problems affecting the mental 
health sector. This lack of independence is consistent with other 
critiques of the Kingdon model as noted in Chapter 2; that the three 
streams of problems, policy and politics display varying degrees of 
interdependence. Stream independence should be viewed as a 
conceptual device to help examine the various elements in the streams 
to uncover rationality, rather than an absolute condition.
While categorising data into problem and policy solutions was
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straightforward, Kingdon's model did help explain some of the changes 
and reasons why these became elevated in the hierarchy of policy 
attention. It was clear, as Kingdon described, that information or 
indicators demonstrating service deficiencies are not automatically 
accepted as evidence of a problem needing policy attention (Kingdon 
[1995] 2003, 91). For example the problems highlighted by the HREOC 
inquiry in 1992 had been present for generations. It did help for the 
problems to be 'countable' (Kingdon [1995] 2003, 93), for example the 
Commonwealth expenditure on people with mental illness identified by 
the Eisen-Wolfenden report. However as Kingdon noted the problems 
did not come to political attention because there were indicators to 
describe them.
Kingdon ([1995] 2003, 109) notes that translating conditions into 
problems often involves a process of categorisation. People see a 
problem quite differently if it is put into one category rather than 
another. Again this was found in the data collected. For example the 
HREOC report emphasised the human rights of people with mental 
illness and psychiatric disability, moving them from a category where 
they were seen as less deserving and even a potential danger to 
community safety, into a category where they were seen as individuals 
deprived of basic human rights.
Kingdon points out that conditions become defined as problems 
when it is believed that something needs to be done about them. 
Something needing to be done is also often a result of a change in the 
national perception or mood in relation to the problem. Kingdon's 
conceptualisation of the national mood has been singled out as being 
rather indeterminate and he acknowledges that his model is unable to 
account for how policy makers gauge or perceive national mood ([1995] 
2003, 152-72).This inability to operationalise a concept of national mood 
was identified by Soroka (1999) as another limitation to the testability 
of the Kingdon model.
The change in perception or mood by the public often requires a 
focusing event or crisis or to be connected to a powerful symbol. In
210
mental health, both conditions occurred. As described in Chapter 6, 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, there was a progressive change in perception 
by the public about mental health. It became less stigmatised and 
people with mental illness and their families experienced less shame and 
were more vocal in advocating for better services. Mental health 
problems became something that could happen to anyone, not just 
someone else. There were also focussing events evident in the opening 
of the mental health policy windows, for example the Port Arthur 
shootings and the cases of Cornelia Rau and Vivian Solon.
The Kingdon model has also been found useful in understanding 
other areas of health policy. It was applied to a case study of cannabis 
law reform in Western Australia (Lenton 2004) where the problem of 
cannabis use and the policy solution of decriminalisation were being 
debated in public. The Labor Opposition differentiated themselves from 
the incumbent Coalition government by committing to a policy of 
decriminalisation. After winning the election a policy window was 
opened, a Community Drug Summit held which considered legislative 
options for cannabis use and a public mandate to pursue politically 
contentious policies.
It was also applied to a case study of reforms to manage recidivist 
drink driving in Western Australia (Lenton 2008). Media coverage of 
serious drink driving accidents and statements from a respected 
magistrate identified the need for policy attention to this area by 
government. Researchers, using the results of studies, proposed a 
refocus of policy responses away from increasing penalties to more 
evidence based alternatives (e.g. alcohol interlock devices, assessment 
for alcohol problems) which received wide media coverage and were 
subsequently supported by the government.
Lenton (2007) uses Kingdon's model to explain how drug and 
alcohol research forms only one small component of the range of factors 
influencing policy making, policy implementation and legislative change. 
He describes the Kingdon framework as the 'closest fit' model given his 
experiences in drug and alcohol policy reform, commenting that:
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Feeding the research findings and recommended policy response 
d irectly to the politician drafting the ir drugs policy was a tangib le  
example of bringing toge ther the problem , policy and political 
streams.
Schmied-Blackman (2005) examined and critiqued the agenda­
setting model proposed by Kingdon with respect to the issue of tobacco 
control in the State of California. The problem of tobacco's damage on 
health had gradually permeated the public understanding but the policy 
solution of applying excise tax was not considered politically viable. The 
public was increasingly informed about the practices of the tobacco 
industry, culminating in the revelation that seven American tobacco 
companies' CEOs lied to the US Congress about the addictive properties 
of nicotine. This weakened the industry's standing in lobbying against 
tobacco control measures allowing the passage of Proposition 99 (to 
apply excise tax to tobacco products).
As discussed in Chapter 3, Zwi and colleagues (2011) found that 
mental health policy change in the Solomon Islands was driven by 
multiple factors including: socio-cultural issues; bureaucratic motivation; 
research and evidence; external factors including international aid; and 
political, security and economic concerns. Hamid and Everett (2007) 
used the Kingdon model to describe the development of Iraq's mental 
health policy.
The Kingdon model has lim itations and establishes a 
preconfigured cyclical dynamic. I t  does not predict when a policy window 
might open. However it does however provide a framework for 
identifying and explaining the factors which are most important in the 
policy window opening.
3. Future Directions
Throughout the period covered by this thesis, and since 2008, the 
cycles of mental health reform in Australia have led to progressive 
improvement in mental health services with no clear period of 
'stagnation and decline' to borrow the terms used by Rochefort (1998) 
but with periods of neglect of parts of the reform agenda. The public and 
professionals did not tolerate this neglect. Public information and
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knowledge about mental health (often referred to as 'mental health 
literacy') has improved (Reavley and Jorm 2012) and the number of 
inquiries and reports produced over time suggests the issue of mental 
health service quality has indeed penetrated various levels of the 
Australian policy agenda (Rosen 2008). The policy debates amongst 
stakeholders, advocates and government have become more public and 
at times more vitriolic (Colvin 2010, O'Brien 2010, Rattan 2012, 
Rosenberg 2012). These directions are likely to continue.
Important challenges remain to be tackled. While there are 
fluctuations, reversals and changes in nearly all areas of government 
policy, Rochefort (1998) argued that there is a particular instability in 
mental health policy. He identified changes in the understanding of 
mental illness over time, exaggerations in mental health ideologies and 
rhetoric, the incomplete development of psychiatry as a scientific 
discipline, a mismatch between the goals of mental health policy and the 
means by which these goals can be achieved, the impact of professional 
organisations and changes in public opinion with evolving social changes 
as factors contributing to an unstable policy process. These along with 
others such as the political mood of the time can all be identified as 
contributing to the policy fluctuations in Australia and action to address 
these technical and professional issues should help introduce more 
stability and consistency in mental health policy.
In addition to the technical problems, tackling mental health 
policy and services for people with mental illness creates for policy 
makers problems of the intractable or 'wicked' variety (Hannigan and 
Coffey 2011); that is, issues that are highly resistant to resolution, 
socially complex, difficult to define and multi-causal involving the 
responsibility of several different service sectors (Rittel and Weber 
1973). As noted above the problems that mental health policies are 
trying to solve are complex and resistant and problem formulations and 
their solutions are contestable. In addition policy actions taken can have 
widespread system consequences and solutions that have been 
successful for one part of the problem can create difficulties in other
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areas. The evidence available to guide the development of solutions is 
inadequate, open to challenge and a priority for policy and services 
researchers.
One key informant who worked in government told me that the 
opening of a policy window required 'a lot of luck ... tim ing was on our 
side'. This is a common view with the perception that the development 
and adoption of public policy is an unpredictable, even irrational, 
process. However from this thesis and the work of other authors, the 
cyclical nature of mental health reform can be understood to a degree 
but is changing. While mental health still moves up and down the 
Commonwealth policy agenda it has not, since 1992, moved off the 
Commonwealth policy agenda. The cyclical nature is now about a 
movement between policy directions and emphasis not whether there 
will be a mental health policy at all.
The policy space in mental health is now much more contested 
with multiple agendas competing for government attention. For there to 
be ongoing improvement in the mental health of the population and in 
the treatm ent and care of people with mental illness there needs to be 
clear identification of the problems causing the greatest impact, 
evidence-based policy solutions and an understanding of how these 
solutions can come to be adopted by government. For example the 
analysis undertaken of the three policy windows suggests that policy 
decisions focused on finite number of problems achieved better 
outcomes than when the policy and its implementation plan attempted 
to appease as many stakeholders as possible and implement overly 
ambitious reforms. The policy and political challenge will be how to 
contain the advocates from one part of the stakeholder community (for 
example those advocating for the treatm ent and care of people with 
severe mental illness or those advocating for prevention and early 
intervention) while focussing on a finite number of problems and 
resisting the temptation to overpromise and try and accommodate all 
agendas.
As has been noted the opening of each of the three policy
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windows was associated with a public crisis, often a story or stories of 
personal tragedy. AN health services have failures and personal 
tragedies. Mental health m ight well have more than its share due to its 
legacy of stigma and marginalisation. However addressing the issues 
raised by authors such as Rochefort and Hannigan above, especially now 
that mental health is a constant on the Commonwealth health agenda, is 
to promote policy solutions w ithout having to rely disproportionately on 
a personal tragedy or presenting the system as being in crisis and its 
services as failing? While a 'crisis' might obligate governments to do 
something, albeit reluctantly, it can devalue achievements of previous 
reform, damage the morale of those working in services, worsen public 
and political scepticism about mental health and impact adversely on the 
recruitment and retention of staff.
There continue to be service failures and tragedies in mental 
health and these should and do get aired. However as the mental health 
advocacy community becomes more sophisticated, and the stigma and 
discrimination that surrounds mental illness lessens, the sector should 
be able to emphasise its successes, identify the deficiencies and 
highlight the benefits that will accrue to consumers and their families 
from innovative solutions. Governments like to be associated with 
success, not only the hope of success and not always the compulsion to 
intervene in a crisis. Mental health policy cycles will continue but need to 
progressively mature, avoid destructive competition for prominence of 
policy ideas and ensure engagement of those for whom mental health 
services exist (Rosen 2008).
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APPENDIX 1 - NATIONAL RESPONSE TO POLICE SHOOTINGS OF 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
In November 1995, a police officer in the Australian Capital Territory 
fatally shot a man with schizophrenia. In response to this event, the 
Australian Psychiatric Disability Coalition called on the Commonwealth 
government to initiate a Royal Commission to investigate the treatment 
of people with mental illness by police and by crisis intervention 
services. Other prominent individuals and organisations, including the 
Human Rights Commissioner Chris Sidoti, the Australian Council for Civil 
Liberties, ANAMH and the Australian Council for Social Services, also 
declared their support for a Royal Commission.
The then Commonwealth Minister for Health, Dr Carmen 
Lawrence, decided not to establish a Royal Commission but on 23 
November 1995 wrote to all State and Territory health ministers and to 
the Commonwealth Minister for Justice proposing the establishment of a 
taskforce comprising police and health ministers to examine the 
treatment of mentally ill people by police and crisis teams at the 
national level and to identify best practice.
Responses to the Minister's proposal varied significantly between 
jurisdictions (Mental Health Crisis Intervention Ad Hoc Advisory Group 
1998). Queensland, the Australian Capital Territory and New South 
Wales were in support of the proposal. The Northern Territory declined 
to participate but expressed an interest in learning the outcomes of the 
proposed taskforce meeting. Victoria proposed an alternative approach - 
the establishment of a meeting of experts to share information and 
ideas, to consider ways in which health and police agencies could work 
together to resolve crisis situations, and to develop 'action-orientated' 
advice for consideration by police and health ministers. This proposal 
was supported by Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia.
In March 1996, the Commonwealth convened an ad hoc advisory 
group involving the health and police sectors, consumers, carers and 
mental health NGOs to examine existing crisis intervention practices and
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police training protocols, to identify good practice collaborative 
approaches and to develop recommendations for future consideration by 
health and police ministers.
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology, of the th irty - 
five people shot dead by police between 1990 and 1995 at least eleven 
had an identified mental illness. Twenty of the th irty-five  fatal shootings 
were in Victoria and of those at least seven had an identified mental 
illness. This far exceeded any other jurisdiction, despite the fact that 
Victoria provided above average funding for community mental health 
services compared with other jurisdictions (see Table 5), suggesting the 
issues involved are far more complex than simply the level of 
resourcing. Whilst adequate resources were important in the capacity of 
mental health, police and ambulance services to effectively respond to 
mental health crisis situations, the advisory group identified other 
significant contributing factors. These included: stigma and the attitudes 
and the level of mental health awareness of responding personnel; the 
inadequacy of police training in mental health issues which varies 
significantly between jurisdictions; and the lack of collaboration between 
emergency service and health personnel in crisis response (Mental 
Health Crisis Intervention Ad Hoc Advisory Group 1998)
Table 5: Deaths resulting from  gunshot inflicted by police, Australia, 1 January 
1990 to 21 November 1995
S tate 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total W M I *
V IC 2 2 2 1 9 3 19 7
N S W 1 2 1 4 2
Q LD 1 1 1 1 4 0
W A 1 1 2 0
SA 1 1 2 0
T A S 1 1 2 0
NT 1 1 1
A C T 1 1 1
A U S T 4 5 6 3 12 5 35 11
* The psychiatric history of many of the people recorded as being fatally shot is 
unknown and this column only records those whose psychiatric history is
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definitely known by the Australian Institute of Criminology. Victoria Police 
advised the ad hoc committee that during the period of the 19 people fatally 
shot by police in Victoria, 10 had a mental illness (Mental Health Crisis 
Intervention Ad Hoc Advisory Group 1998).
In May 1996 the following guiding principles and 
recommendations, amongst others, were proposed and endorsed by 
police and health ministers. The final report was published in March 
1998 (Mental Health Crisis Intervention Ad Hoc Advisory Group 1998). 
The Committee's recommendations were implemented to varying 
degrees across jurisdictions with examples below:
1. Development of national. State and Territory guidelines for crisis 
response, service agreements and protocols for police, mental 
health and ambulance services. These were first published in 
Victoria in 1995 and updated in 2010 (Victoria Department of 
Health and Victoria Police 2010), in Western Australia in 2000 
(Western Australia Police Service and Health Department of 
Western Australia 2000), in NSW in 2007 (NSW Health, 
Ambulance Service of New South Wales and New South Wales 
Police Force 2007).
2. Development of national guidelines to regulate the use of non- 
lethal weapons such as capsicum spray. Capsicum spray was first 
trialled in Queensland in 1996 under Project Lighthouse and 
evaluated in 2009 (Criminal Justice Commission and Queensland 
Police Service 1999), commenced in Victoria in January 1998 
(Office of Police Integrity Victoria 2009), and Western Australia in 
2007 (Corruption and Crime Commission 2010).
3. Improvement of training of mental health staff, police officers and 
ambulance officers including reinforcing the principle of peaceful 
resolution of mental health crisis situations as the primary 
objective.
4. Establishment of a health and police ministers' working party to 
examine the ethical and legislative issues regarding information 
sharing and confidentiality consideration related to cross-agency 
management of mental health crisis situations. This was 
established and reported in 2000 (Expert Advisory Committee on
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Information Sharing in Mental Health Crisis Situations 2000).
Victoria, the jurisdiction with the highest number of fatal 
shootings by police of people with mental illness, made the most 
concerted effort to address the issues raised in the ad hoc committee's 
report. Between 1980 and 1995, thirty-five people were fatally shot by 
police in Victoria, twice as many as all other jurisdictions combined 
(Office of Police Integrity Victoria 2005). A protocol was established 
between Victoria Police and the Victorian Department of Health to 
improve collaboration in mental health crisis intervention between the 
two agencies. Project Beacon was established in 1995 which introduced 
a planned approach to the education and training of police in crisis 
management, minimised the use of force and, in 1998, introduced 
capsicum spray as an alternative to firearms. In the ten years following 
Project Beacon there were sixteen fatal shootings, a significant per 
capita reduction. However, in the period from January 2004 to January 
2005, the number of fatal shootings by police in Victoria increased 
again, with six people fatally shot. The review found that Victoria Police 
had 'lost the strategic focus on safety and avoiding the use of force' that 
it had developed under Project Beacon, emphasising the need for 
continued focus and perseverance if a shift in an entrenched attitude 
and culture was to be achieved (Office of Police Integrity Victoria 2005).
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APPENDIX 2 - CASE STUDY: CORNELIA RAU AND VIVIAN  
ALVAREZ
Cornelia Rau is a German born permanent resident of Australia with a 
history of mental illness (Palmer 2005, 1) who in 2004 was being 
treated for schizophrenia in a psychiatric hospital in Sydney as an 
involuntary patient. Ms Rau was reported as 'm issing' to the police on 18 
March 2004 (Palmer 2005, 2). A fortn ight later, she came to the 
attention of the Cairns police in North Queensland following concerns 
raised about her behaviour by local residents. Ms Rau identified herself 
as a tourist, variously giving her name as 'Anna Schmidt' and 'Anna 
Brotmeyer' from Munich, Germany. The police were unable to verify her 
claim and Ms Rau could not produce any documentation or identify 
fam ily contacts. She was taken into police custody on 31 March 2004 
(Parliament of Australia 2005) and referred to officials from the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(DIMIA), as a suspected illegal immigrant. Due to the lack of 
immigration detention facilities in Queensland, Ms Rau was moved to the 
Brisbane Women's Correctional Centre where she was detained for six 
months and then for four months in the Baxter detention centre in 
South Australia before the error of her incarceration was discovered 
(Parliament of Australia 2005). The family of Ms Rau recognised her 
from an article published in the Sydney Morning Herald in February 2005 
(Prince 2005). Ms Rau was subsequently admitted to the Glenside 
Psychiatric Hospital in Adelaide for treatm ent (Parliament of Australia 
2005). Ms Rau's illegal detention highlighted failures in mental health 
service provisions, the Department of Im m igration and lack of 
coordination between States dealing with missing persons inquiries; 
subsequently it became the subject of a federal government inquiry 
known as the Palmer Inquiry (Palmer 2005).
Vivian Alvarez, an Australian citizen of Filipino descent, was found 
by a social worker in Lismore, New South Wales, with no place of 
residence. With obvious physical and mental health problems she was
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then hospitalised (Palmer 2005, 183). Despite Ms Alvarez claiming 
Australian citizenship, she was unable to produce the required evidence 
at that time. Imm igration officials considered her an unlawful non-citizen 
as there was no record of her entering Australia (Palmer 2005, 184). On 
the 20 July 2001, Ms Alvarez was deported to Manila (Levett et al. 
2005). The Queensland Police Service contacted DIMIA and requested 
they carry out further checks using the names Solon and Young. Her 
mother's family name is Alvarez, her father's family name is Solon, her 
former married name, was Young (Crowley-Cyr 2005).
On t20 August 2003, Channel 9 television broadcast details of Ms 
Alvarez at the end of the Without a Trace program devoted to stories 
about missing persons. Officers at the DIMIA became aware that the 
missing persons case publicised on television was that of Ms Alvarez but 
failed to act on this. Due to the persistent inquiries by Mr Young (her ex- 
husband), the matter was brought to the attention of the Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Ms Alvarez was 
located in a hospice in the Philippines after a priest recognised her from 
various news reports. On 18 November 2005 Ms Alvarez returned to 
Australia (ABC 2005). On May 2005, Peter McGauran, the Acting 
Minister for Imm igration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
referred the m atter to the Palmer Inquiry (Palmer 2005, 196-7). The 
formal inquiry was conducted by Neil Comrie and the report was known 
as the Comrie Report (McMillan 2005).
On 8 February 2005, Minister for Immigration Amanda Vanstone 
announced an official inquiry into the Cornelia Rau matter would be 
conducted by former Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick 
Palmer. She announced the Palmer Inquiry would examine (Vanstone 
2005):
Complex issues arising from the Rau case, including the 
effectiveness of Commonwealth/State cooperation in locating 
missing people and in the provision of mental health services.
The inquiry attracted some criticism. Former Victorian Premier 
and Chairman of beyondblue, Jeff Kennett maintained the inquiry should 
be public and armed with the powers of a Royal Commission. Premier of
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Queensland Peter Beattie was opposed to the limited scope of the 
Palmer Inquiry as was the Victorian Premier, Steve Bracks. Keith Wilson, 
Chairman of the Mental Health Council of Australia, asserted that the 
rules of the Rau inquiry 'invited buck-passing and cover-ups'. Barbara 
Hocking Director of SANE Australia, considered it an attem pt to 'do 
something fairly quickly to get it out of the way'. Both the German 
ambassador and Ms Rau's family expressed concern that the inquiry was 
closed to public scrutiny and had limited terms of reference (Freckelton 
2005).
Nevertheless the inquiry proceeded and focussed not only on the 
immigration detention system but also the mental health services for 
people with severe mental illness. The Prime Minister, John Howard, 
commented (Elizabeth 2005, 4):
This case raises questions not only about the im m igration 
detention system , which has attracted all the critical a tten tion , 
but it also raises some questions about the mental health policies 
tha t th is country has followed fo r a long tim e.
The Palmer Inquiry established the failure of mental health 
services to adequately care for patients in the community and poor 
intersectoral linkages with other government departments (Townsend et 
al. 2006).
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A PPEN D IX  3 - KEY INFO RM ANTS
1. Politicians and m in is teria l advisors  
Brian H ow e (interviewed 7 June 2010)
Commonwealth M inister fo r Community Services and Health, 
1990-91.
Commonwealth M inister fo r Health, Housing and Com m unity 
Services, 1991-93.
Rebecca Jam es (interviewed 25 May 2010)
Advisor to Dr Michael Wooldridge w ith responsibility fo r mental 
health, 1996-99.
Prior to this Ms James had worked in Dr Wooldridge's electoral 
office from  1993 to 1999.
Kathy Casey (interviewed 18 May and 24 May 2010)
Mental Health Advisor to Parliamentary Secretary, Christopher 
Pyne, 2004-07 .
Ms Casey worked on the Liberal Party 2004 election campaign and 
prior to tha t was the Manager fo r beyondblue, the National 
Depression In itia tive  from  2000 to 2004.
2. C om m onw ealth  and S ta te  go vernm ent officials
A ndrew  Podger (interviewed 22 October 2010)
Secretary o f the Departm ent of Health and Aged Care, 1996- 
2002 .
D erm ot Casey (interviewed 17 January 2011)
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Director, Quality and Effectiveness Section, Mental Health Branch, 
Commonwealth Departm ent o f Health and Ageing, 1994-98.
Assistant Secretary, Mental Health Branch, Commonwealth
Departm ent o f Health and Ageing, 1998-2004.
N athan Sm yth (interviewed 23 October 2010)
Assistant Secretary, Mental Health Branch, Commonwealth
Departm ent o f Health and Ageing, 2005-09.
M ary B lackw ood (interviewed 23 October 2010)
Regional Program Manager, Mental Health, Southern Tasmania, 
1991 and 1992.
State Program Coordinator fo r Mental Health, 1993-96.
State Manager fo r Mental Health fo r Tasmania, 1997-99.
David M eldrum  (interview ed 16 March 2012)
D irector o f Mental Health, South Australia, 1989-92.
B everley Raphael (interviewed 8 October 2010)
D irector o f Mental Health, New South Wales, 1996-2005.
Aaron Groves (interview ed 21 January 2011)
D irector o f Mental Health, Western Australia, 2001-05 .
D irector o f Mental Health, Queensland, 2005-12.
3. M ental health  advocates -  academ ic exp erts  and NGO 
rep resen ta tives
B everley Raphael (interviewed 8 October 2010)
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President, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Psychiatrists in 1984.
Professor of Psychiatry, University of Queensland, 1987-95.
Jeff Cheverton (interviewed 2 December 2010)
CEO, Queensland Alliance for Mental Health, September 2004-11.
Board member, Mental Health Council of Australia, November 
2005-11.
Prior to joining the Queensland Alliance, Mr Cheverton was with 
the Brisbane Youth Service and Queensland Council on Social 
Services.
Ian  Hickie (interviewed 13 September 2010)
Clinical Director at the St George Hospital Mental Health Service, 
Sydney, 1995-2000.
CEO of beyondblue, 2000-03.
Executive Director, Brain and Mind Research Centre, University of 
Sydney, since 2003.
David Meldrum (interviewed 16 March 2012)
Board Member and then CEO, Mental Illness Fellowship of 
Australia, board member from 2006, CEO from 2009.
John Mendoza (interviewed 9 December 2011)
CEO of the Mental Health Council of Australia, 2004-07.
Prior to joining the Council Mr Mendoza was with the Australian 
Sports Drugs Agency from 1996 to 2004. After leaving the Council 
Mr Mendoza was Chair of the Commonwealth government
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National Advisory Council on Mental Health.
4. Independent consultants
Shane Solomon (interviewed 11 May 2010)
Consultant for the National Health Strategy (a review of 
Australia's health system) 1990 to 1993, contributing author to 
"Help Where Help is Needed: Continuity of Care for People with 
Chronic Mental Illness.
Mr Solomon has worked as Under-Secretary of Health at the 
Victorian Department of Human Services, Group Chief Executive 
Officer of the integrated Sisters of Mercy Victorian hospital and 
aged care services and CEO of the Hong Kong Hospital Authority.
Bill Buckingham (interviewed 8 February 2011)
Consultant, Buckingham & Associates, Melbourne. Author of all 
National Mental Health Reports prepared on behalf of the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing since 1994.
Prior to 1994 Mr Buckingham was Chief Psychologist, then 
Manager, Statewide Service Planning, in the Victorian Health 
Department Division of Psychiatric Services.
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A PPEN D IX  4: SUMMARY OF P O S IT IO N S  HELD BY THE
C A N D ID IA TE  AND PU BLIC ATIO N S RELEVANT TO THE TH ESIS
Period Key in fo rm an t (fo r  
all or som e of the  
period )
R elevant positions I  
held fo r th a t period
1 9 8 8 -9 6 M Blackwood 





D irec to r o f Mental
Health
Queensland
D epa rtm en t o f Health 
(1989  to 1996)
Chair, N ational Mental 
Health W orking  Group 
(1993  to 1997)
1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 3 M Blackwood 
B Buckingham  
D Casey 




D irec to r o f Mental
Health
C om m onw ea lth  
D epa rtm en t o f Health 
and Ageing (1997  to 
1999) and Mental
Health A dv iso r from  
2001








Mental Health A dv isor 
C om m onw ealth  
D epa rtm en t o f Health 
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Policy
P eriod
P olicy  W in d o w P osition  H e ld  by  C a n d id a te
1988-96  
(Chapter 5)
1992 (adop tion  o f 
N ationa l M en ta l Hea lth  
Policy  and f irs t  p lan)
1989 -96 , D irec to r o f Mental H ealth, 
Q ueensland D e p a rtm e n t o f Health
1996-2003  
(Chapter 6)
1998 (adop tion  o f 
Second N a tiona l
M enta l H ea lth  P lan )
1997 - 1999, D irec to r o f Mental 
H ealth, C om m onw ea lth  D e p a rtm en t 
o f Health and Aged Care, Canberra 
1999 - 2000 , M ental Health
Specia lis t, W orld  Bank, W ash ington  
DC
2003 -08  
(Chapter 7)
2006 (adop tion  o f 
COAG N a tiona l M enta l 
Health  A ction  P lan )
2000 -  cu rre n t, M ental Health
Advisor, C om m onw ea lth  D e p a rtm en t 
o f Health and A ge ing , C anberra
Mv com m ittee involvem ent relevant to thesis
2006-08 Chair, Steering Committee to revise the National
Mental Health Policy
2002-03 Chair, Steering Committee to draft the National
Mental Health Plan 2003-08
2002-03 Chair, Steering Committee to evaluate the Second
National Mental Health Plan
2002 Joint Chair, Mental Health Reference Group
established by Australian Health Ministers to inform 
the 2003-08 Australian Health Care Agreements
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1993-98 Chair, A ustra lian  Health M in is te rs ' A dv isory Council 
(AHMAC) N ational Mental Health W orking  G roup to  
oversee the  im p lem en ta tion  o f the  N ational Mental 
Health Plan
1996 C hair, A ustra lian  M in iste ria l Taskforce to  estab lish  a 
N ational M ental Health Peak Body
1993-95 C hair, National M ental Health In fo rm a tio n  S tra tegy  
C om m ittee
1993-94 M ental health  rep resen ta tive , Queensland S tra teg ic  
Planning G roup fo r the  C om m onw ea lth /S ta te  
M edicare A greem ent
1992-93 Queensland rep resen ta tive , A ustra lian  Health 
M in is te rs ' A dv isory Council National W orking Group 
on Mental Health Policy
1992 M em ber, W orking G roup to  d ra ft A ustra lia 's  Mental 
Health Goals and Targe ts  fo r the  Austra lian  
G ove rnm en t
1991-92 Queensland rep resen ta tive , A ustra lian  Health
M in is te rs ' A dv isory Council, Mental Health W orking 
G roup d ra ftin g  the  N ational Mental Health Plan
1989-91 Q ueensland rep resen ta tive , A ustra lian  Health
M in is te rs ' A dv isory Council W orking Party to  develop 
a National M ental Health Policy
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A P P E N D IX  A - SEARCH STRING  FOR MEDLINE
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Advocacy OR Consumer Advocacy OR National Health Programs OR 
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APPENDIX B - SEARCH STRING FOR EMBASE
Mental Health OR Mental Disease 
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Health Care Cost OR Funding OR Health Care Policy OR Policy OR 
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A PPEN D IX  C - SEARCH STRING  FOR PSYCINFO
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OR Mental Health Services
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